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Abstract
In my thesis, I develop a framework based on John Rawls’s Political Liberal-
ism that addresses the question: how is it possible for democratic institutions
and their decisions to be legitimate, given that (i) they are supposed to be
governed by the “will of the people”, but (ii) the people will disagree with
each other about what political institutions ought to do about any given is-
sue? Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson advance a deliberative democratic
response to this question, which has served as the basis of governments’ at-
tempts to “strengthen democracy”. They argue that political decisions are
justified insofar as they are made in a process that allows citizens to exchange
reasons that are respectful and moral. Furthermore, although a binding deci-
sion must be made at some point, it should be possible to revisit any decision
after a period of time.
I argue that while respectful public discourse about political issues may
be desirable in some circumstances, this is inadequate as a basis for guiding
and evaluating political decisions, in light of the reasonable disagreement that
persists about what political institutions ought to do. Instead, I argue that
the legitimacy of political institutions, or their obligatory force over citizens,
depends on the extent to which reasonable citizens are sufficiently satisfied with
the institutions that govern them, over time. Furthermore, I argue that other
indicators besides deliberative democratic discourse may be used to assess
how well institutions are meeting the standard of political justification that I
develop.
Keywords: Rawls, political liberalism, deliberative democracy
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2Chapter 1
The problem of liberal
democracies
1.1 Introduction
A slogan that is often used to capture the meaning of democracy is that “gov-
ernment should be ruled by the will of the people”. But when they have the
freedom – as they do in modern liberal democracies – to adopt their own
conceptions of the good, and to determine how they will pursue them, indi-
viduals often hold conflicting views about contemporary political issues. As a
result, there is often widespread disagreement among the people about what
governments should do about any particular political issue.
As Jeremy Waldron so eloquently puts the point:
There are many of us, and we disagree about justice. That is, we
not only disagree about the existence of God and the meaning of
life; we disagree about what count as fair terms of co-operation
among people who disagree about the existence of God and the
meaning of life. We disagree about what we owe each other in the
way of tolerance, forbearance, respect, co-operation, and mutual
aid. Liberals disagree with conservatives; socialists disagree with
market economists; the party of freedom disagrees with the party
of community and both disagree with the party of equality; femi-
3nists disagree with those who want the government to stand up for
‘family values’; last-ditch defenders of the welfare state disagree
with triumphant opponents of taxation; and pragmatists and util-
itarians disagree with those who think the task of the law is to
vindicate the claims of order, retribution, and desert.(Waldron,
1999, 1)
The question that this disagreement gives rise to and that I will address in
this thesis is: given the extent of disagreement among citizens, how can gov-
ernments in modern liberal democracies maintain their legitimacy in the face
of such disagreement, and relatedly, how can they make justified decisions?
That is, how can governments reconcile what seem to be two essential but
competing commitments – to treat individuals with conflicting conceptions of
the good as equals, and to base their decisions on “the will of the people”?
As I will explain further below, this thesis will assume that there are demo-
cratic governments that have at least some amount of legitimacy, and make
decisions that are to some extent justified. However, it also seems as though
there will always be citizens who disagree about what the government ought to
do about particular political issues. As John Rawls (2005, 56–7) identifies in
his discussion of the “burdens of judgement,” a number of factors lead citizens
to disagree with one another about how the government should respond to
political issues. Obviously, they disagree because they hold different values.
But it is useful to understand their disagreement as being the result of their
different background beliefs, knowledge, and experiences, which inform their
views about issues. Furthermore, citizens may disagree about what evidence
should count in the issue at hand, and, for any given piece of evidence, they
may disagree about what it implies for how the issue should be resolved. Also,
they may disagree about the very meanings of the concepts that are involved.
4An example that may illustrate the burdens of judgement is the controver-
sial political issue of whether it ought to be legal to destroy human embryos,
e.g., for human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, or as a means of termi-
nating pregnancy. Not only are conflicting values the source of disagreement,
although that is of course part of it. There is also disagreement about the an-
swers to such questions as: What is an embryo (is it a person or not)? What
happens during embryonic development (at what point does the embryo have
the ability to feel)? Which facts about embryonic development are morally rel-
evant? Insofar as there is agreement about the facts of embryo development,
what normative conclusions follow from this? If one believes that embryos do
have some moral status, how should that be weighed against the good that
may come from using them for research, or against the harm that would come
to the woman as a result of not terminating the pregnancy?
One strategy for dealing with disagreement is to try to find political pro-
cesses that all could agree to for resolving the issues that confront us. But, as
Waldron points out in the passage cited above, citizens disagree about this as
well. That is, they disagree about what processes are fair, democratic, just,
etc. for making political decisions in the face of disagreement. And competing
political philosophies reflect the conflicting views that citizens have about how
institutions should be structured.
For example, Benjamin Barber (1984, xxxiv–xxxv) argues for political in-
stitutions that are based on his theory of strong democracy. Barber’s theory
emphasizes what many ordinary citizens believe is wrong with modern liberal
democracies: there should be greater participation by more individuals in po-
litical decision-making. And Waldron raises the concern that many citizens
5share about constitutional democracies, i.e., endowing unelected officials – viz.,
judges – with the authority to make decisions about people’s basic rights and
freedoms cannot be squared with democracy.(Waldron, 1999, 212)
These disagreements, found both in theory and in everyday politics among
the general citizenry, support the argument by W.B. Gallie (1955) that democ-
racy is indeed an “essentially contested concept.” That is, there is disagree-
ment about what the term means, and it seems impossible to resolve that
disagreement in any way that is justified. In contrast, in other domains of dis-
agreement, such as physics or biology, there seem to be some settled meanings
for the fundamental concepts that are at work within these disciplines.
In my thesis, I will consider two responses to the problems of what it means
for democratic institutions to have legitimacy, and how they may make justified
decisions, given the pluralism of modern liberal democracies. One response
that I will examine is Rawls’s constitutionalism; the other is Amy Gutmann
and Dennis Thompson’s deliberative democracy theory.1 While some view
these two theories as compatible accounts of political justification, Rawls (e.g.,
1997, 770) and Gutmann and Thompson (e.g., 1996, 37–9) argue that there are
important points of divergence between the two. My goals are to elucidate the
differences between these two theories, identify the strengths and limitations
of each, and draw out the importance of their differences for practice.
After considering the arguments for each, I wish to show that the Rawlsian
framework I defend is the better foundation for contemporary, democratic,
liberal societies. For, I shall argue that Rawls’s theory is better equipped to
1In my thesis, unless I specify otherwise, any reference to deliberative democracy theory
is meant only to refer to the theory advanced by Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004).
6address the deep but reasonable disagreement about what the state ought to
do in a way that is consistent with the tenets of liberal democracy. The core of
my Rawlsian view is that the legitimacy of democratic institutions depends on
the degree to which a significant proportion of reasonable citizens are satisfied
with those institutions and their decisions over time.
Building on my view of legitimacy, according to my view, the justification
of an institution’s decision depends on the extent to which that decision is con-
ducive to the satisfaction of reasonable citizens with the institutions involved
over time. This, I shall explain later, has the implication that decision-makers
should strive to meet the standard of public reason: they ought to make de-
cisions (and to make them in a way) that is conducive to reasonable citizens’
satisfaction with the institutions that govern them over time.
1.2 Deliberative democracy theory
Although deliberative democracy theories come in a variety of forms, they
generally share two fundamental commitments reflected in the slogan, “gov-
ernment that is ruled by the will of the people.” First, the democratic aspect
of it: citizens should have meaningful opportunities to engage in discourse
with one another and decision-makers about the political issues that signifi-
cantly affect them. Generally, deliberative democracy theorists are explicitly
concerned with the current trend that seems to exist in many places, of the
public’s diminishing participation and interest in politics.
Second, the reference to “the will” reflects that not just any input from
citizens about government will do to justify state institutions’ decisions. Delib-
7erative democracy theorists generally emphasize that the government should
take into account citizens’ thoughtful and informed views about political is-
sues. People’s unreflective opinions that are formed in ignorance of relevant
information, on the other hand, should have less weight in the government’s
decisions.
These commitments lead to the following contrast between deliberative
democratic institutions, on the one hand, and representative and constitution-
alist institutions, on the other. Representative institutions are flawed with
respect to the deliberative aspect that deliberative democratists value, in that
they accept whatever preferences the people indicate, regardless of whether
they are sound judgements or not. And institutions based on constitutional-
ism, such as supreme courts and the constitution, are counter to democracy,
since they effectively remove decisions from the hands of the people altogether.
In contrast, deliberative democracy retains the commitment that no deci-
sion should be beyond the reach of the people, and that institutions should
be structured so that the people are able to make their decisions on the basis
of good reasoning about the relevant information. In Chapter 2, I will ex-
amine the criticisms that Gutmann and Thompson advance against Rawls’s
constitutionalism, which motivate them to develop their theory in response.
In addition to Gutmann and Thompson, I will also consider others’ related
objections to further elucidate Gutmann and Thompson’s critique.
One way of differentiating between deliberative democracy theories is on
the basis of the principles they advance to determine how their two main
commitments ought to be fulfilled. In Chapter 3, I will present Gutmann
and Thompson’s account of the principles that comprise deliberative democ-
8racy. Not only will I outline the principles they advance in their theory of
deliberative democracy, but also, I want to focus on its structure of political
justification, or how their principles are meant to strengthen political decisions.
Gutmann and Thompson recognize that even if political institutions are
constructed on the basis of their theory, the outcomes or decisions they result
in may fall short of being fully justified. As they say,
Deliberative democracy does not assume that all the results of all
actual deliberations are just. In fact, most of the time, democracies
fall far short of meeting the conditions that deliberative democracy
prescribes. But we can say that the more nearly the the conditions
are satisfied, the more nearly justifiable the results are likely to
be.(emph. added, Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 17)
Thus, here we see Gutmann and Thompson’s commitment to the idea that
institutions and their decisions are at least better justified to the extent that
they are determined in processes that meet their principles of deliberative
democracy.
I will agree with Gutmann and Thompson that their theory can be use-
ful for strengthening the justification of political decisions in certain ways.
For example, public engagement tools that are based on deliberative democ-
racy, such as citizens’ assemblies and councils, may provide the government
with valuable information about (some) citizens’ considered judgements about
particular policy issues. This could assist the government in making better de-
cisions, insofar as the government is more attuned to the people’s views about
what it ought to do and why, and their likely responses, in terms of their sat-
isfaction with the institutions involved in the decisions. However, in Chapters
4 through 6, I will argue that their theory is not adequate as an account of po-
litical justification. Their principles do not, in themselves, provide the ideals
9at which democratic institutions should aim.
1.3 A Rawlsian theory of justice
The positive argument that I will make is that Rawls’s theory of justification
as he advances it in Political Liberalism provides us with the necessary con-
cepts for determining which decisions available to political officials may be
justified in modern liberal democracies.2 So, my account allows that fulfill-
ing Gutmann and Thompson’s principles may strengthen the justification of
political decisions. However, determining whether decisions (including those
about the design of institutions) are justified depends on whether they meet
the standards of Rawls’s Political Liberalism.
I use Rawls’s Political Liberalism(2005) rather than A Theory of Jus-
tice(1971) because I agree with the substantive revisions to his view that are
reflected in the former. For example, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues
that citizens are to state their reasons in secular terms for those reasons to
count in discussions in the public political forum. Later, however, in Politi-
cal Liberalism, Rawls (2005, xlix–l) explicitly amends this commitment, and
allows that in public political discourse, citizens should be permitted to state
their reasons in terms of their comprehensive doctrines.3 I believe that re-
visions such as these strengthen Rawls’s position, in the sense that his view
in political liberalism more accurately reflects the necessary conditions for a
stable and well-ordered modern liberal democracy.
2Throughout the thesis, I will use the term ‘political liberalism’ to refer to Rawls’s theory
of political justification as he presents it in Political Liberalism unless I state otherwise.
3Of course, the standard of justification – public reason – remains independent of whether
one accepts any particular comprehensive doctrine.
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Relatedly, I focus on Rawls’s theory of political liberalism because I wish
to defend an account of political justification that is more widely applicable
to modern liberal democracies than is Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness.
Although I will not defend it here, I agree with Rawls that his theory of
justice as fairness is likely to best fulfill the standards of liberal democracy.
However, I also agree with his view that other public political conceptions of
justice may support stable and well-ordered liberal democracies.(Rawls, 2005,
xlvi–xlvii) For example, I believe that different principles of justice serve to
support the decisions that are made by governments in the U.K., Canada, and
the United States. The principles of justice as fairness are only applicable to
democracies in which the institutions therein seem to reflect its principles of
welfare egalitarianism (as some believe to be true of Canada). Rawls’s theory
of political liberalism is meant to be a more general theory that is applicable
to all of these contexts.
1.4 Justification and legitimacy
To further clarify the scope and aim of my thesis, a distinction made by A.J.
Simmons may be helpful. Simmons draws a distinction between the questions
of justification and legitimacy. According to Simmons, justification of the state
may be best thought of as directed towards the anarchist, where the goal is
“showing that some realizable type of state is on balance morally permissible
(or ideal) and that it is rationally preferable to all feasible nonstate alterna-
tives.”(emph. added, Simmons, 1999, 742) So, justifying the democratic state
in this sense requires showing that there is any defensible form of the state
11
that coerces individuals to comply with its laws and policies. One must show
that it is possible to hold a coherent conception of a democratic state at all.
As Simmons helpfully elucidates the anarchist’s objection that the demo-
cratic state cannot meet this standard of justification: “anything that is suf-
ficiently coercive (hierarchical, inegalitarian, etc.) to count as a state is also
necessarily, and for that reason, morally indefensible and prudentially irra-
tional.”(Simmons, 1999, 743) On the anarchist’s view, the tenet that a demo-
cratic government is to be ruled by the will of the people cannot be made
consistent with the coercive power that an effective state necessarily has, to
impose its decisions on citizens when they would choose not to comply. Unless
the state has the power and is willing to use it to compel citizens to comply
with its laws, there seems to be little sense to the claim that there is a state in
place, nor does there seem to be any point in having one. Simmons proceeds
to argue that justifying the democratic state in this sense is impossible.
In contrast with the justification of the state, according to Simmons, le-
gitimacy “is the exclusive moral right of an institution to impose on some
group of persons binding duties, to be obeyed by those persons, and to enforce
those duties coercively.”(Simmons, 1999, 769) The question of legitimacy then,
concerns existing institutions in a particular state. It asks whether the insti-
tutions in question are justified in imposing binding obligations on particular
individuals. In defending an institution’s legitimacy, one might, for example,
attempt to show that the individuals who were subject to it had rightly found
that it was rational for them to submit to the coercive force of that state. For
example, they may have reasoned that an extremely minimalist state provided
important benefits, such as protection from other persons, which outweighed
12
the costs to individuals of submitting to the coercive authority of it.
Using Simmons’ terminology, my Rawlsian theory is meant to be a response
to those who question the legitimacy of states that are identifiable as stable
and well-ordered modern liberal democracy. However, I am not attempting to
provide what Simmons refers to above as justification for it. That is, my Rawl-
sian account might be thought of as taking the form: given that one accepts
that it is possible and wishes for a state to be a modern liberal democracy,
these are the conditions that must be in place (to some degree), and the ideals
and principles that decision-makers in the institutions must follow, so that
the coercive power of the state may be consistent with the tenets of liberal
democracy.
It is important to be clear about my goal because of its implications for
what assumptions can legitimately be made. A basic assumption that Rawls
seems to help himself to (as will I) is that the general population consists in
a significant proportion of people who are satisfied with the institutions that
exist in those modern liberal democracies – e.g., a mixed system of constitu-
tionalist and representative majoritarian institutions. If I were attempting to
provide justification for why rational people should submit to the state, then
this move would be ruled out.
But I will argue that this assumption, that the general population is some-
what satisfied4 with politico-legal institutions traditionally associated with
modern liberal democracies, is permissible, given the scope of my argument.
This assumption forms part of my hypothesis about what are the necessary
conditions for a stable and well-ordered liberal democracy to obtain and per-
4I will discuss how satisfied later in Chapter 4.
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sist over time. The assumption of a predominantly satisfied population is
permissible because I am not attempting to answer Simmons’ anarchist about
whether individuals should submit to the state. My view is that this must be
true, if the society is a stable and well-ordered modern liberal democracy.
Although I will not attempt to justify the liberal democratic state against
Simmons’ anarchist challenge, I will frequently argue about the basis of politi-
cal justification. However, when I use the term ‘justification’, I will be using it
in a second sense that Simmons himself raises, to address another normative
question that he identifies. When I refer to the question of political justifica-
tion throughout, I will be speaking to the question of what particular decisions
the state should make about how to use its coercive force.
Simmons describes the relationship between the justification of actions by
a state, the justification of the state, and the legitimacy of a state, in the
following passage:
States may be justified on balance in enforcing certain laws even if
they are not justified in existing [i.e., not justified in the first sense
within Simmons’ framework] or are not legitimate with respect to
those against whom the laws are enforced. In my view even the
government of the Third Reich was justified [in the second sense
of the term] in prohibiting rape and punishing rapists, however
illegitimate that government may have been with respect to its
subjects and however unjustified was its existence (i.e., however
much of an improvement over its rule even the state of nature
would have been).(Simmons, 1999, 770)
In the example Simmons cites here, of prohibiting rape and punishing rapists,
his point is that the question of whether a state is justified to take those
actions is, on Simmons’ view, entirely separable from any special status it has
as the state. Questions about the legitimacy of a state, or justification of the
14
state, have no bearing on the question of whether it is justified to prohibit
and punish individuals for committing rape. The justification for the state to
prohibit someone from committing such a harm, and punishing someone for
it if they do so, derives from the same morality that justifies the actions of
anyone who is able to prohibit and punish such harms.
My account of political justification rejects Simmons’ view that the justifi-
cation of the state’s particular decisions may be separated from its legitimacy.
I will argue that the justification of the state’s decisions are determined by its
legitimacy. That is, the state should make its decisions on the basis of what is
likely to strengthen its legitimacy. And I will argue that the state’s legitimacy
depends on how well justified are the particular decisions it makes, over time.
My account assumes that there is a morally relevant difference between, on
the one hand, what the state is justified in doing to others, and, on the other,
what individuals – i.e., private citizens – are justified in doing to others.
1.5 A place for deliberative democracy
A final word about the aim of my thesis. The arguments that I make against
Gutmann and Thompson’s theory are not meant to undermine their principles.
I agree with them that fulfilling the principles of deliberative democracy may
strengthen the justification of political decisions in a modern liberal democ-
racy. My point is that their theory falls short on the following aims that one
may look to a political theory to fulfil. First, it does not provide a good ac-
count of what it means for a political institution to be legitimate, in spite of
disagreement that exists about the form it should take, or what decisions it
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ought to make. Also, it is not equipped to inform us about how well polit-
ical decisions in modern liberal democracies are justified, including decisions
about whether political institutions should be designed according to Gutmann
and Thompson’s principles as they advance them. As an example, I will use
the case of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly (OCA) to argue that their theory
cannot tell us whether to use a citizens’ assembly to choose the electoral sys-
tem, or whether another institution, such as the legislature or an expert panel,
would be better justified. Instead, I will argue that my Rawlsian framework
better serves as a theory that enables us to determine the legitimacy of po-
litical institutions, and whether political decisions are justified in accordance
with the principles of liberal democracy.
One advantage of my theory is that it better emphasizes that a society
must already have certain fundamental features, in order for the state to make
justified political decisions. For instance, one of the most important features
that a modern, liberal democracy must have is that a significant proportion of
the population must subscribe to a principle of equality. Also, given their con-
ceptions of justice, it must be possible to define the politico-legal institutions
in a way that a significant proportion of the population (that is committed to
egalitarianism) is willing to be bound by their decisions. To the extent that
a society does not have these features, the strength of legitimacy with respect
to their institutions will be undermined.
Furthermore, my theory better captures the structure of political justifi-
cation. For example, it reflects that the ability for a modern, liberal democ-
racy (i.e., its institutions) to make justified political decisions depends on how
prevalent egalitarianism is among the general population. Also, my theory
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captures how the state may make politically justified decisions even though
individuals have different conceptions both of the good and of justice, e.g.,
by ensuring that over time, citizens are satisfied with the decisions that insti-
tutions make. So, if an institution makes decisions that are contrary to the
satisfaction of someone, all is not lost, so long as it is able to make subsequent
decisions that regain her satisfaction with the state. I will argue that because
Gutmann and Thompson ground political decision-making in actual public dis-
course, their theory does not have the resources to adjudicate between persis-
tent disagreement among citizens about particular decisions, including about
the importance of actual public discourse in political decision-making.
In addition to examining the principles of each theory, in the last two chap-
ters I use the experiences of the OCA, which was to review the Ontario electoral
system, to illustrate the theoretical points that I argued in previous chapters.
I present Thompson’s defence of his position that citizens in a deliberative
democratic institution – viz., a citizens’ assembly – rather than a committee
of experts, legislators, or judges, ought to be given the opportunity to review
and potentially recommend changes to the electoral system. Thompson argues
that the electoral system designed by an assembly of ordinary citizens should
then be voted on by the full electorate, in a referendum to be determined by
simple majority. According to Thompson, this process better fulfils the prin-
ciples of democracy than do the other aforementioned political institutions.
Thus, according to Thompson, a citizens’ assembly followed by a referendum
provides a better political basis for decisions about the electoral system.
The OCA serves as an example of a deliberative democratic institution
that was meant to strengthen democracy. To fulfil this goal, it was largely
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designed and implemented in accordance with the principles that Gutmann
and Thompson advance. However, I will argue that the OCA illustrates the
limitations of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory. That is, I use the OCA to
show the problems that arise by neglecting the standard of public reason –
i.e., the likely effects on the satisfaction of reasonable citizens with the institu-
tions and decisions they are making – as the ultimate grounding for political
decisions.
I conclude that while Gutmann and Thompson’s theory is not equipped
to be a basis of political justification in modern liberal democracies, fulfilling
the principles of deliberative democracy may serve to strengthen the justifi-
cation of political decisions and the legitimacy of democratic institutions. I
argue that they may do so by grounding decisions about how to structure de-
liberative democratic institutions with Rawls’s theory. Conceiving of political
justification and legitimacy in this way allows us to better understand what
was wrong with decisions that have been heavily criticized about the OCA,
e.g., who was included in the process and how, and the length of time that
was taken to engage with the public about the decision at hand. Furthermore,
my alternative understanding of the theories also provides a better way of
determining how similar mistakes may be avoided in the future.
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Chapter 2
Rawls’s critics
2.1 Introduction
As we saw in the previous chapter, perhaps the most central question that
contemporary democracy theories must address is, “how can democratic in-
stitutions make justified political decisions in a modern liberal democracy?”
For, as democratists generally accept, people who are given the freedom to do
so will adopt conceptions of the good that lead them to have conflicting views
about how to resolve political issues. Thus, this pluralism makes it difficult
to give a satisfying answer to the question of how the state can make justified
political decisions in the face of such widespread and persistent disagreement.
In response to this challenge, Rawls follows the tradition of social contract
theories. Recognizing that actual agreement about political decisions is un-
likely, social contract theories instead ask: what decisions would the people
agree to, and under what conditions? One way to define the social contract
is to identify who are the parties that are to be represented in the “negotia-
tions”. For instance, at a minimum, a social contract theorist might stipulate
that contracting parties must be rational agents, and attempt to provide an
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acceptable definition of what this means. Thus, in the political context, the
social contract theorist may answer the question of how political institutions
should be structured by identifying the parties who should be represented
in the “negotiations” about this issue, and then attempting to work up the
answers such parties would be likely to give.
The other consideration that may be raised by social contract theories is
the conditions for negotiations.(Gauthier, 1990, 1) Even though the parties
represented in the contract negotiations may have conflicting views about a
political issue, it may be possible to reach a justified political decision by
finding a process that all would agree to as fair. It may be that none have
particularly positive feelings about the resulting policy, but what matters to
the contractarian is simply whether the parties would agree to be bound by
the outcome of negotiations, or terms of the contract.
Many hold that Rawls’s theory follows in this tradition, in that it bases
justification for political decision-making on what those citizens that he defines
as reasonable and rational would choose under certain idealizations that he
specifies in his theory of justice. However, a number of concerns have been
raised for this approach in general, and for Rawls’s theory in particular. In
this chapter, I will outline the main objections that have been advanced in
response to his theory. These criticisms motivate the development of Gutmann
and Thompson’s theory outlined in the next chapter, as well as the framework
I present in the fourth chapter.
In the next chapter, I will outline how Gutmann and Thompson’s theory
is meant to address the problems they identify in Rawls’s account. However,
in the fourth chapter, I will defend a Rawlsian response to Gutmann and
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Thompson’s objections, and show that the Rawlsian account that I develop
is not vulnerable to the criticisms examined here. Then, in the remaining
chapters (5 and 6), I will argue that not only are the moves that Gutmann
and Thompson make to address the problems they find in Rawls’s theory not
necessary, the theory they develop is not adequate to address the problem of
deep but reasonable disagreement in modern, liberal democracies. It requires
my Rawlsian framework as a foundation to assess the legitimacy of existing and
proposed political institutions in modern, liberal democracies, and to assess
political decisions in the face of reasonable disagreement.
2.2 Unhelpful idealizations
Gutmann and Thompson raise a number of objections to theories that base
political justification on hypothetical as opposed to actual deliberation. One
objection is to the implication of hypothetical reasoning, which also seems to
exist in practice. For, in practice, policymakers also base their decisions on
an “internal monologue,” in which policymakers imagine what would be likely
to garner citizens’ agreement, rather than finding out what citizens actually
want by engaging in discourse with them. Gutmann and Thompson argue
that instead of basing decisions on an internal monologue, political decisions
ought to be based on “explicit dialogue” with ordinary citizens.1
As I argue in the next chapter, according to Gutmann and Thompson,
the central point that sets their theory apart from Rawls’s is that the justi-
1I owe thanks to Richard Vernon for bringing this way of phrasing the objection to my
attention, which I think brings into sharper focus this central point of disagreement between
Rawls and Gutmann and Thompson.
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fication for political decisions is based on actual discourse between citizens,
in a process that fulfils the principles they hold are essential to deliberative
democracy. As they state one of the advantages their theory has over others:
“Deliberative democracy, in contrast, admits reasons and principles that are
suitable for actual societies, which all still suffer from discrimination and other
kinds of injustice.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 16)2 They argue that one
of the virtues of resting political justification on actual discourse is that their
theory is equipped to provide principled guidance about how to settle politi-
cal controversies, while taking into account the actual circumstances of actual
people.
The advantage that Gutmann and Thompson identify with their theory,
that it is suitable for actual societies, brings us to one of the reasons that
they object to the hypothetical reasoning in Rawls’s theory. An idealization
that Rawls builds his theory on is that the general population supports his
egalitarian principles of justice and constitutional essentials. Gutmann and
Thompson (1996, 35) object that, “Constitutional standards seem compelling
when stated abstractly: few would deny that majorities should not violate the
basic liberty of their fellow citizens. But abstraction comes at the price of
disagreement about their interpretation.”
Recall that the goal of the social contract theorist is to identify what the
2The fact that Gutmann and Thompson explicitly distinguish their theory from e.g.,
Rawls’s becomes especially important in arguments I make elsewhere for Rawls’s constitu-
tionalism, since Rawls himself states that by constitutional democracy, he means a deliber-
ative democracy(see Rawls, 1997, 771–2). However, he distinguishes his view from that of
Gutmann and Thompson at least on the basis of the meaning of reciprocity they each have,
which they all argue ought to order public discussion(Rawls, 1997, 770n19). As I’ll discuss
later, Rawls argues that the role of reciprocity in his concept of public reason is purely
political, and so less comprehensive than Gutmann and Thompson. In the last chapter, I
will argue this comes out in practice in the OCA.
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parties in the contract would agree to and under what conditions. One way of
achieving agreement is to define the terms of the contract so abstractly that
the parties would agree to them. For example, people might agree that all
persons are equal. However, Gutmann and Thompson object to this strategy
on grounds that disagreement will occur as soon as one tries to further specify
this general principle. For example, although people may agree that all persons
are to be treated as equals, people may disagree about who is to count as
a person, or what it means to treat someone as an equal. Gutmann and
Thompson point out that while Rawls may be right that citizens would agree
to very abstract formulations of constitutional principles, e.g., the equality
of persons, their rights to certain fundamental freedoms, etc., hypothetical
agreement will be lost as soon as we try to further specify what those principles
imply in practice.
To return to the example I presented in Chapter 1, both a scientist engaged
in hESC research and a person who believes that it is wrong to destroy human
embryos may believe in the principle of equality of persons. But this agree-
ment seems to do little good for settling their disagreement about whether the
state should permit human embryonic stem cell research. For the principle
of equality to be helpful for resolving their disagreement, they need to settle
their differences about, e.g., whether a human embryo is a person, if that is
where the source of disagreement lies. Thus, Rawls cannot justifiedly presume
hypothetical agreement about constitutional principles will be an adequate
basis for determining what egalitarianism amounts to in politics.
But, object Gutmann and Thompson, Rawls does exactly this. As they say,
“Rawls relies on ‘established political procedures [being] reasonably regarded
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as fair’ to resolve these substantive disagreements.”(Gutmann and Thompson,
1996, 36) On the basis of accepting constitutional essentials stated in the
abstract, Gutmann and Thompson charge Rawls with unjustifiedly supposing
that further specifications of these in current institutions are accepted as well.
Furthermore, they criticize his theory for assuming that people will accept
how those institutions ultimately resolve disagreement about political issues,
based on his deeper assumption that citizens accept the institutions as fair.
Gutmann and Thompson identify these theoretical assumptions in actual,
existing institutions as well.(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 91) For example,
the U.S. Constitution sets the bar for amendment so high that it seems that
any initiative to do so will almost certainly fail. Another example may be
found in the context of electoral systems in Canada. A reason that the Ontario
government gave for holding a citizens’ assembly on electoral reform was that
Ontarians have never had a say in choosing their electoral system, which is
true in many places.(Secretariat, 2007, 3)
Fundamental decisions about the structure of political institutions in mod-
ern liberal democracies have often been decided in ways that do not conform
to Gutmann and Thompson’s principles of deliberative democracy. They were
made by a small group of an elite few (relative to the population to be governed
according to their decisions), with little or no consultation with the general
population about the acceptability of their decisions. Thus, the processes for
building traditional institutions often seem to reflect Rawls’s assumption that
they can be constructed in ways that the people would accept, without the
people’s input about what forms they should take.
In his critical analysis of Rawls’s theory, Joshua Cohen also criticizes the
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weight that Rawls places on the idealization of egalitarianism and agreement
about the constitutional essentials. Cohen objects that even if we suppose that
Rawls’s egalitarian principles of justice have the support that Rawls seems to
think, they are incapable of grounding other elements that Cohen argues both
he and Rawls believe are essential to a just liberal democracy. According to
Cohen, those essential elements are that: “[i] public deliberation focused on the
common good, [ii] requires some form of manifest equality among citizens, and
[iii] shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways that contribute to the
formation of a public conception of common good.”(Cohen, 2002, 89)
So, according to Cohen, both he and Rawls share the view that institu-
tions in modern liberal democracies should attempt to show how they serve
the common good, while still respecting the equality of individuals with their
different and, in some ways, conflicting conceptions of the good. And they
should also attempt to promote citizens’ conceptions of themselves as mem-
bers of a collective (the citizens of that state), so that citizens will identify
the advancement of its good with their own interests. This strengthens the le-
gitimacy of institutions in a liberal democracy, since institutions will thereby
be better able to serve citizens’ interests in virtue of their having the same
interests.
While Cohen finds these goals laudable for a liberal democracy, he rejects
that Rawls’s theory is capable of supporting these commitments. That is,
Cohen argues that even if we suppose, as he believes Rawls does, that a sig-
nificant proportion of the population subscribes to principles of equality and
fairness, (i)–(iii) do not necessarily follow. Something more is needed to sup-
port Rawls’s view that public deliberation in a modern liberal democracy must
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be focussed on the common good, make manifest the equality of citizens, and
try to encourage a conception of the (singularly determinate) common good.
So, Cohen agrees with Gutmann and Thompson that Rawls’s theory does
not justify institutions for which Rawls argues. However, contrary to Gutmann
and Thompson, Cohen believes that Rawls actually supports the view that
institutions should better fulfil deliberative democratic principles. Cohen’s
objection then is to Rawls’s attempt to fundamentally support deliberative
democracy with egalitarian ideals. According to Cohen, it is the ideal of
democracy itself that justifies (i)–(iii), not the principle of egalitarianism.
One important practical implication of this theoretical disagreement is that
if Rawls is right, then what is most fundamentally necessary to support strong
democratic institutions is a prevailing sense of egalitarianism among the people
in society. Thus, (as I will argue in Chapters 5 and 6,) what should dictate
how to structure and make decisions within democratic institutions are the
principles of equality that are held by the people in the society. If Cohen
is right however, the question of how to order our democratic institutions
is fundamentally determined and justified by the ideal of democracy itself.
And, according to Cohen, this is best ensured by the principles of deliberative
democracy he defends and attributes to Rawls as well.3
The first deliberative democratic commitment that Cohen identifies in
Rawls’s theory is that in an ideal pluralist society,
Public explanations and justification of laws and policies are to
be cast in terms of conceptions of the common good (conceptions
that, on Rawls’s view, must be consistent with the two principles of
justice), and public deliberation should aim to work out the details
3As I will outline in Chapter 3, Gutmann and Thompson’s theory follows a similar
structure, but differs in the substantive principles they argue are essential to democracy.
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of such conceptions and to apply them to particular issues of public
policy.(Cohen, 2002, 88)
So Cohen ascribes to Rawls the view that when citizens deliberate about po-
litical issues, their reasons must be cast in terms that are consistent with the
principles of welfare egalitarianism. The goal of public discussion is to deter-
mine what that common good – i.e., the principles of egalitarianism – implies
with respect to particular decisions.
Furthermore, according to Cohen, Rawls holds that people ought to couch
their reasons in terms of the public good for more than merely instrumental
reasons. As Cohen draws out, “So an ideal pluralist scheme, in which demo-
cratic politics consists of fair bargaining among groups each of which pursues
its particular or sectional interest, is unsuited to a just society.”(Cohen, 2002,
88) Citizens must move beyond the view of others as mere instruments or
barriers to pursuing their own conceptions of the good. Rawls’s theory de-
mands more of citizens than that they participate in politics to advance their
own individual or group-based interests. They must participate in a way that
appreciates the values that others have as persons who are ends in themselves.
The second deliberative democratic requirement that Cohen finds in Rawls’s
theory is that the fairness of political institutions must be made manifest to
citizens. For instance, laws may need to be changed so that political campaigns
are financed to a greater extent by public funding rather than by corporate
donations. Also, restrictions might be placed on the amount of funding that
any one individual or corporation can contribute to a campaign. These mea-
sures are justified on grounds that they would make evident to the people
that the political system is designed to prevent parties from having financial
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reason to count some people’s interests more than others.(Cohen, 2002, 88)
Cohen points out that Rawls himself reasons that these measures are justified
because they make manifest to citizens that the society is committed to the
democratic principles of free and equal participation in politics by all.(Cohen,
2002, 88–9)
Lastly, Cohen argues that Rawls is committed to the deliberative ideal that,
as Cohen puts it, “democratic politics should also shape the ways in which
the members of the society understand themselves and their own legitimate
interests.”(Cohen, 2002, 89) For example, Rawls argues that individuals are
entitled to the social bases of self-respect, that they ought to learn about their
roles as citizens, and about their place in the structure of political institutions
in a constitutional democracy. As Cohen points out, on Rawls’s view, the
point of democracy is not only to make justified decisions about how the
state’s power may be used to limit people’s freedom in the ways it does. It is
also to shape citizens’ understandings of themselves as individuals living in a
society with others, with whom they should be willing to find and submit to
fair terms of cooperation.
Cohen’s objection to egalitarianism is that although the way that institu-
tions are designed can certainly shape people’s understanding of themselves as
citizens, it does not seem adequate to provide the grounding and direction for
this feature of democratic institutions. That is, egalitarianism cannot justify
the requirement that institutions promote a particular conception of the self,
i.e., a view of how citizens should understand themselves as political agents in
a modern liberal democracy. Rather, for Cohen, the principle of democracy
justifies the requirement that that institutions should inculcate such values in
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citizens.
Cohen identifies the following lines of defence in Rawls’s theory for these
three requirements: “The formal argument is that parties in the original po-
sition would choose the principle of participation with the proviso that the
political liberties have their fair value.”(Cohen, 2002, 89) Citizens (as parties
in the social contract) in a liberal democracy who did not know their lot in
society (e.g., their race, socioeconomic status, religion, etc.) would choose
institutions that meet the three conditions named above. That is, citizens
would choose institutions that allowed them to: (i) exchange reasons in terms
of the common good; (ii) recognize the equality of all; and (iii) facilitate their
understanding of themselves as members of society who share in a common
good.
Cohen also identifies an alternative “informal” line of reasoning in Rawls’s
theory, in addition to his thought experiment to justify these requirements
or constraints in politics. That is, (i)–(iii) are justified as a direct result of
the commitment to fairness in general. Because citizens so highly value the
principle of fairness, they recognize that their political institutions themselves
ought to reflect and to be based on that value. As Cohen describes it,
The suggestion is that, since we accept the intuitive ideal of a fair
system of co-operation, we should want our political institutions
themselves to conform, in so far as it is feasible, to the requirements
that terms of association be worked out under fair conditions. And
so we arrive directly at the requirement of equal liberties with fair
value, rather than arriving at it indirectly, through a hypothetical
choice of that requirement under fair conditions.(Cohen, 2002, 90)
So, the other reason for accepting the deliberative democratic conditions that
Cohen identifies in Rawls is because the means for achieving fair decisions
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ought to be consistent with the end that we are trying to achieve.
Cohen agrees with this view he finds in Rawls, that these deliberative
democratic ideals ought to be reflected in democratic institutions. However,
since, according to Cohen, the principle of egalitarianism cannot justify those
ideals, Cohen holds that they ought to be considered as justified because these
deliberative democratic commitments are essential to the view of democracy
that citizens generally endorse. As Cohen puts the point of dispute between
himself and Rawls:
Taking the notion of fairness as fundamental [as Rawls does], and
aiming (as in the informal argument) to model political arrange-
ments on the original position, it is not clear why, for example,
political debate ought to be focused on the common good, or why
the manifest equality of citizens is an important feature of a demo-
cratic association. The pluralist conception of democratic politics
as a system of bargaining with fair representation for all groups
seems an equally good mirror of the ideal of fairness.(Cohen, 2002,
90)
Cohen’s objection to Rawls then, is that the priority Rawls gives to the prin-
ciple of equality to ground his theory of justice is inadequate to justify the
deliberative commitments that Cohen finds in Rawls. The principle of equal-
ity could just as easily be thought to entail a fair system of bargaining in one’s
own self- or group-based interests.
But, given the commitments that Cohen ascribes to Rawls, self-interested
bargaining is contrary to the goal of a well-functioning democracy. For, recall
that according to Cohen, Rawls seems committed to the notion that what
justifies political decisions is appeal to a common good. And bargaining for
the sake of self- or group-based interests seems to violate the priority that
Rawls places on the common good over individuals’ other interests.
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Gutmann and Thompson seem to agree that a fundamental commitment
to the principles of deliberative democracy implies that self-interested bar-
gaining should be excluded from political decision-making. As they argue,
“The claim that self-interested (or group-interested) bargaining processes are
better than deliberative ones relies on the premise that interest-based politics
is more morally desirable and mutually justifiable than a deliberative poli-
tics.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 113–4) So, according to Gutmann and
Thompson, bargaining is only a legitimate form of political decision-making if
its proponents can show that it is mutually justifiable.
As I will discuss in more detail in chapter 3, according to Gutmann and
Thompson, in general, political procedures and decisions may only meet the
principle of mutual justifiability if, “a citizen offers reasons that can be ac-
cepted by others who are similarly motivated to find reasons that can be
accepted by others.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 53) The principle of mu-
tual justifiability refers to a standard that is set by citizens who must hold a
certain attitude towards one another. This attitude that citizens must hold
is what Gutmann and Thompson refer to as the principle of reciprocity. For
Gutmann and Thompson, the principle of reciprocity captures the idea that
citizens are to advance reasons that others could accept, where those others
must also be similarly disposed to provide mutually acceptable reasons for
their views on issues. Roughly, we might say that the principles of mutual jus-
tifiability and reciprocity reflect the requirement that citizens ought to treat
each other as moral equals, at least so long as others are similarly disposed.
Gutmann and Thompson object that the requirement of mutual justifia-
bility generally precludes self-interested and group-based reasoning as a legiti-
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mate way of political decision-making in most cases. They allow that a process
of deliberation could lead stakeholders to endorse a bargaining approach to re-
solve a political issue. In that case, Gutmann and Thompson admit, “At
least one claim that deliberative democrats often make would need to revised
– but revised in order to satisfy the demands of deliberative democracy it-
self.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 114) Even if a group of deliberators
chose to determine a decision via a bargaining process, which would be con-
trary to Gutmann and Thompson’s principles of deliberative democracy, what
would justify the decision is that they chose the procedure deliberatively.
However, according to Gutmann and Thompson (2004, 114), “In any po-
litical context, a general defense of bargaining is not likely to be plausible.” If
Cohen’s view that Rawls’s theory is fundamentally a deliberative democratic
one is right – i.e., it is fundamentally committed to deliberative democratic
principles – then it seems that Rawls’s view about what is required in legit-
imate democratic processes must agree with Gutmann and Thompson’s view
that bargaining on the basis of self- or group-interests is prohibited in political
decision-making.
2.3 The epistemic objection
Gutmann and Thompson also raise an epistemic objection to Rawls’s reliance
on implicit monologues for political justification. In the absence of discussion
about controversial issues, citizens and policymakers all too often underesti-
mate the disagreement that exists about political issues. As Gutmann and
Thompson put the point: “Actual deliberation has an important advantage
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over hypothetical agreement: it encourages citizens to face up to their actual
problems by listening to one another’s moral claims rather than concluding
(on the basis of only a thought experiment) that their fellow citizens would
agree with them on all matters of justice if they were all living in an ideal
society.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 16)
Although Gutmann and Thompson do not develop the point explicitly, the
idea seems to be related to a line of reasoning that John Stuart Mill advances
in defence of the freedom of speech as a basic and inviolable liberty.(Mill,
1991b, 25) In On Liberty, Mill argues that one of the reasons for protecting
freedom of speech as a basic liberty is because of its potential for exposing
mistaken beliefs. As Mill points out, falsehoods about a subject eventually
yield to “fact and argument,” but this depends on, as he puts it, “hearing
what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying
it by every character of mind.”(Mill, 1991b, 25)
So, one of the reasons to value and promote actual public discourse about
political issues is because of its tendency to expose people’s mistaken beliefs
by subjecting them to the doubts and scrutiny of others. More specifically,
a person’s beliefs may be disproven when others from different backgrounds
and perspectives who disagree confront the individual with lines of reasoning
that challenge her beliefs. For Gutmann and Thompson also, the advantage
of requiring actual public discourse about political decisions is that it may
expose false beliefs in politics – namely, the false belief that one’s own view is
shared by the majority, if not everyone.
Another similar worry in Mill’s arguments that is also mirrored in Gutmann
and Thompson’s objections is found in his “Considerations on Representative
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Government”. There, Mill draws attention to the problem of elitism in gov-
ernment, which has the potential to allow the interests of “the working class”
to be neglected in government decisions. As Mill describes his concern:
We need not suppose that when power resides in an exclusive class,
that class will knowingly and deliberately sacrifice the other classes
to themselves: it suffices that, in the absence of its natural de-
fenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being
overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes
from those of the persons whom it directly concerns.(Mill, 1991a,
246)
For Mill, if political officials belong to a different class than much of the general
citizenry, and do not engage with the working class, there is a real danger that
policies will be decided in ignorance of those perspectives. To be clear, this
worry is not that political officials will intentionally sacrifice the interests of
the general citizenry (although that may be a problem, too). Mill’s worry is
that they may do so simply because all those in positions of decision-making
authority are ignorant of the negative implications that their decisions are
likely to have for other classes in society.
Such decision-making clearly runs counter to the commitment of democ-
racy, which is meant to take into account the interests of all citizens as moral
equals. Similarly, for Gutmann and Thompson, insofar as we know that cer-
tain groups’ interests aren’t being adequately represented in government, there
is good reason for creating better opportunities for citizens to have a say in
political decisions. Otherwise, government officials are likely to make their
decisions on the basis of inaccurate judgements about how their constituents
are likely to be affected.
Whether Mill would agree with Gutmann and Thompson about how best to
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address this worry is beyond the scope of this chapter. The point is that he, an
ardent supporter of representative government, recognizes the epistemic worry
that it raises for democracy.4 Gutmann and Thompson argue that the current
political institutions, many of which do not fulfil the principles of deliberative
democracy, do not give citizens the opportunity they ought to have to object
to them. For representative institutions to fulfil the principles of democracy,
they must be supplemented with deliberative democracy.
And the point to be made against Rawls is that if citizens lack meaningful
opportunities to object to contemporary institutions, then inferring that citi-
zens accept those institutions from their lack of objections is unwarranted. It
is just as possible that citizens do object to those institutions, but their objec-
tions simply have not been heard by political decision-makers. In light of this
sceptical worry, Gutmann and Thompson reject Rawls’s view that hypothet-
ical agreement is adequate for determining whether political institutions are
justified according to democratic principles. It misses the epistemic advantage
of actual dialogue, both in terms of bringing points of disagreement to light,
and interrogating political decision-makers’ beliefs about what people do in
fact support to ensure that they are accurate.
2.4 Who is (not) behind the veil of ignorance
In an earlier quote by Cohen, the Rawlsian concept of the original position
was introduced. Rawls develops this concept to represent the ideas of im-
4Gutmann and Thompson do make explicit appeal to other aspects of Mill’s arguments
in their defence of their deliberative democracy theory, but not to the argument that I am
suggesting is implicit in the above-mentioned passage.
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partiality and fairness in individuals’ judgements about the basic structure,
i.e., fundamental social, political, and economic institutions. When individ-
uals adopt the original position, or go behind what Rawls refers to as the
“veil of ignorance”, they do not know particular features about themselves. In
abstracting away particular features about themselves, their decision-making
models the principle of equality: it reflects the requirement that people who
are committed to a principle of equality ought to make their decisions impar-
tially, or in a way that does not unfairly favour themselves or others, e.g.,
family, friends. When individuals are behind the veil, and do not have any
personal information about themselves (including who they may be in close,
personal relationships with), they are thereby prevented from choosing insti-
tutional arrangements that would unfairly favour themselves or others close
to them.
Thus, (barring preferences for risk) a person should choose an arrangement
that does not unfairly advantage anyone in virtue of particular features that
they have. When individuals are in the original position, they do not know
whether they are a particular racial or ethnic minority, hold particular religious
or philosophical commitments, etc. Without this knowledge about themselves,
it would be most rational for them to choose a basic structure that ensures
that basic goods such as political liberties, a minimum level of security and
education, etc. are ensured to all equally, regardless of these characteristics.
The idealization of the original position in Rawls’s theory, as I have just
outlined it, has attracted a number of criticisms.5 One is by Susan Moller Okin,
who points out that according to Rawls’s account of the veil of ignorance, one
5In Chapter 4, I will outline an alternative conception of the original position.
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feature that individuals do know about themselves is that they are “heads of
households”. As Okin argues, this is a necessary aspect of Rawls’s account of
the original position.
Individuals in the original position must be heads of households in order to
address the question of how to take future generations into account in current
decisions about justice. For Rawls, the obligation to future generations can
be captured in the original position only if those behind the veil are making
their choices in light of the implications they are likely to have for their own
future generations. In this way, people behind the veil will be psychologically
motivated to choose principles and institutions that take into account their
likely consequences for the interests of existing family members, as well as
those yet to come.
But Okin criticizes the invocation of heads of households on grounds that
it renders concerns about justice within the family invisible. And Okin points
out that Rawls himself explicitly states that considerations about justice are to
apply to the family. “However,” Okin continues, “the family is to a large extent
ignored, though assumed, in the rest of the theory.”(Okin, 1999, 93) For Okin,
this is problematic because the family is a significant site of economic and
social injustice against women.(Okin, 1987, 50) For instance, in many homes,
unfair divisions of labour remain the norm, which limit women’s liberty in
numerous ways, e.g., to pursue successful careers and job advancement outside
the home, and to achieve financial independence and emotional fulfilment. But
any inegalitarian attitudes or beliefs held by “heads of households” and which
may be advanced by those in the original position are rendered invisible by
Rawls’s thought experiment. For, the heads of households are assumed to
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speak for the entire family about how to structure political institutions.
Okin argues that an adequate theory of justice must be equipped to allow
issues of injustice within households to be brought into the public sphere. And
Rawls seems to agree. But the structure of his theory excludes injustice that
occurs inside people’s private homes from being raised, much less addressed,
in the sphere of public debate.
Martha Nussbaum also raises another objection to Rawls’s idealization
of agents in the original position. Nussbaum takes issue with the exclusion
of individuals with disabilities from participating in the social contract. In
social contract theories, a fundamental assumption is that the parties who are
contracting with one another are equal, and ought to recognize each other as
such. From there, the theorist has only to work out what would be reasonable
and rational for the parties to agree.
But Nussbaum objects that this commitment results in a theory that ne-
glects “the presence of a large asymmetry of power between the parties, which
makes it no longer mutually advantageous for them to be included as fully equal
parties to the social contract.”(Nussbaum, 2009, 333) The theory neglects the
reality that some people, such as those with disabilities, are significantly dis-
empowered in society, and do not, in fact, have any sociopolitical clout to
motivate others to address them as equals. As a result, these individuals are
left to accept whatever advocates manage to gain on their behalf in the social
contract negotiations.
Nussbaum argues that the only answer is that, “Rawls would ultimately
need to jettison the idea of rough equality in power and the related idea of
mutual advantage as the aim of the social contract, were he able to do justice
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to the claims of people with disabilities.”(Nussbaum, 2009, 333–4) That is,
the only way that Rawls’s theory could address the exclusion of people with
disabilities is by foregoing its basic assumption that the parties must be roughly
equal.
Furthermore, the aim of the social contract would need to be reformulated
so that it is no longer for roughly equal individuals to try to find a fair way of
ordering society such that they are all benefited. If the claims of individuals
with disabilities are to be treated more justly, the “negotiations” will have to
reflect that some claims (e.g., restructuring buildings to be more accessible to
people with physical disabilities) will deserve to be met even though they will
not benefit all or most others, i.e., people without disabilities. They will simply
result in the conditions of some being raised to a level that better reflects their
equal moral standing with others in society.
2.5 Taboo topics in Rawls’s theory
In addition to the worries we have seen about who is not represented in Rawls’s
theory, Gutmann and Thompson also object that his theory is too restrictive
in another sense. They argue that it discourages certain topics from being
debated in the political sphere. Gutmann and Thompson argue that Rawls’s
commitment to an overlapping consensus as the basis for political justifica-
tion results in the exclusion of topics that are too controversial or divisive, or
that will be likely to throw into question citizens’ acceptance of basic institu-
tions. As Gutmann and Thompson (2004, 198n38) say, “the aim of a political
conception of justice, on Rawls’s account, is to create an overlapping consen-
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sus and thereby decrease political controversy.” In Rawls’s theory, political
justification rests on individuals’ agreement about and acceptance of the in-
stitutions. However, as a result, the aim of the theory becomes to maintain
that consensus.
Because its priority is maintaining a consensus about the institutions,
Rawls’s theory seems to discourage debate about controversial issues that are
likely to be divisive, or that will call into question the legitimacy of the ba-
sic institutions in society. For, raising them could threaten the stability of
the democracy itself by undermining the consensus. This leads to Gutmann
and Thompson’s charge that Rawls’s theory justifies a sort of conservatism
about which issues should be brought into the political spotlight for debate.
Also, for the same reasons that controversial issues are to be kept out of the
sphere of debate, challenges to the authority of fundamental institutions are
also discouraged by the theory.
Furthermore, Gutmann and Thompson find that Rawls’s commitment to
maintaining the overlapping consensus results in unacceptable constraints on
the way that citizens are to advance their reasons. As they describe Rawls’s
position, “Comprehensive moral theories contribute constructively to politics
only to the extent that they serve as a source of common principles.”(Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004, 93) Similar to Cohen’s finding (§2.1), they argue that
in Rawls’s theory, citizens are only supposed to advance reasons that follow
from principles that would be accepted by all, or that would advance those
principles.
Gutmann and Thompson object that this wrongly prevents people from
advancing their deeply held values and beliefs in the public political sphere.
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They argue that, “Because we should agree on how to be morally governed
in our political behaviour, even when we morally disagree on fundamental
political issues, a public philosophy should be more comprehensive than Rawls
suggests.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 93) Since the decisions that the
government makes stand to affect our own and others’ freedom to act on
our conceptions of the good, and since democratic government’s decisions are
(supposed to) take into account our own and others’ views about what it
should do, we should be allowed to bring those moral reasons into the public
sphere. For, not only do individuals’ reasons based on their own conceptions
of the good sometimes change other people’s minds about political issues, but
also, allowing people to argue from these reasons shows individuals’ respect
for each other even as they continue to disagree with one another.(Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004, 93)
Iris Marion Young and Philip Pettit also object to the constraints of Rawls’s
theory, specifically on what sorts of liberties are worthy of protection by the
state. Pettit charges Rawls with holding a conception of liberties as the right
to non-interference. Pettit writes: “John Rawls (1971:302) manifests a concern
for liberty as non-interference, for example, when he writes: ‘liberty can be
restricted only for the sake of liberty.’”(Pettit, 1999, 50,111) Pettit identifies
the central aim of Rawls’s theory as to restrict individuals’ freedom as little as
possible. And, to the extent that individuals’ freedoms do have to be impinged
upon, that can only be justified by appeal to the liberty of another.
Pettit objects that the liberal tradition of focussing on non-interference
misses other important rights that his concept of non-domination captures,
such as not being exposed to the arbitrary interference of others – by either
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other individuals or the state.(Pettit, 1999, 52) Even if the state ensures that
citizens’ freedom is impinged upon as little as possible, it is no less important
for citizens not to live under the threat of arbitrary interference by others
(including the state) in their lives.
Young advances a related objection to what she refers to as the distribu-
tive paradigm, according to which Rawls develops his theory. Young objects to
the exclusive focus of the distributive paradigm on the equitable distribution
of the traditional basic liberties, e.g., freedom of expression, consciousness,
etc. Young’s concern is that this misses other important aspects of injustice
in societies, namely: “decisionmaking procedures, division of labor, and cul-
ture.”(Young, 1990, 39) Focussing on the “distribution” of the basic liberties
misses procedural injustice, as well as the possibility that even though institu-
tions seem to be well-structured, they can have unjust consequences because
of other factors at work that determine their outcomes as well.
The inequitable distribution of the basic liberties only captures part of the
injustice that some groups suffer from in modern liberal democracies. Another
no less important source of injustice is that the design of political, economic,
and social institutions result in the nearly insurmountable barriers to partici-
pation for marginalized groups in society. In Pettit’s terms, they are subject
to domination as a result of the structure of these institutions, i.e., they are
subject to the arbitrary exercise of power by others in ways that they ought
not to be.
Theories such as that of Rawls, which are built on the distributive paradigm,
tend to focus our attention simply on whether the institutions are structured
such that they do not discriminate against any particular social group. Young
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argues that as a result, questions of how the basic structure contributes to
and perpetuates the inequitable distribution of power are overlooked by these
theories. And, as Young summarizes her objection, “Without a structural
understanding of power and domination as processes rather than patterns of
distribution, the existence and nature of domination and oppression in these
societies cannot be identified.”(Young, 1990, 33)
Young argues that theorists need to work within new paradigms that focus
more attention on how the processes in traditional institutions, and their in-
teractions with existing social circumstances and processes, contribute to the
patterns of injustice we see. Rawls’s theory leads us away from asking impor-
tant questions about the role of political institutions themselves as processes
that may perpetuate injustice. It does so in virtue of implicitly accepting the
current structure, in spite of evidence that it contributes to ongoing oppression.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented some of the major criticisms that have been
advanced against Rawls’s theory, and which motivate Gutmann and Thomp-
son to develop their account of deliberative democracy as they do. As we saw,
critics’ interpretations of Rawls’s theory has him neglecting the importance
of giving people an actual opportunity to participate themselves in decision-
making that significantly affects them, according to principles typically asso-
ciated with deliberative democracy, e.g., exchanging impartial and non-self-
interested reasons in a fair process that other stakeholders could accept.
According to these views of Rawls’s theory, it allows typically marginalized
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groups to continue to be neglected in political decisions, such as people with
cognitive disabilities, or other family members besides the heads of households.
Furthermore, Rawls’s theory discourages institutional reform, and violates the
principle of democracy by discouraging citizens from debating issues in polit-
ical forums, if doing so might threaten the stability of the politico-legal struc-
ture. Finally, (if he rejects Cohen’s view that he is deliberative democratist)
his theory commits him to allowing self-interested and group-based bargaining,
which Gutmann and Thompson argue conflicts with the principle of equality.
In the next chapter, I will present Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, which
they develop in response to these problems with standard liberal democratic
theories and the practices built on them.
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Chapter 3
Deliberative democracy in
theory
3.1 Introduction
For Gutmann and Thompson, the driving idea behind deliberative democracy
is that, “when citizens deliberate in democratic politics, they express and re-
spect their status as political equals even as they continue to disagree about
important matters of public policy.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 18) Gut-
mann and Thompson recognize and accept that citizens rarely come to agree-
ment about political issues. They do not hold that deliberative democracy
ought to strive for an ideal of consensus to resolve particular political deci-
sions. Rather, the aim of deliberative democracy is to enable citizens to come
to terms with their disagreement in a way that treats them all with the equal
respect that they deserve, according to the tenets of democracy.
However, Gutmann and Thompson (2004, 27) do hold that citizens should
all be willing to agree that, “Finding fair terms of cooperation among free and
equal persons is a common good for both individuals and society as a whole.”
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Thus, their theory is meant to provide a principled way to achieve the goals of
democracy in this sense, i.e., of protecting citizens’ basic liberties, including
the opportunity to participate in political decision-making that affects them,
given their moral disagreement with one another that affects their views in
politics. In this chapter, I will outline the principles that they argue best fulfil
the principles of democracy, by drawing from their two books, Democracy and
Disagreement and Why Deliberative Democracy?
3.1.1 The aims of deliberative democracy
In 1996, Gutmann and Thompson published their first book-length treatment
of deliberative democracy, Democracy and Disagreement. There, the theory
is presented primarily as a response to the challenge of how to deal with the
conflict that arises about political issues as a result of citizens’ conflicting
moral commitments. A particular worry that the book is meant to address
is that in the face of political disagreement, citizens increasingly seem to ei-
ther simply neglect each others’ moral claims, or respond to them with con-
tempt.(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 12) Gutmann and Thompson locate
the source of this worry in the shortage of three features in public discourse:
reciprocity, publicity, and accountability.(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 14–
5) In §3.1.4, I will outline the principles – including these three – that Gutmann
and Thompson advance to improve democratic decision-making in a way that
is responsive to this problem they identify with contemporary politics.
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue that there should be more opportu-
nities in politics to address disagreement through respectful public discourse
between citizens and political officials. To be clear, Gutmann and Thompson
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allow that addressing political issues in majoritarian representative and con-
stitutionalist institutions may be legitimate. However, the legitimacy of these
institutions depends on how well-supported they are once they are reviewed
by the people in deliberative democratic institutions.
In 2004, Gutmann and Thompson published their second book, Why Delib-
erative Democracy? In it, they respond to a different but related problem for
modern liberal democracies. They instead emphasize how their theory may
resolve the problem of legitimate decision-making in contemporary politics.
That is, they address the problem of how institutions should create legitimate
laws and policies about divisive issues facing many democratic societies, such
as health care.
One of the issues that Gutmann and Thompson address is that in many
modern liberal democracies there are too few resources for everyone to get
what they may feel is their fair share. Although citizens may never reach
agreement about how much each person should get, as Gutmann and Thomp-
son argue, “In the face of scarcity, deliberation can help those who do not get
what they want, or even what they need, to come to accept the legitimacy of
a decision.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 10) Individuals may deeply dis-
agree about political decisions, especially those that significantly affect their
interests. But Gutmann and Thompson’s view is that even those who do not
get what they want or need may be more willing to accept decisions made
by political institutions as legitimate, if the institutions strive to make their
decisions in a way that fulfils Gutmann and Thompson’s principles.
Gutmann and Thompson argue that compared to other theories, includ-
ing that of Rawls, their principles (see §3.1.4) provide a superior strategy for
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addressing disagreement, and in a way that facilitates the goal of making de-
cisions that citizens will be willing to accept even if they continue to disagree.
Contrary to Rawls’s theory, theirs may be used to address any subject of dis-
agreement, no matter how fundamental the question, or how controversial.
Recall that earlier (see §2.5), Gutmann and Thompson objected that Rawls’s
theory privileged political stability over citizens’ freedom to challenge the legit-
imacy of the basic structure, or to debate deeply controversial issues. Not only
may their principles be used to address current controversial issues, they may
also illuminate where past decisions have gone wrong, even in regards to the
basic structure. In the next section, I will outline Gutmann and Thompson’s
account of the justification and legitimacy they advance for modern liberal
democracies.
3.1.2 Political justification
In the opening pages of Why Deliberative democracy?, Gutmann and Thomp-
son make the justificatory role of deliberative democracy explicit:
Deliberative democracy makes room for many other forms of decision-
making (including bargaining among groups, and secret operations
ordered by executives), as long as the use of these forms themselves
is justified at some point in a deliberative process.(Gutmann and
Thompson, 2004, 3)
As I mentioned earlier (§2.6), Gutmann and Thompson allow that justified
political decisions may be made using non-deliberative democratic processes,
such as bargaining. However, for any political decision, including which pro-
cess(es) to use to make a decision, the decision is only justified insofar as it
is reviewed in a process that fulfils the principles of deliberative democracy.
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Or, a deliberative democratic process may be used retrospectively to review a
decision that has already been made in some other process, such as decisions
about which electoral system to use, or the structure of legislatures. So, for
instance, a policy that results from bargaining may be justified, but only if
a deliberative democratic process is used to choose or review the choice to
accept bargaining as a legitimate way to settle an issue.
For Gutmann and Thompson, justifying political decisions to citizens rests
on doing so in a process that is in accordance with the principles of deliberative
democracy. This raises the question of how to further specify that process. In
response, say Gutmann and Thompson,
Public policies are justifiable insofar as they satisfy the principles
that constitute both the content and the conditions of delibera-
tive democracy (e.g., publicity, respectfulness, equality), accord-
ing to the best understanding of the meaning and implications of
each that citizens can achieve at any particular time.(Gutmann
and Thompson, 1996, 229)
It is important to note that according to this passage, deliberative democracy
is not merely one way among many to reach justified political decisions. In
saying that public policies are justifiable insofar as they satisfy their princi-
ples, Gutmann and Thompson imply that fulfilling the principles of deliber-
ative democracy at some point in the decision-making process is a necessary
condition for the justification of political decisions.
Three further points come through in this statement about the justification
for political decision-making by Gutmann and Thompson. First, they (rightly,
I think) conceive of justification for political decisions as a matter of degree.
This implies that it is not, by contrast, a dichotomous matter of being justified
or not. Nor is it obviously a threshold concept, whereby for a decision to be
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just, the principles must be fulfilled to a certain degree. Perhaps a threshold
may be chosen for pragmatic reasons, to determine what decision ought to be
made. But the justification for doing will also be a matter of disagreement,
and must be determined in a deliberative democratic process if it is to be just.
Second, their theory recognizes the fallibility of current judgements about
how best to fulfil the principles of liberal democracy. However, that does not
undermine the possibility of making justified decisions. The best we can do,
and what we ought to do, is continue to try to figure out both how best to
resolve political issues in the face of deep disagreement in general, and given
the implications that general answer holds for how we ought to determine any
particular case before us.
Third, whether a policy-making procedure fulfils the principles of deliber-
ative democracy is itself to be determined by our best judgements about that.
If there is disagreement about the extent to which decisions meet the princi-
ples of deliberative democracy among the general citizenry, that is a matter
to be resolved through further public deliberation in a process that best ap-
proximates the understanding the citizenry has of the principles of deliberative
democracy.
3.1.3 The methodology of deliberative democracy
In the following passage, Gutmann and Thompson state what sets their theory
apart from others, including Rawls’s:
Deliberative democracy, in contrast, admits reasons and principles
that are suitable for actual societies, which all still suffer from dis-
crimination and other kinds of injustice. Actual deliberation has
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an important advantage over hypothetical agreement: it encour-
ages citizens to face up to their actual problems by listening to one
another’s moral claims rather than concluding (on the basis of only
a thought experiment) that their fellow citizens would agree with
them on all matters of justice if they were all living in an ideal
society.(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 16)
Recall that in §2.2, the objection was raised that Rawls’s idealizations com-
promised the applicability of his theory to actual societies. Because Gutmann
and Thompson’s theory is grounded in actual discourse in actual societies, it
avoids this problem.
Two other epistemic advantages result from Gutmann and Thompson’s
insistence on actual public discourse about political issues. First, engaging
in actual public discourse may correct people’s beliefs that their positions on
political issues are uncontroversial. As discussed in the previous chapter, unless
people engage in dialogue with others, and discuss their values and beliefs with
others, they may mistakenly believe that few if any others disagree with them.
Discussing political issues with others, then, may show people that there are
those who object to their views.
The other epistemic advantage of actual public discourse is that the objec-
tions others have may bring to people’s attention mistakes or problems in their
reasoning. In other words, they may realize that others disagree for reasons
that change a person’s own view about the issue at hand. These mistakes may
be errors in their reasoning process, such as making a bad inference that does
not follow from the facts that they believe are true. Or actual discourse may
strengthen people’s positions by exposing the uncertainty or falsity of beliefs
that underlie their positions.
Because of its ability to improve the epistemic grounds for decision-making,
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Gutmann and Thompson argue that beliefs about citizens’ acceptance of po-
litical decisions is only justified once that belief has been tested in a process
that fulfils their deliberative democratic principles. Imagining oneself with
interlocutors will not do as a substitute for actual dialogue with others, to
determine whether citizens are satisfied with current institutions. For, all too
often, people wrongly assume that others think as they do about things, and
they fail to see the errors in their reasoning that discourse with others could
bring to light.
Deliberative democracy is committed to making political decisions through
deliberative public discussion wherever possible. However, because their the-
ory rests most fundamentally on public deliberation to make and justify polit-
ical decisions, they acknowledge that they face the following question: “How
is it possible for a theory to propose substantive principles to assess laws while
regarding citizens as the final moral judges of the laws they make?”(Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004, 111) That is, their commitment to public deliberation
to make and justify laws raises the question: how should we settle disagree-
ment between citizens about the principles of deliberation, their implications
for institutional design, or a particular political decision that results from a
deliberative democratic process?
Gutmann and Thompson respond that the principles of deliberative democ-
racy “are morally and politically provisional in ways that leave them open to
challenge, and therefore more amenable to democratic discretion.”(Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004, 111) They recognize that there will be disagreement
about what the principles of deliberative democracy mean in theory and in
practice. But the point of their theory is to bring all such disagreement to
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the fore, and to emphasize that citizens deserve an opportunity to voice their
deliberative views about all levels of politics. Not only should they be able to
voice their views on particular issues, such as abortion or public health insur-
ance, they should also have a say in how citizens should participate in politics
and how institutions should be structured.
Gutmann and Thompson describe their account as a “second-order the-
ory,” as opposed to a first-order theory. First-order theories, according to
Gutmann and Thompson (2004, 126), are those that “seek to resolve moral
disagreement by rejecting alternative theories or principles with which they
conflict.” The principles of a first-order theory are meant to resolve political
conflict by showing that it is better than any of the other alternatives. A
first-order theory may be judged as better or worse according to how well it
resolves the particular problem with which we are grappling, as well as how
well it is able to generalize over a variety of cases, or to be extended to other
issues we may face.
Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, on the other hand, is a second-order
theory. As they describe it, their theory “can be held consistently without
rejecting any of a wide range of moral principles expressed by first-order the-
ories.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 126) Their theory is meant to provide
a framework for evaluating reasons that people have for holding particular
views about political issues, even though individuals may disagree about their
commitments at the first-order level.
Deliberative democracy thereby respects the depths to which citizens may
disagree based on their moral differences. A political theory that is suitable
for a liberal democracy should not reject the principles that some people may
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hold as right for resolving political issues. Deliberative democracy respects
this pluralism since people may bring their disagreements about this – i.e.,
disagreement about first-order theories – to political discussions. Deliberative
democracy seems to have the advantage over Rawls’s theory as it was out-
lined in the last chapter then. Critics, including Gutmann and Thompson,
charged Rawls’s theory with unjustifiedly excluding or imposing certain ways
of decision-making, such as self-interested reasoning, or reasoning based on the
common good. According to Gutmann and Thompson, all of this is open for
deliberative discussion among citizens who are to be treated as equals.
As a result of the room that deliberative democracy leaves for disagreement
about first-order theories, determining what deliberative democracy implies
for any particular case will not be a matter of straightforward application
of the principles. The principles of deliberative democracy (which follow in
the next section) are not meant to provide an algorithm for resolving issues.
Deliberative democracy is meant to be fundamentally flexible, and based on
what best meets the demands of the particular society.
Which principles should be used or emphasized is to be determined by
those who are significantly involved and affected by the decision (who I will
refer to as “stakeholders”). In some cases, they may rely more heavily on some
principles, and not draw on others much if at all. In each case, the parties
involved are to engage in the reason-giving process with others, and to evaluate
each reason without rejecting any of them out of hand. In the remainder of
this chapter, I will present the principles that are fundamentally essential to
deliberative democracy, according to Gutmann and Thompson.
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3.1.4 The principles of deliberative democracy
Invoking the requirement that representatives publicly justify proposed laws
or policies raises the question of what form such justification ought to take in
modern democracies. Gutmann and Thompson offer the following summary
of the principles that, to the extent they are fulfilled, will serve to justify
government decisions:
...we can define deliberative democracy as a form of government
in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), jus-
tify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons
that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim
of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citi-
zens but open to challenge in the future.(Gutmann and Thompson,
2004, 7)
In other words, fulfiling the principles of deliberative democracy requires that
during actual discussions, individuals involved in the process must: treat
each other respectfully, offer reasons that are moral (i.e., not exclusively self-
interested), and ultimately, at some point, decide on an action to be taken,
but always remain open to revisiting and revising decisions in future.
However, Gutmann and Thompson argue that the goal of their theory is
fulfiling substantive principles as well, e.g., basic opportunity, fair opportu-
nity, and the basic liberty of individuals. They acknowledge that this raises
a difficulty for their theory, in that these principles are contested among in-
dividuals. About this challenge, Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 229) say,
“each element of the content of deliberation – basic liberty, basic opportunity,
and fair opportunity – depends on deliberative procedures to advance a com-
mon understanding of its substance.” To the extent that there is disagreement
about these fundamental principles, that is also to be settled through delibera-
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tive democratic forums, rather than trying to impose one’s own understanding
of them on others.
Equipped with this understanding of the nature of deliberative democratic
principles, and the role of those principles in justifying political decisions, I will
next outline the principles of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory of deliberative
democracy. In the following, they argue for their conception of the principles
that they regard as essential to deliberative democracy.
The principle of reciprocity
According to Gutmann and Thompson, the deliberative process for justify-
ing political decisions in a liberal democratic society is constrained, first and
foremost, by the principle of reciprocity. As they describe it, the principle of
reciprocity is the general rule that “a citizen offers reasons that can be accepted
by others who are similarly motivated to find reasons that can be accepted
by others.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 53) Whether citizens’ reasons are
acceptable depends on the views of others who are similarly disposed to engage
in public deliberation.
To elucidate the role of reciprocity as a constraint on the process of de-
liberative democracy, Gutmann and Thompson draw an analogy between its
role and the replicability requirement they identify in science.(Gutmann and
Thompson, 2004, 133–4) As they put the point,
Reciprocity is to justice in political ethics what replication is to
truth in science. A finding of truth in science requires replicabil-
ity, which calls for public demonstration. A finding of justice in
political ethics requires reciprocity, which calls for public delibera-
tion.(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 133)
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In science, being able to replicate the results of a study or experiment publicly
is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for justifying an hypothesis
as true. Just so in politics, argue Gutmann and Thompson. Establishing
a political decision as justified depends on whether it can withstand public
scrutiny by stakeholders.
Another similarity between science and politics is that just as in science,
there are some truths that we no longer need to revisit. In science, we no longer
need to replicate experimental results once they have been “amply confirmed.”
Just so in politics, where we no longer need to deliberate over entitlements
such as that all citizens have equal protection under the law. For this has
been established already, through extensive public deliberation.(Gutmann and
Thompson, 2004, 133–4)
The point of providing publicly accessible reasons for our beliefs to others is
that although our beliefs may well be right or true, they aren’t justified as such
until they undergo public scrutiny under conditions that meet the principle of
reciprocity. For, subjecting one’s evidence and reasoning to public scrutiny in
science is meant to give others an opportunity to bring to light countervailing
evidence or objections to the reasoning of the scientist. It ensures that the
claim is sufficiently robust to be justified as true.1
According to Gutmann and Thompson, the principle of reciprocity does
not entail that citizens must deliberate over every decision that affects them.
Their theory permits that, for example, representative forms of government
may be justified, and may make justified decisions. Allowing someone else,
1I am grateful to Robert Batterman for introducing me to the concept of robustness as
a standard for assessing truth.
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such as an elected representative, to make a political decision on citizens’
behalf may fulfil the requirement of reciprocity if decision-makers take into
account citizens’ views, not only about a particular issue at hand, but also,
about how decisions ought to be made. The process of public deliberation,
in which the citizens who are affected exchange reasons with each other and
decision-makers, confers legitimacy on the process in virtue of its publicity and
engagement with stakeholders.
As I argued earlier, this requirement may serve three aims. First, it may
serve as an epistemic checkpoint for the representative, that she understands
her constituents’ interests. Second, it may serve to show constituents the
moral respect they deserve as political equals. And third, it highlights the
requirement that processes should be designed so that representatives continue
to communicate with their constituents.
Gutmann and Thompson acknowledge that merely having a disposition
to take seriously others’ values and beliefs will not enable us to resolve all
disagreements. However, the best way to proceed in the face of political dis-
agreement is to continue to exchange reasons with one another in accordance
with the principles of deliberative democracy. That is, reasons should continue
to be given for one’s own position that could reasonably be accepted by others,
who are similarly disposed to offer reasons that are acceptable to others than
themselves, in a process that must have some conclusion. And any conclusion
must also be open to revision in the light of new considerations raised by those
affected by the decision.
Gutmann and Thompson argue for the superiority of actual discussion
about moral disagreements versus hypothetical reasoning on the following
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grounds, as well:
Political theories that cope with irreconcilable disagreement by a
(hypothetical) social agreement to disagree on these questions –
letting each individual decide – seem increasingly evasive. They
offer a false impartiality in place of social recognition of the per-
sistence of fundamental conflicts of value in our society.(Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004, 78)
As I stated in the introduction of the previous chapter, social contract theories
try to find alternatives that the parties could generally accept. One way of
achieving that aim is to find a solution that as much as possible, allows people
to “agree to disagree”. For, it only builds into the contract that to which the
parties would agree.
But, as Gutmann and Thompson charge, this runs the risk of making it ap-
pear as though the decision that has been reached is “neutral” because it seems
to favour no particular position at all on the issue. Gutmann and Thompson
object that this perpetuates a false impression that a justified outcome has
been reached because a resolution has been reached with which all are able to
agree.2 Instead, however, the controversy has merely been effectively removed
from the political agenda, but the disagreement has not actually been resolved.
2One example of this may be the ruling in France to prohibit Muslim girls from wearing
headscarves to public school. One principled reason that has been given for the policy is
that prohibiting visible symbols of religious commitments serves to maintain secularism in
public schools. However, the move has also been publicly defended on grounds that the
headscarves are symbolic of the oppressive role that women have in their community, and
so the prohibition is justified in order to promote the equality of women. The first principle
against visible symbols of one’s religious commitments seems to apply equally to everyone,
and so may appear as though it is impartial. But the second principle seems to target one
particular group and restrict its freedoms. E.g., it would seem to allow students to wear
crucifixes, so long as they were discreet, which seems unfair. Thus, although it appears as
though no one has reason to reject the policy, at least one group – viz., Muslim girls who
are old enough to choose to wear headscarves, and argue that doing so is not only a symbol
of their religious commitment, but also a symbol of their autonomous rejection of Western
values – may have good reason for rejecting the rule.
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Gutmann and Thompson argue that allowing moral disagreement into pub-
lic discussions provides citizens with an opportunity to “explore the full im-
plications of their arguments” for the particular moral view they hold on a
political issue.(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 78) This is important because
it may improve the grounds of our arguments, by improving stakeholders’ un-
derstandings about how their positions may affect others. And it may also
change the attitudes and values that ground our and others’ initial positions.
The best hope we have of truly resolving disagreement in a way that results
in politically justified decisions is through the respectful exchange of moral
reasons for our differences, in a process that meets the principle of reciprocity
and the other principles of deliberative democracy.
Respectful reasons
Besides being part of a justificatory standard for the process of reason-giving,
the principle of reciprocity refers to a disposition that is to be adopted by
citizens in the process of exchanging reasons. As Gutmann and Thompson
describe it, the principle of mutual respect “requires a favorable attitude
toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one dis-
agrees.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 79) So, the parties involved in the
deliberation must be willing to seriously engage with and consider the reasons
that others have for their conflicting positions, insofar as others are willing to
do the same.
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Moral reasons
Another constraint meant to serve the principle of reciprocity is that reasons
must be moral. As Gutmann and Thompson put it, the standard for whether
reasons are moral depends on whether they are generalizable, so that “moral
arguments apply to everyone who is similarly situated in morally relevant
respects.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 147) Reasons should only justify
one’s views if their acceptance does not depend on the unfair advantage of
those who are advancing them.
Gutmann and Thompson recognize that this raises the question, “what are
the morally relevant respects in which people are similarly situated?”(Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004, 148) For example, suppose that someone (Bob) disagrees
with another person (Anne) about who should be provided with public drug
insurance, how, and under what circumstances. Bob believes that, at a min-
imum, the government should ensure that all recipients of disability pensions
(a category that includes himself) are provided with public drug insurance
programme. Anne believes that narrower constraints should apply, such as
a maximum income threshold, beyond which recipients of disability wouuld
not be provided with public drug insurance. In part, Anne’s position is mo-
tivated by concerns about the burden that Bob’s more inclusive programme
would place on those (including her), who sustain the public drug insurance
programme through their taxes. Bob’s position is motivated by his experience
that those who rely on disability pensions for their income are seriously bur-
dened by their health care costs, which do not affect the amount they receive
from the government.
The problem that the criterion of moral reasons raises is: how do we decide
61
whether to give either of these claims moral weight, or dismiss either or both
of them as merely self-interested – and hence, non-moral – arguments? Gut-
mann and Thompson argue that when the issue of whether a reason is moral
is in dispute, it is better to subject that issue to public discussion and deliber-
ation in accordance with the principles of deliberative democracy, rather than
uncritically allow self-interested reasons into the decision-making process.
The requirement that reasons be moral effectively excludes reasons “that
are intended to show that a policy is the best that all parties to the decision,
given their relative decision-making power, can expect to achieve.”(Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004, 148) So, in the example of Anne and Bob, it seems that
the criterion of morality is meant to prevent Anne from successfully making
her case solely because she is in a superior socioeconomic and political position.
For, that would violate the condition that reasons be generalizable, or in other
words, that they must be ones that someone in Bob’s position could accept.
It is unclear whether, if Bob and Anne were truly on equal footing, Bob would
be likely to accept Anne’s position, although he may well be forced to accept
it in reality. Instead, to fulfil the principles of deliberative democracy, they
ought to continue to reason with one another about what should be done in a
way that allows them to acknowledge each other’s interests and values.
Public/accessible reasons
Another principle that Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue must be fulfilled
in the service of reciprocity is publicity, i.e., that the reasons for political deci-
sions must be made public to those who are affected by them. This principle
goes hand-in-hand with the next principle to be discussed, accountability. For,
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citizens will be unable to evaluate the decisions made by officials unless they
know what decisions they have made and why.
It also relates to representatives’ obligation to serve the interests of their
constituents. Representatives are unlikely to be able to adequately determine
their constituents’ interests unless they have consulted with them on the issue
at hand. Ascertaining constituents’ views on issues seems to require that
constituents have some idea of what is going on in politics.
However, while Gutmann and Thompson advance a prima facie duty to
make reasons public, they also recognize that sometimes governments claim to
have good reasons that override this duty. Thus, rather than promote these
principles absolutely, Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 96) take as their main
task “to locate the place of a principle of publicity in deliberative democracy
to establish the basis for a presumption in favor of publicity and the authority
of claims of secrecy and other values that could rebut the presumption.” That
is, their goal is to determine under what conditions political officials may be
justified in not informing the constituency about their actions.
When political officials claim to have good reason for keeping political
secrets, such as national security, say Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 105),
“citizens are right to insist that the secret-keepers give an account of the
reasons for the secrets, and respond to demands to limit their scope.” Thus,
even if secrecy about the content of such decisions is necessary, this does
not justify foregoing the obligation of disclosure altogether. The government
still has an obligation to offer reasons why secrecy is needed. In this way,
the government remains accountable to the people significantly affected by its
decision. As Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 96) say, “publicity has its moral
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limits, but those limits themselves must be publicly affirmed. ”
Later, in Why Deliberative Democracy?, Gutmann and Thompson develop
the principle of publicity further, and rename it as the principle of accessibility.
The principle of accessibility not only entails that reasons be made public, but
that the content of these reasons must be expressed in a certain way to be
considered accessible as well. Gutmann and Thompson use the example of
President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq to demonstrate one way this principle
constrains reason-giving. They point out that several times, President Bush
claimed that “God was on his side,” with respect to the war in Iraq. However,
they argue that the principle of accessibility rules out appeals to God’s support
as justification for Bush’s decision, since it fails to be a reason that any member
of the general public could be expected to assess for its legitimacy.(Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004, 4)
Also, the requirement that constituents must be able to assess reasons
places a burden on experts involved in the decision-making process. The rea-
sons that experts offer must be cast in terms that those to whom they are
directed can understand and evaluate. For, as Gutmann and Thompson point
out, “a deliberative justification does not even get off the ground if those to
whom it is addressed cannot understand its essential content.”(Gutmann and
Thompson, 2004, 4) It is not enough merely to state one’s reasons to other
stakeholders; those reasons must be comprehensible for them to fulfil the prin-
ciple of accessibility.
Furthermore, Gutmann and Thompson require that citizens must be given
good reasons to accept the authority of experts who inform political decisions.
About the justification of relying on experts in political decision-making, Gut-
64
mann and Thompson (2004, 5) say:
Citizens are justified in relying on experts if they describe the basis
for the conclusions in ways that citizens can understand; and if
the citizens have some independent basis for believing the experts
to be trustworthy (such as a past record of reliable judgments,
or a decision-making structure that contains checks and balances
by experts who have reason to exercise critical scrutiny over one
another).
While this standard leaves much to be said about the degree and extent to
which accepting authority will be justified, this room for disagreement should
be seen as a virtue rather than a shortcoming, according to Gutmann and
Thompson. For, if there is disagreement about the weight that should be
given to the word of authorities, their theory makes room for settling this
issue by public deliberation.
The principle of accountability
The previous requirement, that reasons can be understood by those to whom
they are addressed, is important in part because it serves the principle of
accountability. The centrality of this principle is perhaps one of the most ap-
pealing features of deliberative democracy for many. That is, an increasing
number of citizens seem to be concerned about the apparent lack of account-
ability on the part of the government to the people.
According to Gutmann and Thompson, the principle of accountability re-
quires that citizens be accountable to each other and officials, and officials
are likewise accountable to each other and their citizens. However, they are
well aware that this “universal accountability is obviously difficult to real-
ize in practice,” and that “it is also problematic in theory: it does not fit
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comfortably with political representation, a necessary and desirable process in
deliberative democracy.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 128) The principle
of accountability requires that all those whose interests are at stake in partic-
ular decisions have an opportunity to evaluate the decisions that are made by
representatives on their behalf.
However, one reason why people accept representative institutions in poli-
tics is because they would rather leave some decisions in the hands of another,
e.g., in the interests of time, or they feel that someone else is better situ-
ated to make some decisions than they themselves are. But Gutmann and
Thompson’s theory seems to require that constituents must be able to evalu-
ate a representative’s decision. And, in order to evaluate the representative’s
decision, it seems as though a constituent must be able to determine what
she herself would have chosen. Thus, it seems as though fulfiling the require-
ments of deliberative democracy results in losing the benefits of representative
decision-making processes.
However, Gutmann and Thompson identify two questions that are raised
on the heels of this recommendation, “one concerning who gives the reasons,
and the other concerning to whom the reasons should be given.”(Gutmann
and Thompson, 1996, 128) Gutmann and Thompson answer that a strength of
deliberative democracy is its commitment to subjecting all political decisions,
including how best to represent conflicting interests, to a process of public
deliberation. For instance, a proposed improvement on the process concerning
representation that continues to be debated in the U.S. is limiting the amount
of money that can be spent on campaigning. Deliberative democracy would
seem to require that this issue be subjected to public discussion that would
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include all citizens, given its significant impact on everyone.
As Gutmann and Thompson put it, “deliberative democracy does not spec-
ify a single form of representation. It searches for modes of representation that
support the give-and-take of serious and sustained moral argument with leg-
islative bodies, between legislators and the citizens, and among the citizens
themselves.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 131) Thus, their theory allows
for flexibility in developing processes for determining what forms representa-
tion should take. But the point seems to be that the forms that would be
agreed to by constituents would result in a much more rigourous standard of
accountability than is currently the case.
For example, Gutmann and Thompson consider the case of a politician
whose own personal commitments about whether to support legalizing abor-
tions conflict with those of many of his constituents. Rather than recom-
mending a determinate decision about whether the politician should follow his
constituents’ commitments or his own, Gutmann and Thompson argue that
deliberative democracy emphasizes the important aspects of the dilemma that
require consideration, and a process for attempting to resolve it. For example,
to whom does the elected official owe reasons – only citizens in his state, or in
the rest of the U.S. as well, and is there adequate opportunity in the current
political structure to deliberate with citizens about the conflict?(Gutmann and
Thompson, 1996, 130)
In this way, the citizens and the elected official may work through the con-
flict in accordance with the principles of deliberative democracy. The elected
official may publicize his reasons for holding the view that he does, while still
recognizing the competing claims of other stakeholders. As Gutmann and
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Thompson describe these sorts of processes, “Voters could listen to their rea-
sons, present their own, and hold officials accountable at the next election,
if necessary choosing new representatives to reverse the decision.”(Gutmann
and Thompson, 1996, 142)
Gutmann and Thompson discuss their accountability principle in the in-
ternational context as well. In the example they consider, one group of city
officials in the U.S. is considering whether to send its toxic waste to the coun-
tries of Bangladesh and South Africa. In this case, the U.S. representatives
are in no way legally accountable to people whose interests stand to be greatly
affected. However, the people who stand to be greatly affected in Bangladesh
and South Africa are what Gutmann and Thompson refer to as “moral con-
stituents” of the U.S. officials.
Gutmann and Thompson acknowledge that representatives’ obligations to
their own constituents will differ from their obligations to others. Furthermore,
as they say, “deliberative democracy does not guarantee that the claims of
foreigners will receive the attention they deserve. Nor does it provide any
formula for determining how to balance the claims of our fellow citizens against
those of foreigners when they come into conflict.”(Gutmann and Thompson,
1996, 150) The theory does not guarantee that deliberation will be able to
determine the right answer about what is owed to non-U.S. citizens. However,
they argue that those who live in the proposed destination city ought to have
their interests and concerns heard in public deliberation as well, in accordance
with the principle of reciprocity.
Gutmann and Thompson point out that often countries that are approached
to make agreements with other countries are not democracies, in which the
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people who will be significantly affected will have an opportunity to have
their interests heard. Or, even if they are, often those who will be affected
have not been informed adequately, e.g., about the risks of being exposed to
hazardous toxins, or given the opportunity to accept their representatives’ de-
cision on their behalf as truly representative. They argue that when political
officials know that some stakeholders’ interests will not be taken into account
adequately through democratic mechanisms in their own country, political of-
ficials may have a moral obligation to take the interests of non-constituent
stakeholders into account in their decision-making. For instance, in this case,
the U.S. officials cannot rely on the South African government’s agreement to
take the toxic waste as adequate justification for imposing it on the citizens of
Bangladesh.(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 149)
Gutmann and Thompson argue that making international justice as de-
liberative as possible serves to “inform representatives about the claims of
foreigners,” and also “to educate citizens about their [the Bangladeshi and
South Africans’] circumstances.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 151) This
accords with one of the functions that Gutmann and Thompson advance for
their theory in the domestic context, to educate others about the moral reasons
that citizens have for their political views. In this case, considering the posi-
tions of stakeholders in other countries may serve to educate political officials
about the likely consequences of their decisions.
Also, Gutmann and Thompson emphasize two reasons for requiring “hor-
izontal justification”, which is owed between moral constituents. One reason
is that, as Gutmann and Thompson mentioned in their defence of reciprocity,
and as Rawls seems to agree, it is morally required by citizens. But, also, jus-
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tification between citizens is important because, as Gutmann and Thompson
(1996, 151) point out, “the more closely the perspectives of electoral con-
stituents track those of moral constituents, the more nearly the deliberative
principle of accountability can be realized.” If electoral constituents are sympa-
thetic to reasons grounded in the interests of the non-electoral, though moral,
constituents, then representatives will be more empowered to take the interests
of non-electoral constituents into account.
Binding decisions
Another requirement for political decision-making processes is that at some
point deliberation must end, and a decision must be made and implemented.
As Gutmann and Thompson point out, deliberative democracy theory may
raise the concern that its principles could impel us to continue talking indefi-
nitely, in an effort to work through disagreement. For them, the requirement
that a binding decision be made follows from the intended function of the
exercise:
In this respect the deliberative process is not like a talk show or
an academic seminar. The participants do not argue for argu-
ment’s sake; they do not even argue for truth’s sake (although the
truthfulness of their arguments is a deliberative virtue because it
is a necessary aim in justifying their decision). They intend their
discussion to influence a decision the government will make, or a
process that will affect how future decisions are to be made. At
some point, the deliberation temporarily ceases, and the leaders
make a decision.(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 5)
The reason for employing a deliberative democratic process is essentially to try
to determine what to do about a political issue about which citizens disagree.
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Thus, it follows that the process must have implications for decision-making,
which also presupposes that a decision will be made at some point.3
To illustrate the principle that the deliberative process must terminate with
a binding decision, Gutmann and Thompson return to the U.S. government’s
decision to invade Iraq. Some people may claim that the decision was unjus-
tified because the government was still facing heavy objections from critics at
the time of its decision. They may argue that the government had an obli-
gation to delay making a decision until more public deliberation took place,
which raises the question of when public deliberation ought to have ended.
Gutmann and Thompson (2004, 6) instead locate the controversy about
this decision in concerns about “the competence or judgment of the current
administration.” They argue that the problem with the decision was not in
the fact that the U.S. government took action in spite of the failure to achieve
a greater consensus about its decision. It was not that more deliberation
was needed. Rather, the government’s decision was unjustified because it
presented evidence that it knew to be false as the basis for its decision. Insofar
as the information on which it purportedly based its decision was false, the
government lost its justification for making the decision it did.
3The question of whether deliberative democracy conceptually entails that a determinate
decision must be made at some point is debated among deliberative democracy theorists. It
seems that a simple answer of “yes” – including in Gutmann and Thompson’s case – may
be ambiguous in the following sense. One may say that a decision necessarily results from
any process, whether the decision is to take an action that departs from the status quo or
not. That is, even if nothing is done on the basis of the process, arguably, a decision will
have been made and enacted, i.e., not take any (new) course of action, and to continue with
the status quo. It is unclear to me whether this is the view that Gutmann and Thompson
mean to take, or if they mean something stronger.
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The principle of revisability
The Iraq example serves to illustrate another worry that is raised by the re-
quirement that a decision must be made. That is, some may worry that the
principle that a binding decision must be made may lead to action that is too
hasty. For example, decisions may be made on the basis of faulty information
that given more time, would have been exposed as flawed. Also, circumstances
may change, which may affect the justifiability of decisions that were at one
time good ones, but now it seems should not have been taken.
Their appreciation of the fallibility of decision-makers, and the importance
of circumstances to the justification of decisions, motivates Gutmann and
Thompson’s principle that for any political decision made in a deliberative
democratic process, it must be possible to revisit it. As Gutmann and Thomp-
son (2004, 6) put the point, “although deliberation aims at a justifiable deci-
sion, it does not presuppose that the decision at hand will in fact be justified,
let alone that a justification today will suffice for the indefinite future.” The
principle of revisability is meant to address the fallibility of decision-makers,
and the possibility that the basis for decisions may significantly change.
Furthermore, the principle of revisability has pragmatically desirable con-
sequences. Gutmann and Thompson (2004, 6–7) point out that, “those cit-
izens and representatives who disagreed with the original decision are more
likely to accept it if they believe they have a chance to reverse or modify it in
the future.” It is much more likely that people will accept decisions that are
explicitly provisional than decisions that are presented as final.
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3.2 Conclusion
To summarize, it is a process of public deliberation, in which the citizens who
are affected have the opportunity to exchange reasons for their views about
how decisions ought to be made, that confers legitimacy on decisions made by
individuals in deliberative democratic institutions. First, the deliberative pro-
cess serves as an epistemic checkpoint for the representative and constituents,
that they understand each others’ interests and beliefs. For, these should be
the basis for political reasoning. Second, it shows constituents the moral re-
spect they deserve as political equals. And third, it serves to better ensure
that the laws that are subsequently created will have the support of the people.
Although the principles of deliberative democracy have much to recom-
mend them, in the following chapters, I will raise a number of principled
concerns with the structure of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory. First, how-
ever, I will respond to the criticisms to Rawls’s theory that I presented in
Chapter 2. My responses to Rawls’s critics are intended to make clearer why I
believe that Gutmann and Thompson are wrong to hold that the fundamental
goal of institutions should be to strive to fulfil the principles of deliberative
democracy, as they have argued. Instead, I will argue that the goal of fulfilling
Gutmann and Thompson’s principles should only be adopted in order to make
institutions and their decisions better justified according to Rawls’s theory of
political justification.
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Chapter 4
A defence of political liberalism
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, I presented a number of criticisms that Gutmann and Thompson,
as well as others, raise against Rawls’s theory. In this chapter, I will develop a
Rawlsian response to those objections. The Rawlsian account of political justi-
fication I defend here will then serve as the basis for my criticisms of Gutmann
and Thompson’s theory, which I will advance in the following chapters. On the
basis of those criticisms, I will conclude that deliberative democratic theories
such as Gutmann and Thompson’s must be situated within a Rawlsian frame-
work. In practice, this means that deliberative democratic processes will only
be legitimate to the extent that they are supported by the Rawlsian frame-
work that I describe in this chapter. Furthermore, the decisions produced by
deliberative democratic processes will only be justified insofar as they meet
the Rawlsian standard of public reason that I defend here.
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4.2 Internal monologue versus explicit dialogue
One of the main objections that Gutmann and Thompson make to Rawls’s
theory is that justification for political decisions is based on hypothetical rather
than actual agreement between citizens. As I discussed in §2.1, Rawls relies
on hypothetical reasoning because relying on actual public discourse to settle
political disagreement has two important shortcomings. First, we cannot rely
on actual public discourse because of what Gutmann and Thompson refer to
as the burdens of injustice. The burdens of injustice are those elements of
the current structure that seem clearly to be contrary to the principles of
democracy. However, these elements remain in place because those who could
change them are well-served by that structure, and have significant incentive
not to do so.
Second, the burdens of judgement prevent us from relying on public dis-
course to determine political decisions as well.(Rawls, 2005, 54–58) These are
the circumstances that lead to disagreement among reasonable people, no mat-
ter how much they discuss political issues. These include reasonable people’s
values and beliefs, and the meanings they ascribe to concepts involved in po-
litical issues. And they will also disagree about, e.g., what information should
count as evidence for any particular position, how much weight it adds to the
strength of a position, etc.
As I pointed out in my discussion of their principle of reciprocity in §3.1.4,
Gutmann and Thompson draw an analogy between justifying claims about
what is true in science and how to determine which decisions are justified in
politics. They argue that publicly replicating experimental results in science
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serves a purpose similar to publicly defending political decisions to stakehold-
ers. In both contexts, the process of publicly defending claims in open view of
others improves the justificatory basis of the decision.
In his discussion of the burdens of judgement, Rawls also contrasts the role
of public discourse in the context of science with that of politics. When Rawls
(2001, 35) compares the two contexts, however, he draws a somewhat different
conclusion. Within science, it seems as though public discourse eventually set-
tles controversies and disputes about the truth. But ongoing public discourse
in politics rarely seems to bring the parties to agreement about what the state
ought to do about political issues. If what justifies claims in science is that
eventually the parties involved come to agreement, then in politics, we need
an alternative standard to adjudicate between conflicting claims about what
is right, for agreement in the latter context rarely obtains.
In spite of these limitations of public discourse, Rawls explicitly acknowl-
edges its valuable role in a well-functioning democracy:
Here I am concerned only with a well-ordered constitutional democ-
racy [...] understood also as a deliberative democracy. The defini-
tive idea for a deliberative democracy is the idea of deliberation
itself. When citizens deliberate, they exchange views and de-
bate their supporting reasons concerning public political questions.
They suppose that their political opinions may be revised by dis-
cussion with other citizens; and therefore these opinions are not
simply a fixed outcome of their existing private or non-political
interests.(Rawls, 1997, 772)
Clearly, Rawls recognizes the important role that public deliberation among
citizens can play in maintaining the stability and order of a modern liberal
democracy.
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And this quote suggests that he agrees with Gutmann and Thompson about
the potential advantages of public discourse. Both acknowledge that engaging
in public discourse with one another gives people the opportunity to reflect on
their positions on political issues in light of others’ perspectives. And public
debate and deliberation about their reasons and views may result in changes
to citizens’ own, as well as others’, views about the issues under discussion.
Indeed, according to Rawls, citizens have a moral obligation to explain
their own views about political issues to each other. As he says,
[...], the ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty
– the duty of civility – to be able to explain to one another on
those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they
advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of
public reason.(Rawls, 2005, 217).
A citizen has a moral obligation to offer reasons for her views about political
issues to others, and to explain why she believes that others should view her
position as a reasonable one to hold. A person has this obligation because if the
state is making decisions in accordance with the principles of liberal democracy,
citizens will each carry some amount of responsibility for the actions it takes.
And these decisions will have implications for other citizens’ abilities to live
out their conceptions of the good. Because of their shared responsibility for
the actions of the state, and because individuals in a stable and well-ordered
modern liberal democracy must (as I will argue below) recognize each other as
moral equals, citizens have an obligation to account to one another for their
political views and the ways that they act to direct government.1
1I think it is noteworthy that the way Rawls has worded this implies that the duty
of civility does not require that citizens defend why they hold the view they do, in its
77
However, the aim of Rawls’s theory is not to address the question of how
citizens are to fulfil this moral obligation to one another. Its central aim is to
develop a principled account of how to determine how to structure political
institutions, and how democratic institutions ought to make their decisions,
given persistent disagreement among citizens about these questions. Following
Rawls, my account is not opposed to the idea that public discourse may be used
for that end, or that the principles that Gutmann and Thompson outline may
be good ones. But the Rawlsian account that I defend here rejects resting the
justification of political decisions on public discourse because of the burdens of
injustice and judgement. It is meant to supplement their view with an account
of when and in what ways aspiring to fulfil their principles may be justified.
4.3 Unattainable idealizations
In Chapter 2, two sources of concern with Rawls’s theory that I presented
were: the idealization of a reasonable overlapping consensus about a public
political conception of justice that is egalitarian, and the idealization of gen-
eral, widespread support for constitutionalism in modern liberal democracies.
Rawls’s critics charged that such idealizations are problematic because not
only are they unrealistic, but also, the theory draws one’s attention away from
the important fact that reality departs from the ideal.
In response, I argue that what appear to be idealizations in Rawls’s theory
are in fact better thought of as conditions2 that must be true of a society to
requirement that they show it to be reasonable. If they are able to show the reasonableness
of their view without spelling out their own personal reasons for endorsing it, this rightly
seems as though it would be fine on Rawls’s account.
2What I am calling conditions here may be thought of as preconditions in Rawls’s own
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some extent in order for a modern liberal democracy to remain stable and
well-ordered. To the extent that they are not, the strength of the democracy
will be compromised.
Rawls describes his approach to the problem of maintaining a modern
liberal democracy in the following passage:
The point, then, is that the problem of stability is not that of
bringing others who reject a conception to share it, or to act in ac-
cordance with it, by workable sanctions, if necessary, as if the task
were to find ways to impose that conception once we are convinced
it is sound. Rather, justice as fairness is not reasonable in the first
place unless in a suitable way it can win its support by address-
ing each citizen’s reason, as explained within its own framework.
Only so is it an account of the legitimacy of political authority as
opposed to an account of how those who hold political power can
satisfy themselves, and not citizens generally, that they are acting
properly.(Rawls, 2005, 38-9)3
The point I wish to make with this lengthy quote is a methodological one.
Rawls does suppose that most individuals in a stable and well-ordered modern
liberal democracy hold egalitarian conceptions of justice, and endorse a consti-
tutional democratic regime. But he makes this move because his strategy for
developing a theory of justice is to begin with the question: what conditions
account. ‘Preconditions’ seems more appropriate in his account, since he is not, I think,
explicit about their necessity in a stable and well-ordered modern liberal democracy. I refer
to them as ‘conditions’ in my analysis, however, since one of my goals is to make explicit
the importance of these assumptions in his theory and in reality.
3Having argued in §1.3 that Rawls admits other principles than justice as fairness to
comprise the standard of public reason, I will not further elucidate or defend the principles
that Rawls advances. Instead, I will focus on how Rawls conceives of the role of reasonable
conceptions of justice within the framework of his theory of political liberalism. I agree
with Rawls’s concession that other conceptions of egalitarianism than justice as fairness
may support a stable and well-ordered liberal democracy, which is reflected in his theory
of political liberalism, although I agree with Rawls (2005, 149-50) that justice as fairness is
the best public political conception of justice for a welfare egalitarian society.
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are necessary to support a stable and well-ordered modern liberal democracy?
On his view, the most fundamental conditions are that a significant propor-
tion of the population is egalitarian, and that the constitutional essentials can
garner widespread support from those citizens.
Then, Rawls uses his answer to this question to build an account of political
justification that is suitable for modern liberal democracies. That is, it is
meant to be a theory of political justification and legitimacy that is applicable
to nation-states, insofar as they are recognizable as stable and well-ordered
modern liberal democracies. Countries that may be included in this category
are Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and its constituent countries.
This point provides a response to objections raised by Cohen and Gut-
mann and Thompson. They charged that Rawls’s theory is structured so that
its most fundamental aim is to protect the political structure for the sake of
maintaining stability and order. However, on my view, according to political
liberalism, designing institutions in the ways that Rawls’s framework recom-
mends is only justified if there is good reason to believe that the people are or
would be satisfied with those institutions and the decisions likely to come out
of them, given citizens’ own conceptions of the good.4 It is not that the state
is justified in doing whatever it can to try to bring about this state of affairs;
it is that this state of affairs must obtain, as a matter of fact, for the state to
be legitimate.
4Later I will discuss the epistemic issue of how to know whether there is support for
existing institutions, or political decisions that have been made or are under consideration.
Also, in §4.5, I will defend my view that citizens have good reason to endorse a political
structure that protects it from change for the sake of stability and order to some extent.
These arguments are not, however, meant to show how legitimate any particular constitu-
tional structure is, in a particular society. That remains to be determined, on the basis of
empirical data about the particular society in question.
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His most fundamental condition is that most of the people in the society
must view each other as equals, in order for a modern liberal democracy to
persist. If the state’s decisions are to be determined by “the people”, and
if the state is also to make decisions that recognize the equality of citizens,
then a significant proportion of citizens must be committed to the principle of
equality. If a significant proportion of citizens do not subscribe to a principle
of equality in some form, then on my view, it will be unlikely that state in-
stitutions will be able to force them to do so in a way that is democratically
justified. My theory highlights that under these conditions of prevailing ine-
galitarianism, it will be impossible for governments to make decisions that are
supported by “the people” and that also treat them as equals.
However, the bare fact that a significant proportion of the population sub-
scribes to a principle of equality is certainly not sufficient for political officials
to be able to make democratically justified decisions. Even though people may
subscribe to a principle of equality, the principles of equality that individuals
in modern liberal democracies hold are often substantially different from one
another’s. These differences are likely to lead to conflicting views about what
the government ought to do about particular political issues. Thus, individuals
may hold such conflicting conceptions of equality that it is impossible for the
state to make decisions that are satisfactory enough to most of the population
to uphold the legitimacy of politico-legal institutions. The second challenge
that my Rawlsian framework identifies is that there must be prevailing support
among the (predominantly egalitarian) population for a set of constitutional
essentials that define the society’s political institutions.
As two examples of egalitarian conceptions of justice that may conflict,
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some people may subscribe to a libertarian principle of equality, which gives
primacy to protecting individuals’ (negative) rights to be kept free from others’
interference in their lives. Others may hold a more welfarist principle of equal-
ity, which places primary importance on ensuring that all people have their
basic needs met, even if this means state interference into people’s private lives
(in the form of taxation). If a significant proportion of the population holds
these two conflicting conceptions of equality, this may pose a serious challenge
for the state when it comes to making democratically justified decisions, e.g.,
about taxation.
The account of political justification that I am developing here does not
discriminate against any of these and the many other conceptions of equality
that reasonable citizens may hold. The challenge for political officials (and
for my theory) is how to make decisions given these conflicting conceptions of
equality. On my view, decisions must be made in a way that allows current
citizens, as well as those in the foreseeable future, to remain satisfied5 enough
with the institutions to continue to see them as authoritative. Moreover,
they must view the institutions and their decisions as authoritative because
enough aspects of the institutions and the decisions they make resonate enough
with individuals’ views about what are fair terms of social cooperation for
the institutions and their decisions to maintain authoritative force for their
intended subjects.
Given the disagreement that will persist about political issues, institutions
will necessarily make decisions about which there will always be some disagree-
5I will explain in what sense I am using the term ‘satisfaction’ in more detail in later
sections of this chapter.
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ment. But I will argue that, nonetheless, it may be possible for institutions to
remain legitimate and to make justified decisions. They may do so insofar as
citizens are able to remain satisfied with the institutions as they are specified
by the constitutional essentials.
The people’s recognition of each other as moral equals is one of the features
of modern liberal democracies that I believe allows them to persist in spite of
the people’s disagreement about politics. When they regard each other as
moral equals, citizens will be more likely to accept the government’s efforts
to accommodate those conflicting views. If, on the other hand, some people
regard others as inferior or undeserving of consideration by the state in its
decisions, then it will be much more difficult, if not impossible, for the state
to make decisions that take those others’ views into account and maintain the
satisfaction of the people in a way that allows it to remain legitimate. That is,
it will be more difficult to make decisions that are conducive to the satisfaction
of a significant proportion of its citizens with the institutions over time.
4.4 Reasonable persons
Underlying the requirement of egalitarianism among a significant proportion
of the population is the most basic criterion that citizens must meet in order
for their satisfaction to count towards the justification for political decisions:
they must be reasonable. The criterion of reasonableness as it applies to
persons serves to exclude those whose satisfaction ought not to determine po-
litical decisions.6 Specifically, it excludes the satisfaction of those who do not
6As I will argue below, my Rawlsian framework does not exclude the interests of people
who are not reasonable – i.e., do not have the powers of reason – from counting in po-
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accept that other reasonable7 people may legitimately hold conflicting views
about political issues, and the government ought to take into account reason-
able people’s disagreement in its decision-making. Although individuals who
are unreasonable may be satisfied with them, institutions and their decisions
should not be evaluated according to how well they maintain the satisfaction
of unreasonable people with the institutions involved in the decisions, over
time.
For citizens’ satisfaction to count towards political justification they must
be free. And citizens are only free in the sense that matters for determining
political institutions and their decisions if they are reasonable and rational.
Rawls (2005, 19) explains the requirements as follows: “The basic idea is that
in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice and for a
conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of judgement, thought, and
inference connected with these powers), persons are free.”
For individuals to be reasonable in Rawls’s sense, they must have what
Rawls refers to as the two moral powers: first, they must be able to formulate,
revise, and determine how to rationally pursue a conception of the good, and
second, they must have a developed capacity for a sense of justice. It is impor-
tant to distinguish between the Rawlsian criterion of reasonableness and the
concept of rationality, which is also a condition for individuals’ satisfaction to
count towards the legitimacy of political institutions. Reasonableness presup-
poses that someone is rational, but the reverse does not necessarily hold true.
litical decision-making. However, consideration of their interests is mediated through the
satisfaction of those who do meet the condition of reasonableness.
7Unless I specify otherwise, ‘reasonable’ is being used in its Rawlsian sense, i.e., to refer
to persons or doctrines that accept others who hold conflicting values and beliefs as morally
equal.
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In other words, a person who is reasonable will also necessarily be rational,
but a person who is rational may not be reasonable, in Rawls’s sense.
Although the concept of rationality is much contested in philosophy, for my
purposes, the important point is that a person is able to order and determine
how to achieve the ends that she has adopted for herself. As Rawls says,
in our everyday conversations, we sometimes note the distinction between
rationality and reasonableness in statements such as the following: “Their
proposal was perfectly rational given their strong bargaining position, but
it was nevertheless highly unreasonable, even outrageous.”(Rawls, 2005, 48)
Someone may rationally favour ways of structuring institutions and making
decisions that were clearly unfair.8 But the criterion of reasonableness implies
that citizens are not only able to identify ends for themselves and formulate
ways to pursue them, but also, that they consider whether their choices would
treat others fairly as well.
This understanding of the reasonableness of persons relates to the criticisms
8A concrete example where the rational/reasonable distinction was recently invoked can
be found in a blog entry in the Leiter Report on 25 May 2010. There, Brian Leiter responds
to the announcement by Middlesex University that it was suspending faculty members who
had been involved in a peaceful demonstration to protest the University’s decision to close
its high-ranking philosophy department. As Leiter described the decision to suspend the
faculty members: “[...] given the character of the sanctions imposed, the administration’s
purpose [behind the suspensions] is quite clear: it is to silence protest, and make it more
difficult to organize opposition to the administrative decision to eliminate philosophy. The
Middlesex administrators are, indeed, bonkers, but they remain instrumentally rational in
their vicious behavior.”(Accessed 15 July 2010 at http://leiterreports.typepad.com/
blog/2010/05/more-on-the-middlesex-insanity.html.) As Leiter’s comments suggest,
assuming he is right about the goal of the university, the decision makes perfect sense as
a means to achieve that goal, and for that reason, is rational in Rawls’s sense of the term.
However, although the administration’s actions did seem clearly to be rational, they were
unreasonable in Rawls’s sense – or in Leiter’s terms, “bonkers”. This conclusion about
the administration follows because its actions, when considered in combination with other
actions taken by the administration, such as shutting staff out of previous discussions that led
up to the decision that the staff was protesting, seem to clearly demonstrate a commitment
to ignoring its staff’s views about decisions that significantly affected it.
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of Rawls’s theory raised by Okin and Nussbaum (see §2.4). Nussbaum objected
that Rawls’s criterion of reasonableness wrongly excludes some people, such as
those with cognitive impairments or disabilities, from consideration in political
decision-making that significantly affects them. In response, however, I wish
to distinguish between the ideas of political and moral equality. With respect
to those who are unreasonable, it is true that their satisfaction with political
institutions is not to count directly for or against political decisions. In this
way they are treated unequally, politically speaking.
But this does not imply that they should not and do not count as persons
with equal moral worth, in that their interests should still be taken into account
by those who do meet the conditions of reasonableness in the Rawlsian sense.
Based on those people’s reasonableness, and their commitment to a principle
of equality, their satisfaction with the institutions and their decisions must
take into account not only how their own interests are served, but those of
others – both reasonable and unreasonable – as well.
Thus far, I have argued that for individuals’ satisfaction to count towards
the legitimacy and justification of political institutions and their decisions
respectively, they must hold a principle of equality, and be reasonable, i.e.,
recognize the inherent moral worth of others. Later, when I discuss how to
understand the veil of ignorance (see §4.7), which is a model for how we ought
to think about justice, I will describe more fully in what sense people are to
consider the interests of others. For now, the point I wish to make is that the
condition of reasonableness does not exclude the interests of people who do
not meet it from consideration in political decisions; it does, however, exclude
their satisfaction with institutions and their decisions from counting towards
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political justification.
Turning to Okin’s critique, she objected to Rawls’s conception of the person
in the original position as the “head of the household”. For, as she argued,
this aspect of the theory reflects a mistaken assumption that is often reflected
in practice. That is, the judgements of the head of the household, typically a
man, are often taken to adequately represent those within the family, when in
fact, this obscures oppressive forces at work within the family.
Although there are a number of potential objections that may be raised
to this assumption, Okin’s main objection is that the internal workings of
families are often contrary to democratic principles. Political judgements held
by heads of households may not reflect the interests of the other members
of the family. As a result, we see the problems with the theory reflected in
practice, i.e., laws and structures that in fact privilege men and disadvantage
women are accepted as justified, based on the false belief that all have had an
equal say in their formulation and adoption.
I agree with Okin that the concept of heads of households is problematic,
and should be replaced by individuals as the arbiters of political justification
and legitimacy. On my view, what matters to the question of political jus-
tification is reasonable citizens’ satisfaction with the institutions making the
decisions. For anyone who is reasonable (whatever their position in the fam-
ily), it is their own satisfaction that counts for or against the justification of
political decisions.
And anyone who is not reasonable, e.g., children, should be taken into
account by considering what reasonable people believe would best serve their
interests. If reasonable individuals, including members of the family such
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as the parents of a child, disagree about what would serve the interests of
unreasonable people, both of those reasonable people’s views are to be taken
into account. Moreover, if an individual believes that other persons who have
equal moral status (in their own family or not) ought not to be taken into
account in political decision-making, that individual’s satisfaction with the
institutions ought not to count towards the justification of political decisions.
Although I agree with Okin that the concept, “heads of households”, should
be dispensed with, I disagree with Okin that political liberalism needs this con-
ceptual tool to address concerns about intergenerational justice. As I argue
throughout this chapter, political justification depends on the satisfaction of
reasonable people with the institutions making decisions, over time. The po-
litical justification for decisions that may significantly affect future generations
has the same basis as other sorts of decisions: institutions should make their
decisions based on the views of reasonable people who are currently members
of the society. How institutions should take into account future generations
depends on the conceptions of justice held by reasonable people.
The problem is, of course, that what serves the interests of citizens who
exist now may conflict with what it seems will serve the interests of future
generations. That is, the question of what is owed to future generations seems
to become an issue when there is the possibility of promoting the interests
of the current population, but only at the expense of future generations, or
vice versa. Members of the current population may legitimately ask, “Why
should my interests be compromised in order to serve the interests of those yet
to be?” And future generations, it seems, have a legitimate expectation that
previous decisions would have been made with some thought about the likely
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implications for them.
In response, my view does not preclude the possibility that current citizens
may concern themselves with the interests of future generations because of
familial feelings or concern about the welfare of their own future generations.
However, another reason that reasonable citizens may do so is because whether
individuals exist now or in the future is a morally arbitrary characteristic that
many people’s conceptions of equality recognize as such. To see this, consider
the reactions that many people have when confronted with the sometimes
brutal conditions throughout history in which people have lived. Many have
the reaction that at the very least, the people’s suffering was bad, and that
it would have been a better world had those affected not had to endure such
hardship. I submit that underlying this moral response is the recognition of
those affected as our moral equals.
A similar line of reasoning holds when we consider future generations, only
in their case, the current population may have the power to make decisions
that could improve the quality of life of future generations. However, rea-
sonable people (who recognize future generations as their moral equals and
hold that they should be considered in their decisions) may reasonably dis-
agree about, e.g., how to take into account the interests of future generations,
how much to allow their interests to determine current decisions, how to bal-
ance them against the interests of the current population, and what in fact
will be the future implications of current decisions. In effect, the burdens of
judgement about many of the decisions that significantly affect the interests of
future generations will be magnified, because of the increased timeframe and
complexity of the issue.
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Another reason that the current population may take into account the
interests of future generations is because the current population finds the in-
stitutional structure to be legitimate, and feels it has a vested interest in en-
suring the continuance of that political structure. A goal, then, that current
citizens may, which may give them reason to take into account the interests of
subsequent generations, is to promote the continuance of the structures they
endorse. Taking into account the interests of future generations in current
decisions promotes the goal of maintaining the necessary support to uphold
structures that the current population values.
4.5 Reasonable comprehensive doctrines
In addition to being reasonable, in order for citizens’ satisfaction to count
towards the justification of political decisions, citizens must also hold reason-
able comprehensive doctrines.9 That is, the systems of values and beliefs that
individuals hold must allow them to acknowledge the burdens of judgement.
Recall that the burdens of judgement explain how it is possible for people to
reasonably disagree about what justice requires for political issues.
9As Richard Vernon has helpfully pointed out, on my view, the notion of comprehensive
doctrines may just be another way of conceiving of the requirement of reasonableness, as
articulated about persons. This may be a departure from Rawls’s own view, which seems
to treat them as two fundamentally distinct requirements. On my view, whether a compre-
hensive doctrine is unreasonable essentially depends on how it manifests itself from within
an individual’s own broader system of values and beliefs. So, no comprehensive doctrine
is, on its own, unreasonable; whether it is depends on whether the person who holds it
is unreasonable. Saying that a particular comprehensive doctrine is unreasonable is effec-
tively shorthand for saying that everyone who subscribes to that comprehensive doctrine
is unreasonable because they have done so. Nonetheless, I think it is helpful to discuss
comprehensive doctrines on their own, to elucidate the implications that are unacceptable
with respect to political justification and legitimacy. Also, it may be helpful to recognize
them as the source of a group’s unreasonableness for pragmatic reasons, when someone is
considering how to address unreasonableness in a society.
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Rawls defines comprehensive doctrines as reasonable so long as they recog-
nize that the state should not base its decisions solely on any single particular
comprehensive doctrine. An obvious example of a comprehensive doctrine that
would be deemed unreasonable in Rawls’s sense is a fundamentalist religion
that holds that the state’s decisions are only justified if they agree with the
tenets of that religion. The satisfaction of an individual who subscribes to such
a doctrine would not count towards the justification of political decisions.
To be clear, however, fundamentalist religions are not the only compre-
hensive doctrines that may be unreasonable.10 As Rawls (2005, xviii) points
out, philosophical and moral systems are also comprehensive doctrines as well,
and may also commit individuals to the view that the state ought to make its
decisions solely on the basis of what they believe. Insofar as they do hold such
a commitment, people’s satisfaction does not count towards the legitimacy or
justification of institutions or their decisions.
It is important to be clear about why such doctrines are unreasonable,
on Rawls’s view. They are unreasonable not because they prevent someone
from accepting decisions made by the state; that certainly may be justified,
on Rawls’s view. Nor are they unreasonable because the person believes that
she is right about what the state ought to do. In Rawls’s words:
When we take the step beyond recognizing the reasonableness of a
doctrine and affirm our belief in it, we are not being unreasonable.
Beyond this, reasonable persons will think it unreasonable to use
10As discussed in the previous footnote, nor are they or any other comprehensive doctrine
necessarily unreasonable, on my view. Whether the comprehensive doctrine is unreasonable
depends on whether the person who subscribes to it holds a conception of justice such
that they remain committed to fair terms of social cooperation. In recognition of the
heterogeneity of comprehensive doctrines, even once we know that a person subscribes to a
particular comprehensive doctrine, there is still a further question about whether a person’s
comprehensive doctrine allows her to be committed to fair terms of social cooperation.
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political power, should they possess it, to repress comprehensive
doctrines that are not unreasonable, though different from their
own.(Rawls, 2005, 60)
Reasonable people may be wholeheartedly committed to the view that their
comprehensive doctrine is “right”. What makes a comprehensive doctrine un-
reasonable is that, according to it, the state’s power should be used to suppress
other reasonable comprehensive doctrines that conflict with it. Those who hold
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines believe that the state may legitimately
impose their comprehensive doctrines on others who reject those doctrines.
Their satisfaction is not to count towards the legitimacy or justification of
political institutions and their decisions because they will not be committed
to finding fair terms of social cooperation in politics. And this requirement is
necessary in order for a stable and well-ordered modern liberal democracy to
persist.
4.6 The reasonable overlapping consensus
Thus far, I have argued that in order for a stable and well-ordered modern
liberal democracy to persist, a significant proportion of the population must
hold a commitment to egalitarianism. And in order for people’s satisfaction
to count for or against the legitimacy and justification of political institutions
and their decisions, they themselves must be reasonable and hold reasonable
comprehensive doctrines.11 The other essential feature that I will now discuss
is that it must be possible to construct a set of constitutional essentials that
11In what follows, I shall use the term ‘reasonable people’ to refer to people who meet
both conditions of being reasonable and holding reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
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are capable of garnering the satisfaction of a significant proportion of the
reasonable people in the society.
In Political Liberalism, Rawls (2005, 15) describes the relationship between
individuals’ conflicting comprehensive doctrines, and this support for the con-
stitutional essentials, which he refers to as a reasonable overlapping consensus:
Such a consensus consists of all the reasonable opposing religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to persist over generations
and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more or less just
constitutional regime, a regime in which the criterion of justice is
that political conception itself.
The concept of a reasonable overlapping consensus, which enables a democracy
to remain stable and well-ordered over time, does not suppose a single funda-
mental conception of the good that most citizens must hold, e.g., a national
identity or particular religion to which all are expected to subscribe. It consists
in the satisfaction of the reasonable people in society with the constitutional
essentials, given their own conflicting comprehensive doctrines. I will discuss
the question of exactly what is meant to garner consensus momentarily, when
I further explain what is included in the constitutional essentials.
The consensus about the constitutional essentials is reasonable in the sense
that it is comprised of people who are reasonable and who hold reasonable com-
prehensive doctrines. However, the idea of a consensus returns us to another
of the objections to Rawls’s theory that I considered in Chapter 2. Gutmann
and Thompson objected to the idealization that in modern liberal democracies
there is such widespread agreement about the constitutional essentials.
Furthermore, as Cohen’s analysis suggested, Rawls’s theory may seem to
suppose that consensus forms about the constitutional essentials because cit-
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izens hold some common conception of the good. For example, perhaps cit-
izens hold a nationalist conception of justice that gives the interests of the
community priority over individual interests, and this is what grounds their
consensus about the constitutional essentials. If achieving consensus about
the constitutional essentials depends on this sort of agreement, then Rawls’s
theory is in serious jeopardy. The assumption of a common good flies in the
face of acceptable pluralism that (Rawls agrees) characterizes modern liberal
democracies.
I follow Rawls in rejecting a common good as either an attainable or de-
sirable feature of modern liberal democracies.(Rawls, 2005, 9–10) For, such
a condition does not adequately take into account the depth or amount of
reasonable disagreement that exists among citizens in modern liberal democ-
racies. This is why Rawls develops the idea of an ‘overlapping’ consensus,
rather than a consensus simpliciter. Consensus about the structure of institu-
tions is overlapping when it garners the support of citizens, even though they
hold conflicting views about how best to structure the institutions, and what
decisions they ought to make. It is not that citizens have the same conceptions
of justice or of the good. Rather, citizens’ conceptions of justice must overlap
in the sense that, given their own varying and often conflicting conceptions of
justice, nonetheless they are able to remain satisfied with the institutions that
govern them over time.
Relatedly, an important concept that Rawls mentions in the quote above
is the political conception of justice. This is the conception of justice that
may be worked up from the decisions that are made by political institutions
in a stable and well-ordered modern liberal democracy, and which maintain a
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reasonable overlapping consensus. For example, some hold that Rawls’s theory
of justice as fairness, with its welfarist egalitarian principles, is reflected in
many Canadian political institutions and their decisions. If this is an accurate
view of Canadian political institutions – i.e., their decisions do in fact reflect
the principles of justice as fairness – then it is right to understand Rawls’s
theory of justice as fairness as the political conception of justice that should
be used to evaluate political decisions in Canada.
To say that the principles of justice as fairness are an accurate character-
ization of the political conception of justice that underlies Canadian political
institutions does not mean that all, or even most, reasonable Canadians hold
them. Rather, it means that insofar as Canadian institutions and their deci-
sions reflect these principles, we may expect them to maintain their legitimacy.
That is, we may expect that reasonable citizens in Canada will continue to
be satisfied enough with the institutions that govern them that the obligatory
force of those institutions will remain intact.
Paterson et al. (2001, 1,11,13) also describe an example that may illustrate
a reasonable overlapping consensus that supports a particular constitutional
regime. According to them, one of the key factors that enabled Scotland to
adopt its own constitution, and gain authority over some aspects of political
decision-making, such as taxation powers and education, was the wide variety
of interests these changes served amongst the people in Scotland. For instance,
unionists, who were strongly committed to remaining part of the U.K., were
willing to agree to the changes because they believed that relinquishing some
amount of authority to a Scottish government might reduce nationalists’ zeal
and support for complete independence. Nationalists, on the other hand,
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endorsed the move because they believed it to be a step towards complete
independence. And those concerned about the lack of women in the legislature
endorsed the change because they were convinced that the structure of the new
legislature being proposed could address their issues as well.
The key point is that the decision to create the Scottish Parliament did
not garner the support it did because everyone agreed about a common good.
The people who supported the decision did so because it was acceptable given
the conflicting conceptions of justice and the good they held, and their beliefs
about how to pursue those ends.
4.7 The original position
The conditions of reasonableness as they apply to persons and comprehensive
doctrines define whose satisfaction is to count towards the justification of po-
litical decisions. These criteria effectively define in what sense the reasonable
overlapping consensus is reasonable. But this still leaves the question of in
what sense citizens must be satisfied with the institutions that govern them,
so that it is appropriate to say there is ‘consensus’ about the structure of ex-
isting institutions. To conceptualize in what sense citizens must be satisfied
with the institutions that govern them, so that it is appropriate to say there
is something approaching consensus, Rawls suggests that a person put herself
into what he calls the original position, or place herself behind the “veil of
ignorance”.
In developing his account of the legitimacy of institutions and the justifi-
cation of their decisions, Rawls distinguishes between four stages of political
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decision-making: choosing the principles of justice, agreement on the constitu-
tional essentials, deciding particular laws and regulations, and implementing
those laws and policies in particular cases and contexts. In discussing the
four-stage sequence in his theory of justice as fairness, Rawls says,
[...] the four-stage sequence describes neither an actual political
process, nor a purely theoretical one. Rather, it is part of justice
as fairness, and constitutes part of a framework of thought that
citizens in civil society who accept justice as fairness are to use in
applying its concepts and principles.(Rawls, 1995, 151)
This returns me to a point that I made earlier, about the structure of Rawls’s
theory. As with the other concepts we have seen, conceptualizing political
decision-making as a four-stage sequence is meant to allow us to see the re-
lationship between the principles of justice that are prevalent in a modern
liberal democracy and how they may justify particular political decisions that
are made therein.
So far, we have seen Rawls require that in a stable and well-ordered modern
liberal democracy, justification for political decisions depends on reasonable
citizens who support egalitarian principles of justice, the first of the four-
stage sequence. To draw out his conception of political justification for the
other stages, Rawls develops the following concepts: the veil of ignorance,
the original position, and (narrow and wide) reflective equilibrium. These
conceptual tools are meant to provide models of how we are to determine
decisions at the various levels.
Another way of thinking about the function of these concepts in Rawls’s
theory is that they may be used as heuristic devices for thinking about what
justice requires. To begin with the veil of ignorance and the original position,
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when people go behind the veil of ignorance, they place themselves in what
Rawls refers to as the original position. As Rawls describes it, “To model this
equality in the original position we say that the parties, as representatives of
those who meet this condition, are symmetrically situated.”(Rawls, 2005, 79)
So, the original position is meant to reflect the ways that people should
think of themselves and others when they are considering how to organize the
basic political and economic institutions. It is worth emphasizing that Rawls
refers to what is being done when someone is in the original position, or when
they go behind the veil of ignorance, as modeling their conception of equality.
We are to think of the original position, or adopting the veil of ignorance as
representing a way to determine what individuals already hold their conception
of equality to imply for the various levels of decision-making. Specifically, the
veil of ignorance and the original position may help to elucidate the views of
those who are reasonable, subscribe to reasonable comprehensive doctrines,
and hold an egalitarian conception of justice.
However, these processes are not meant to convince individuals to adopt
any other views than those they have about equality, or to justify imposing
a particular conception of equality on them. The veil of ignorance and the
original position are concepts that are meant to make salient what the rea-
sonable individuals with their reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a society
believe that justice requires. The outcome of these processes – the veil and
wide reflective equilibrium (which I will explain momentarily) – are meant to
be determined by the conception of equality that reasonable citizens already
hold.
Rawls defends his conception of the person as symmetrically situated to
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others, which is modelled by the original position, in the following way:
This requirement [of being symmetrically situated] is fair because
in establishing the fair terms of social cooperation (in the case of
the basic structure) the only relevant feature of persons is their
possessing the moral powers (to the sufficient minimum degree)
and having the normal capacities to be a cooperating member of
society over a complete life.(Rawls, 2005, 79)
As I argued earlier, according to Rawls, decisions about how to design the
political and legal institutions of modern liberal democracies should be based
on the views of individuals in that society, so long as they are free and equal
in virtue of possessing the two moral powers sufficiently developed, and their
comprehensive doctrines are reasonable.
To understand what features of the individual the original position effec-
tively includes and excludes from our considerations about justice, Rawls ex-
plains, “Features relating to social position, native endowment, and historical
accident, as well as to the content of persons’ determinate conceptions of the
good, are irrelevant, politically speaking, and hence, placed behind the veil of
ignorance.”(Rawls, 2005, 79) So, behind the veil of ignorance, these features
of the person are to be excluded from consideration when one is determining
how to structure the basic social, political, and economic institutions.
The features that Rawls points to in the quote are to be excluded on
grounds that egalitarian conceptions of justice that are held in modern lib-
eral democracies generally support their exclusion. A characteristic feature
of modern liberal democracies is that, ideally, political institutions should be
structured so as not to favour particular classes, privilege certain natural abil-
ities that people may have, or privilege certain conceptions of the good, e.g.,
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a particular religion. The fact that citizens predominantly regard each other
as equals in modern liberal democracies is not merely an historical accident.
It is a necessary feature of the general population, if the liberal democracy is
to remain stable and well-ordered.
Upholding a person’s political status as equal means that in the arrange-
ment of social, political, and economic institutions, the rules that define those
institutions do not discriminate against anyone on the basis of these features.
As with the rest of Rawls’s theory, this is not because he takes this to be
an essential aspect of the institutions in modern liberal democracies, indepen-
dent of the people’s views about them. The democratic legitimacy of non-
discriminatory political institutions depends on the extent to which individu-
als’ conceptions of equality in a given society support them. If the exclusion
of these features of persons as the basis for determining the political structure
were not supported by the conceptions of equality that exist in a society, then
the veil of ignorance does not justify their exclusion. But, on the other hand,
Rawls seems to believe, as do I, that the ability of a modern liberal democracy
to persist in such conditions would be compromised.
To determine how to structure political institutions in a way that does
not discriminate against people on the basis of their having these features,
when a person goes behind the veil, she is to consider what she would want
if she did not know her lot in life, with respect to these features. That is,
she is to ask herself: “Which principles would I choose to order society’s basic
social, political and economic institutions if I might have any of the possible
characteristics that do or could exist in the foreseeable future of this society,
such as a different race, religion, social or political status, etc., when I come
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out from behind the veil?”
In explicating his concept of the original position, Rawls draws a similarity
between the metaphysical implications of adopting it and taking on a role in a
play.(Rawls, 2005, 27) The two processes are similar in that when we speak of
a person who adopts the original position, that identity no more becomes the
true nature of the person than when a person takes on a role in a play, that
role becomes that person’s true identity. Indeed, I think the analogy to acting
is an apt one for understanding what one who adopts the veil is meant to do.
Individuals behind the veil may determine how the different ways of struc-
turing institutions would be likely to affect others by “becoming others” in
much the same way that an actor adopting a role in a play does. She does her
best to understand what it would be like to exist as others who occupy the
many different social, economic, and political positions in society. The person
behind the veil may then choose the principles to structure the institutions
in light of her understanding of which structures will and will not unfairly
disadvantage people on that basis.
With respect to how a person should carry out this endeavour, she may
have relevant personal experience that enables her to understand quite easily
(e.g., through merely imagining) the situation of others. But she may need to
work much harder to accurately understand how different structures are likely
to affect others who are much differently situated than her. To do so, she
may need to spend time with other people whose experiences are not known
to her. Or, she may also find out about others’ situations in less direct ways
than engaging with them herself, such as through literature, academic studies
and reports, works of fine art that portray others’ lives, etc.
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Earlier I outlined the criticism that Rawls’s reliance on hypothetical rea-
soning about what individuals would accept reflects the standard that is prac-
ticed in actual politics, that political officials assume they can know what they
should do by merely imagining what their constituents would endorse. How-
ever, according to my view, to the extent that individuals behind the veil fail
to accurately understand others’ positions, they have failed to achieve what is
represented by Rawls’s device. And the standard holds in practice. If political
officials make their decisions based on inaccurate beliefs about the likely im-
plications for people’s satisfaction with the institutions, Rawls’s theory does
not justify this.
The problem lies with the person’s failure to obtain accurate knowledge
of others’ experiences, not with the original position or the veil of ignorance.
The theory is meant to illuminate what information is needed to make good
political decisions. People attempting to “go behind the veil” may do better
or worse jobs of understanding others, just as actors may do better or worse
jobs of researching and understanding the character whose persona they are
meant to adopt.
4.8 Wide reflective equilibrium
Another concept that Rawls develops to determine what structure could garner
the support necessary for it to be legitimate is the process of wide reflective
equilibrium.(Rawls, 2001, 30-2) The notion of wide reflective equilibrium serves
a similar function as the original position in Rawls’s justificatory schema, but
as Rawls puts it, it adopts a different point of view. As I outlined it, the
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concept of the original position is meant to model how we may identify the
principles of justice that we ourselves hold, given that, for all we know about
ourselves, we could be anyone in our society.
The process of reflective equilibrium may be used to assess the coherence
between the conception of justice that we arrive at in the original position, our
determinations about the basic structure behind the veil, and our more partic-
ular judgements about justice. By striving for wide reflective equilibrium, we
may uncover tensions in our belief and value systems that should have been
taken into account differently in the original position, when we were deter-
mining the political structure that could be supported by our value and belief
systems.
To achieve a state of wide reflective equilibrium, first, individuals are to
consider the settled judgements they have about justice, such as that slavery
is wrong. On the basis of those settled judgements, they work up abstract,
generalized principles that serve to capture those particular judgements. Next,
as Rawls (2001, 30–1) describes it,
Focussing on any one person, suppose we (as observers) find the
conception of justice that makes the fewest revisions in that per-
son’s initial judgements and proves to be acceptable when the con-
ception is presented and explained. When the person adopts this
conception and brings other judgements in line with it we say this
person is in narrow reflective equilibrium.
A person has achieved narrow reflective equilibrium when she arrives at a
general conception of justice that seems to capture her considered judgements
about justice.
Rawls refers to this process as achieving a state of equilibrium because
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if the person encounters particular judgements that are in tension with her
initial principles, she may choose either to revise the principles or to revise
the particular judgements; neither is necessarily privileged. The goal is to
bring our own personal views about justice at all levels of generality into line
with one another for the purposes of choosing the principles that we would
want to be used as the basis for the political structure to govern us. Sometimes
it may be appropriate to revise the principles we have come to hold on the
basis of our considered judgements. However, in the light of a tension between
the two, we also may choose to revise particular judgements instead, and bring
those into line with our principles.
To achieve wide reflective equilibrium, individuals then go on to consider
which political regime would best “fit” with the principles they have chosen.
As Rawls describes someone in wide reflective equilibrium,
More exactly, this person has considered the leading conceptions
of political justice found in our philosophical tradition (including
views critical of the concept of justice itself (some think Marx’s
view is an example)), and has weighed the force of the different
philosophical and other reasons for them. In this case, we suppose
this person’s general convictions, first principles, and particular
judgements are in line; but now the reflective equilibrium is wide,
given the wide-ranging and possibly many changes of view that
have preceded it.(Rawls, 2001, 31)
To achieve a state of wide reflective equilibrium, one considers, on an ongoing
basis, the fit between the principles of justice and the particular considered
judgements one has about justice, in light of arguments for possible alternative
conceptions of justice and political regimes. And, as with narrow reflective
equilibrium, no level of generality is privileged.
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The role of wide reflective equilibrium is to bring to light what arrangement
or structure of political institutions would be capable of garnering a reasonable
overlapping consensus. A political structure will be legitimate to the extent
that reasonable people would support it in wide reflective equilibrium. How-
ever, the idea that any particular structure would be capable of garnering such
support in the face of the burdens of judgement and injustice may seem quite
dubious to some. Certainly there are critics of the current political regimes in
modern liberal democracies.
Throughout the thesis, I have used the phrase that citizens must be “sat-
isfied” with the institutions that govern them, in order for those institutions
to have legitimacy, and to make justified decisions. According to Rawls, as
his notion of wide reflective equilibrium captures, the satisfaction that is nec-
essary to uphold the legitimacy of constitutionalism is that citizens view it as
the best out of the alternatives on offer, given the conceptions of justice they
hold. So, although people may well object to aspects of the political regime
as it exists in their society, they may still be included among the reasonable
overlapping consensus that supports the constitutional essentials. They will
still be included if, given their reasonableness and their reasonable compre-
hensive doctrines, they “endorse” the current political regime in the sense we
sometimes hear colloquially expressed as, “it’s the least worst option”. To be
sure, hopefully, there is more support than this threadbare form among the
general population. But Rawls’s notion of wide reflective equilibrium captures
that this is all that is necessary for political legitimacy.
So, contrary to Cohen’s view of Rawls, and in answer to Gutmann and
Thompson’s criticisms I reviewed at the outset of this section, Rawls does
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not presume a common good to ground his reasonable overlapping consensus
about the constitutional essentials. Nor, I have argued, does he suppose that
everyone is satisfied with all aspects of the existing constitutional essentials,
so that they should be held as justified and protected from reform in modern
liberal democracies. Rather, on his account, people’s conflicting conceptions
of the good must be such that individuals are able to support the constitu-
tional essentials in the way that is modelled in wide reflective equilibrium.
Otherwise, according to Rawls’s theory, the legitimacy of the institutions will
be compromised.
Another objection that I examined in the second chapter, which was raised
by Cohen, was that the priority Rawls gives to the principle of equality con-
flicts with the commitment that Cohen finds in Rawls’s theory to deliberative
democratic institutions. Cohen argues that the latter cannot be justified by
the principle of equality. Rather, according to Cohen, Rawls must either ac-
knowledge that his theory is in fact committed to deliberative democracy, first
and foremost, or he must be willing to accept that features such as bargaining
out of self-interest must be permitted in judgements about the political struc-
ture, since it seems evident that people’s conceptions of justice allow this.
On my view of Rawls’s theory, however, people’s conceptions of justice are
prior. Only those elements of a political structure – including deliberative
democratic institutions – that are, as a matter of fact, capable of garnering
the support modelled by the reasonable overlapping consensus of individuals
in wide reflective equilibrium are justified.
If people’s egalitarian conceptions of justice do not support the deliberative
democratic elements Cohen identifies in Rawls’s theory, then, according to the
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structure of political justification that I am defending, these elements are not to
be imposed on the people. However, in Political Liberalism, Rawls discusses the
conditions under which it would be legitimate to structure political institutions
on the basis of the theory of justice as fairness, which is the target of Cohen’s
critical analysis. There, Rawls says:
Whether justice as fairness (or some similar view) can gain the
support of an overlapping consensus so defined is a speculative
question. One can reach an educated conjecture only by working
it out and exhibiting the way it might be supported.(Rawls, 2005,
15)
Cohen’s interpretation of Rawls’s theory of political justification, which iden-
tifies it as essentially committed to the deliberative democratic elements he
describes does not hold for the Rawlsian theory of political liberalism I am
defending here; these are only contingent aspects of democracy. Whether or
not they are politically justified depends on the public political conception of
justice that belongs to the society in question.
Having outlined a way of thinking about how to go from individuals’ con-
ceptions of justice to making determinations about the structure of institu-
tions, next I will respond to another of Gutmann and Thompson’s objec-
tions: even if we suppose that the general population supports egalitarianism
and constitutionalism, consensus is unlikely to come at the other stages of
decision-making. In Rawlsian terms, even if a significant proportion of reason-
able people in wide reflective equilibrium support a constitutionalist regime,
they still will continue to disagree at the other stages of decision-making.
To respond to this, I will agree with Gutmann and Thompson, that even
with support for a constitutional regime, disagreement is likely to increase as
107
we move to the other stages of decision-making. Individuals will continue to
disagree about the particular political decisions made by institutions defined
by the constitutional essentials. However, I will argue that in spite of this, the
concept of reasonable overlapping consensus about the constitutional essentials
does provide a principled way to make political decisions that are justified, in
the face of the burdens of judgement and reasonable disagreement.
4.9 The constitutional essentials
In order to argue that satisfaction about the constitutional essentials may
provide an adequate foundation for making particular decisions, I must first
outline more precisely what the constitutional essentials include. In his eluci-
dation of them, Rawls says, “Constitutional essentials concern questions about
what political rights and liberties, say, may reasonably be included in a written
constitution, when assuming the constitution may be interpreted by a supreme
court, or some similar body.”(Rawls, 2005, 442n7) As this reflects, one aspect
of a constitution that many people are familiar with is to make explicit the
rights and liberties to which all citizens are entitled. For instance, it typically
espouses a principle of equality that is to apply to all citizens, and makes ex-
plicit the basic rights and freedoms they are owed, e.g., freedom of speech or
expression, thought, and association.
Another aspect of the constitutional essentials that Rawls’s account draws
attention to is that they provide guiding rules or principles about how decisions
are to be made by political and legal institutions, e.g., legislatures and supreme
courts. In other words, constitutional-level laws generally define the roles of
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individuals within the political and legal structure, e.g., the roles of judges,
voters, and legislators.12 So, besides making explicit the values and principles
to which a society subscribes, constitutional-level laws also outline the rules
that, for example, define the electoral system and related processes, such as
setting electoral boundaries, processes for appointing judges, the structure and
duties of members of the legislatures, etc.
To better understand the nature and importance of the constitutional es-
sentials in this second sense, and Rawls’s reasons for emphasizing the impor-
tance of their support, it may be helpful to consider H.L.A. Hart’s theory
about the nature of the law.13 One of the questions that Hart’s theory ad-
dresses is the puzzle of what gives laws obligatory force over subjects, even
when they disagree with those laws. That is, what makes the law legitimate
in the sense that subjects recognize an obligation to follow it, even when they
themselves may strongly believe that they have good reason to disobey it?
As Hart argues, the legitimacy or obligatory force of particular laws, e.g.,
not to steal or murder, cannot rest with individuals’ support for the laws
themselves. For, it seems that the very point of having laws is to express what
people ought (not) to do, even (or perhaps, especially) when they wish to act
12Another point to note about this view of the constitutional essentials is that the func-
tion of the constitution is to define important concepts, such as what it means to be a
private citizen, judge, legislator, etc. My account supports this view of the function of the
constitutional essentials, rather than the Ulyssian view that its function is to tie the hands
of society in order to protect individuals from the tyranny of the (apparent) majority.
13Here, I only intend to sketch out the elements of Hart’s theory that pertain to the nature
of the rule of law, for the purposes of better understanding the importance of the consti-
tutional essentials in my Rawlsian account of political justification. Because my primary
aim here is to defend the view that the constitutional essentials have special importance in
an adequate account of political justification, I will not offer a defence of my interpretation
of Hart’s theory against others, or against alternative conceptions or interpretations of the
rule of law. But for those who are sympathetic to (my account of) Hart’s theory of the rule
of law, perhaps it may help to understand my view of political justification.
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contrary to them. However, it also seems that the obligatory force of the law
should not rest on some metaphysical property independent of “the people”.
That is, the law should not be binding on citizens independent of their support
for it.14 It should somehow be related to the people’s views about what the
law ought to be.
Hart argues that the obligatory force of the law depends on there being a
sufficient number of people who are sufficiently satisfied with the institutions
that make the decisions. Or, more precisely, as Jean Hampton puts it, the
obligatory force of the law depends on there being a sufficient number of cit-
izens who are sufficiently satisfied with the roles as they are defined within
those institutions.(Hampton, 1994, 27-8),(Hart, 1982, 59-60) Insofar as this
condition – I will call it the sufficiency condition – holds in a given society,
the decisions by those institutions are more likely to have obligatory force for
the subjects in that society.
In the sufficiency condition, I referred to the roles as they are defined within
institutions. Hart’s account distinguishes between two categories of rules, pri-
mary and secondary. The former, primary rules, place direct obligations on
us. For example, written laws such as not to kill, or not to steal from others
are primary rules. Secondary rules, on the other hand, define how to make
primary rules, by defining the roles of those who operate within the political
structure, e.g., private citizens, political and legal officials. As Hart summa-
rizes the distinction: “Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second
14Another way of stating this problem is by going back to Simmons’ framework, and his
problem of justification of the state, in general. If the state’s function is essentially to impose
and enforce laws that people are sometimes wont to violate, then it seems that an essential
function of the state is to inhibit people’s freedoms. But how can this be justified in a way
that is consistent with the concept of democracy?
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type confer powers, public or private.”(Hart, 1982, 81) The primary function
of secondary rules is to define individuals’ roles in the processes that create
primary rules.
Examples of secondary rules are those that define the electoral system,
the structure of the supreme courts, how judges are appointed to them, how
judges are to make their decisions, how our legislatures are to operate, who
is the head-of-state, etc. As Hart further describes secondary rules, “They
specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained,
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively
determined.”(Hart, 1982, 94) Secondary rules define the process of how laws
are to be made, changed, and decided. Although secondary rules may be
explicitly written laws, they may not be; thus, I will continue to use the
terminology of primary and secondary rules rather than laws.
For my purposes, the useful insight in Hart’s theory is that he locates
the source of authority of the law in citizens’ satisfaction with the secondary
rules. Since the obligatory force of particular laws depends on there being a
sufficient number of subjects who are sufficiently satisfied with the secondary
rules, decision-makers do not have the impossible task of ensuring that all
individuals are satisfied with every decision they make, in order to uphold the
rule of law. Rather, to maintain the obligatory force of particular laws (or the
primary rules), they must make decisions that are conducive to the satisfaction
of a sufficient number of citizens with the secondary rules.
As I stated earlier, one aspect of the constitutional essentials is that they
serve to define the roles of individuals within politico-legal institutions. Trans-
lating between Hart’s and Rawls’s theories, we may say that some of the consti-
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tutional essentials are secondary rules. How does this help with understanding
the question of support for the constitutional essentials, and how to determine
particular decisions on their basis? Hart’s theory elucidates the important
connection between the obligatory force of the law, and citizens’ satisfaction
with particular decisions and the secondary rules.
If enough people become dissatisfied enough with the secondary rules, then
the obligatory force of the institutions could be weakened or lost altogether.
That is to say, the sufficiency condition would be lost. This may happen
because people become dissatisfied with the secondary rules “in themselves”,
i.e., they may hold that the rules are unacceptable regardless of their conse-
quences, or people may become dissatisfied with secondary rules because of
their consequences. For instance, they may lead to primary rules to which
people vehemently object, or some other sort of injustice may arise, which
people may believe could be best addressed by changing the secondary rules.
On my view, if elected officials repeatedly make political decisions with
which citizens disagree, support for the secondary rules that comprise part
of the constitutional essentials is likely to diminish, thereby threatening the
authority of institutions and their decisions. To state the point in terms of wide
reflective equilibrium, particular decisions may generate enough dissatisfaction
that at the final stage of wide reflective equilibrium, citizens may find the
democratic regime that currently governs them is not the best of all possible
options of which they can conceive. Or, they may determine that the regime
that they are living with is unsatisfactory enough, and to enough people, to
throw its authority into question.
Furthermore, the sufficiency condition provides an explanation for why it
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may be desirable to try to facilitate citizens’ understandings of how political
officials make their decisions. The primary aim is not to get citizens to agree
with a decision. Rather, by making explicit the reasons that underlie the
decision, citizens may be better able to recognize the decision as fair under
the circumstances, including the disagreement that existed among their fellow
citizens. As a result of making decisions more publicly, citizens may be better
able to see how the burdens of judgement resulted in a different decision than
the one they thought best. Thus, making public the reasons for decisions
may be conducive to fulfilling the sufficiency condition, if it allows citizens to
remain satisfied with the processes used to reach the decisions, in spite of not
agreeing with the decision itself.
In sum, Hart’s theory may help to make sense of why widespread support
for the constitutional essentials is so important. That support explains the
obligatory force of institutions and their decisions, in the face of persistent
disagreement about particular decisions. And, recall that my goal is to explain
how it is possible for a stable and well-ordered modern liberal democracy
to remain that way. According to my Hartian analysis of the legitimacy of
politico-legal institutions, the stability and order of institutions is grounded
in the widespread and general satisfaction with them, which is determined by
their particular decisions.
The sufficiency condition, as I am bringing it into my Rawlsian framework,
effectively says that the stronger (i.e., the more widespread and prevalent)
the support for the constitutional essentials amongst the population, the more
legitimate the institutions that are defined by them. Conversely, if support
for them drops below a certain level, the obligatory force of institutions and
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their decisions will be compromised, and may be lost altogether. Thus, as I
will argue further in the following chapters, it is extremely important to try to
ensure that there is a great deal of widespread support for the constitutional
essentials. Furthermore, this principle also applies to any changes that are
proposed for constitutional essentials.
As Gutmann and Thompson point out, we know the current political sys-
tem is flawed in many ways. So, they argue, the requirement that changes
have such widespread support among the population sets the bar for reform
too high. As they object,
Although unlimited opportunities to reopen questions would of
course paralyze government, some of the existing barriers to fun-
damental changes may be too high. The procedures for amend-
ing the Constitution, for example, make the possibility of future
change on some major policies seem hopelessly remote.(Gutmann
and Thompson, 1996, 91)
While they recognize that there is a need to not revisit everything in the
political structure, placing such a high priority on maintaining the stability of
the constitution seems to effectively justify quashing any efforts at reform.
To take an example, the U.S. Constitution is often criticized because the
conditions for amending it make it all but impossible to do so. But to the
extent that such a high threshold thwarts a reasonable overlapping consensus
– i.e., there is evidence15 to support that reasonable people are dissatisfied
with rules that make it so difficult to change – it is not justified on my ac-
15In the next chapter, I will discuss in more detail the differences between my Rawlsian
account and Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, when determining the extent to which the
sufficiency condition is met and whether reform is called for. Briefly, justification for reform
does not rest on deliberative democratic processes, although such processes may strengthen
justification for constitutional reform.
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count. To the extent that citizens are dissatisfied with the constitutional es-
sentials enough for it to affect their judgement in wide reflective equilibrium,
my account agrees with Gutmann and Thompson that this compromises their
justification. Thus, when formulating a constitution, according to my Rawl-
sian account, it is important to ensure that the constitutional essentials are
constructed in a way that is likely to garner and retain the satisfaction of
reasonable citizens with the institutions so defined over time.
This still leaves the problem that Rawls’s theory may appear to legitimate
not only constitutional essentials that most believe to be, on the whole, just,
but also, to protect unjust constitutional regimes. In the next section, I will
explain how Rawls’s theory accounts for the potential problem someone might
raise, that the structure could be so unjust that it would be better if it did
not have obligatory force.
4.9.1 Justness and legitimacy
Thus far, I have used Hart only to help make sense of Rawls’s emphasis on the
constitutional essentials as a locus of political justification. However, as I have
outlined Hart’s theory, it is only intended to make sense of how, as a matter of
fact, particular political decisions may have obligatory force for citizens, even
though they disagree with them. What I have said so far does not address the
question of how to ensure that the obligatory force of decisions by institutions
is just in a modern liberal democracy. To address that issue, I argue that
Rawls’s theory of political justification builds on Hart’s point about the locus
of legitimacy for the law, and elucidates the conditions that are necessary for
the rule of law in a modern liberal democracy to be just.
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Rawls’s theory agrees with Hart’s view that in order for institutions to
have legitimacy, as a matter of fact, they must meet the sufficiency condi-
tion: a significant proportion of citizens must be sufficiently satisfied with the
constitutional essentials. For that legitimacy to be consistent with the tenets
of democracy, in Rawlsian terms, the legitimacy or obligatory force will be
just insofar as the sufficiency condition is met by people who also qualify for
inclusion in the reasonable overlapping consensus. Institutions will continue
to have democratic legitimacy so long as those making decisions do so in a
way that is sufficiently satisfactory to a significant proportion of citizens, who,
again, also comprise the reasonable overlapping consensus.
Insofar as particular decisions meet this desideratum, they will effectively
promote the legitimacy of the institutions in accordance with the principles
of liberal democracy. This explains statements Rawls makes about the con-
stitutional essentials such as, “The point is that if a political conception of
justice covers the constitutional essentials, it is already of enormous impor-
tance even if it has little to say about many economic and social issues that
legislative bodies must consider.”(Rawls, 2001, 28) If it is possible to identify
constitutional essentials that are to the satisfaction of most reasonable citizens,
this implies that the institutions defined by the constitutional essentials will
have obligatory force, and that this power over citizens will be in accordance
with the principles of liberal democracy, i.e., based on principles of respect for
citizens’ equality and freedom.
This statement by Rawls recalls a criticism that Gutmann and Thompson
made about the importance that Rawls places on the constitutional essentials.
Rawls clearly agrees that laws at the constitutional level typically do not spell
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out everything that many citizens believe should be protected, e.g., financial
security, access to a minimum level of health care, adequate education for those
with cognitive impairments. Nor do they determine particular decisions about
what people are entitled to on the basis of those things that are included.16 But
I have argued that a reasonable overlapping consensus about the constitutional
essentials is important nonetheless because it implies that there is an adequate
foundation to support decisions at the other levels that have been discussed.
As we move through the levels of of decision-making, the theory (rightly, I
think) reflects that beyond the level of constitutional essentials to the questions
of particular laws and how to decide their application to particular cases,
determining which course of action is politically justified becomes increasingly
difficult. The account that I have just laid out provides a locus for justification
that does not rest on agreement about particular decisions directly, but on
satisfaction with the institutions that make decisions. In the next section, I will
draw out the relationship between this source of justification and how decision-
makers in politico-legal institutions should determine particular decisions.
4.10 The constraints of public reason
Rawls agrees with Gutmann and Thompson that his theory admits a great
deal of indeterminacy when we are considering what response(s) to a political
issue would be justified. But he defends this aspect of his theory on grounds
that, “To some degree these matters are always open to reasonable differences
16Indeed, recall that Rawls himself argued for a third principle in his theory of justice as
fairness that included the basic resources required to exercise one’s political liberties. This
might be read as a commitment to the idea that these basic resources should be included in
the constitutional essentials.
117
of opinion; they depend on inference and judgement in assessing complex social
and economic information.”(Rawls, 2001, 48) While some decisions clearly may
be ruled out as wrong or unjustified, the difficulty in uniquely determining
decisions must not be underestimated. However, some normative standard is
needed to determine and evaluate particular political decisions, which should
be connected in some way to the actual views that people have about those
decisions being made by political officials.
The ideal that Rawls develops to determine the justification for particular
decisions is public reason. Public reason provides a standard or ideal to be
used by officials making political decisions, as well as by citizens to evaluate
those decisions. As Rawls describes it:
This ideal is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief
executives, and other government officials, as well as political can-
didates for public office, act from and follow the idea of public
reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting
fundamental political positions in terms of the political conception
of justice they regard as the most reasonable.(Rawls, 1997, 768-9)
Public reason is to be used by political officials who are making decisions in
finding alternatives that could be supported by the reasonable individuals in
society, given their conflicting but reasonable comprehensive doctrines. That
is, political officials are to look for alternatives that would be likely to allow
those in the reasonable overlapping consensus to remain satisfied with the
institutions making the decisions.
To determine whether a particular decision meets the standard of pub-
lic reason, a person is to consider whether the decision could be defended to
reasonable citizens who hold reasonable, albeit conflicting, comprehensive doc-
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trines. Earlier we saw Rawls propose that a principle of reciprocity should be
the basis for public reason. As he describes it,
The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are
proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those
proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others to
accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social
position.(Rawls, 1997, 770-1)
So, when citizens or their representatives are engaged in reasoning about po-
litical issues, the process ought to be one that citizens who are free and equal
can recognize as fair. And they also must be able to expect others, as free and
equal, to recognize those terms for making decisions as fair. They need not
necessarily agree that the terms of engagement are the best ones, or the ones
that they most wish to advance. But still, they must be able to recognize such
terms as reasonable, in spite of their disagreement.
This conception of reciprocity may appear very similar to the principle of
reciprocity that Gutmann and Thompson advance in their theory. However,
there is a significant difference that lies in in the basis of each. Rawls distin-
guishes his conception from that of Gutmann and Thompson in the following
way:
The idea of reciprocity has an important place in Amy Gutmann
and Dennis Thompson (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, Chs 1 and
2). However, the meaning and setting of our views are not the
same. Public reason in political liberalism is purely political, al-
though political values are intrinsically moral, whereas Gutmann
and Thompson’s account is more general and seems to work from
a comprehensive doctrine.(Rawls, 1997, 770n19)
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The difference that Rawls identifies between his conception of reciprocity and
that of Gutmann and Thompson is that for Rawls, the basis of reciprocity is
the reasonable overlapping consensus.
Because those in the reasonable overlapping consensus determine what will
fulfil the principle of reciprocity in practice, Rawls argues that his concept
of reciprocity is more “political” than that of Gutmann and Thompson. So
long as citizens meet the criteria of being reasonable and holding reasonable
comprehensive doctrines, it is their views that determine what the principle of
reciprocity requires. More precisely, the political conception of justice, which
is worked up from the reasonable overlapping consensus, and that supports
the authority of the constitutional essentials determines what the principle of
reciprocity implies in practice.
For Gutmann and Thompson, in contrast, how to fulfil the principle of
reciprocity is determined by a process that conforms to the best understand-
ing of their other principles. The principle of reciprocity is prior to the other
principles in the sense that it gives rise to the obligation to engage in deliber-
ative democratic processes in the first place. However, political decisions are
still justified, at bottom, by whether the process fulfils the other principles
they advance, and that I discussed in §3.1.4, e.g., that reasons be moral and
respectful.
Still, it may seem as though substantively, Rawls and Gutmann and Thomp-
son’s principles of reciprocity come to the same thing. That is, perhaps if we
were to go through Rawls’s process of identifying what public reason supports,
we would come to Gutmann and Thompson’s principles anyways. However,
Rawls’s comments above draw attention to a significant difference that remains
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between the two. In spite of the burdens of judgement and injustice, Gutmann
and Thompson remain committed to public discourse as the fundamental basis
for settling political disagreement, including about deciding the fair terms of
engagement about the basic structure.
According to Rawls’s theory, on the other hand, requiring a process of
public discourse to justify political decisions is only justified to the extent that
public reason supports doing so. And insofar as public discourse is supported
by public reason, the way to structure that discourse is to be determined by
the ideal of public reason. In other words, whereas Gutmann and Thompson
give priority to public discourse, and hold that it should determine what the
principle of reciprocity requires in practice, Rawls’s theory holds the reverse:
public reason, based on a reasonable overlapping consensus, determines what
the principle of reciprocity requires in practice.
While public discourse may be helpful for determining what meets the
standard of public reason, it may not be the best way of doing so. As I will
discuss in more detail in the last chapter, other mechanisms may be used to
better meet the standard of public reason, such as polls, referenda, sociological,
political, and psychological studies. For the moment though, I wish to continue
to focus on the limitations of giving priority to public discourse, as deliberative
democracy does.
Gutmann and Thompson are right that people raise compelling objections
to the current basic structure. However, while it is important that political
officials be aware of these objections, what we need from a political theory is
a principled basis for deciding what to do in light of the fact that people will
not come to explicit agreement in discourse about what decisions ought to be
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made, either about what is wrong with the system or how it could be improved.
Decisions will best fulfil this goal, according to Rawls’s theory, by striving
to meet the standard of public reason, or by attempting to make decisions
according to what reasonable citizens, with their reasonable comprehensive
doctrines, could recognize as fair. That may be achieved by adopting a process
that meets the principles that Gutmann and Thompson recommend, but it
may be done by other means as well. If a process based on Gutmann and
Thompson’s principles does not meet the standard of public reason, subjecting
a decision to such a process is not politically justified.
Also, the emphasis on actual public discourse about political decisions runs
the risk of going wrong, epistemically. By privileging public discourse as a
source of information about citizens’ preferences, Gutmann and Thompson’s
theory wrongly marginalizes other ways that may be used to assess which
policies would be justified. Other methods of collecting information that could
be useful for developing and deciding justified policies, such as sociological
studies, seem to be treated as epistemically inferior, unless the information is
gathered in a process that fulfils their principles.
As I will draw out more fully in the last chapter, the most fundamental
difference between the Rawlsian view I have advanced and that of Gutmann
and Thompson is that decisions about the design of institutions are deter-
mined according to whether they are likely to conduce to reasonable citizens’
satisfaction with the institutions that are involved with making them. On my
view, whether a deliberative democratic institution as defined by Gutmann
and Thompson contributes to the justification of political decisions depends
on whether it gives political officials good information about whether reason-
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able citizens in wide reflective equilibrium are likely to remain satisfied with
the institutions over time. It may strengthen the political justification of a
decision if the process increases the satisfaction of citizens with the institu-
tions involved. But the justification for the decision to create a deliberative
democratic process according to Gutmann and Thompson’s principles, and
for making any subsequent decisions, ultimately depends on whether the in-
stitution and its decisions are likely to be conducive to reasonable citizens’
satisfaction (based on their reasonable comprehensive doctrines) with the in-
stitutions involved.
As they contrast with Rawls, Gutmann and Thompson develop the con-
cept of “an economy of moral disagreement” to address the issue of persistent
disagreement. As they describe this goal, “It does not ask us to compromise
our moral understandings in the interest of agreement but rather to search for
significant points of convergence between our own understandings and those
of citizens whose positions, taken in their more comprehensive forms, we must
reject.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 86) When citizens hold conflicting
points of view on issues, they ought not to be expected to forego their own
beliefs and values for the sake of maintaining the stability of the basic struc-
ture; they are to search for common ground between their own and others’
comprehensive doctrines.
Gutmann and Thompson argue that in some cases, disagreement about
political issues may be resolved by finding such an economy of moral disagree-
ment. This concept is similar to Rawls’s reasonable overlapping consensus in
that both seek out points of convergence between conflicting views. However,
Gutmann and Thompson distinguish their economy of moral disagreement
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from reasonable overlapping consensus in the following way:
In our view, an economy of moral disagreement is not a defining
feature of a political theory. It is only one form that respectful
accommodation of moral conflict may take in a pluralist society
in those cases in which conflicting moral perspectives fortuitously
converge in their practical applications.(Gutmann and Thompson,
2004, 198n27)
According to Gutmann and Thompson, their economy of moral disagreement
differs from reasonable overlapping consensus because the former better recog-
nizes that we cannot always achieve agreement, no matter how hard we strive
for it. Their economy of moral disagreement better takes into account that
agreement is only one possible manifestation of good political decision-making.
Sometimes, however, it may not be possible to find points of convergence, in
which case an alternative resolution will have to be sought out.
I agree with Gutmann and Thompson that the best way to resolve political
issues may not always be to seek points of convergence between people’s moral
commitments. But I maintain that people’s conflicting moral perspectives
must “fortuitously converge” on a very particular aspect of politics, namely,
the constitutional essentials. For political decision-makers, the goal is to try to
make decisions in such a way that reasonable people are likely to continue to be
satisfied with the institutions making decisions. As I have argued, there must
be something that approaches consensus about the constitutional essentials
because to the extent that citizens are dissatisfied with them, the rule of
law may be compromised. Furthermore, the justness of the rule of law that
prevails in a stable democracy depends on whether the conceptions of justice
that comprise the overlapping consensus are egalitarian.
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The standard of public reason, which is worked up from the conceptions
of justice in the reasonable overlapping consensus, still leaves us with a con-
siderable degree of indeterminacy in theory about what is the right political
decision to make in any particular case. However, it does tell us – albeit indi-
rectly – what information should be the basis for making political decisions,
how to engage in the process of reasoning though political issues, and what
standard should be used to evaluate the options that have been identified.
First, decision-making should take into account the views of reasonable peo-
ple who hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Second, the processes that
should be used are those that will be conducive to maintaining the reasonable
overlapping consensus to support the constitutional essentials. And third,
the outcomes of those processes should be determined by what are likely to
maintain reasonable citizens’ satisfaction with the institutions that make the
decisions, over time.
4.11 Pluralism and public reason
Another objection to Rawls’s public reason that I raised in Chapter 2 is that
it does not allow citizens to offer reasons in terms of their own comprehensive
doctrines. One of the strengths that Gutmann and Thompson claim for their
theory is that it allows citizens to express their reasons in terms of their most
fundamental values and beliefs with others. While they acknowledge that such
discussions can sometimes be divisive, they can also serve to allow citizens to
educate one another about their ways of life and what is important to them.
Although in his earlier works, Rawls does argue that citizens ought not to
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present reasons from within their comprehensive doctrines initially, later he
revises this in Political Liberalism (2005). As he says:
When engaged in public reasoning, may we also include reasons
of our comprehensive doctrines? I now believe, and hereby I re-
vise VI:8 [in Political Liberalism (1996)] that such reasonable doc-
trines may be introduced in public reason at any time, provided
that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable political
conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the com-
prehensive doctrines are introduced to support. I refer to this as
the proviso and it specifies what I now call the wide view of public
reason.(Rawls, 2005, xlix-l)
Thus, Rawls (rightly, I think) allows that citizens may advance reasons in terms
of their comprehensive doctrines when they are engaged in public reasoning
about politics. What matters is whether the comprehensive doctrine, whatever
it may be, is reasonable.
One objection that some may raise to widening public reason is that it
will be less likely that citizens will find shared reasons to support particular
decisions, or find common ground when they hold conflicting comprehensive
doctrines. However, as a matter of fact, it seems as though people can and do
communicate with one another even though one or both of them make explicit
reference to their reasonable comprehensive doctrines that are not shared by
others in the conversation. The narrow view of public reason (wrongly, I
think) supposed that it would be better if, in advance of engaging in political
discourse, people “translated” their reasoning into “secular” language.
Instead, the wide view of public reason allows that people may, in fact,
better carry out this translation process in dialogue with others. One reason
that it may be desirable to talk about political issues in terms of comprehen-
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sive doctrines may be simply that, pragmatically, it is more likely to avoid
misunderstandings or mistakes in communication. Another is that doing so
may illuminate in what ways disagreement is a result of the comprehensive
doctrine, or the particular ways that individuals have interpreted or incorpo-
rated a comprehensive doctrine into their conception of the good.17 Third, if
people discuss political issues with others, and make explicit how their com-
prehensive doctrines affect their views about political issues, people may come
to see that in spite of differences in their comprehensive doctrines, they share
certain values as well, e.g., the importance of health, family and relationships,
security.
The preceding discussion addresses the issue of how the ideal of public
reason might be actualized in processes that involve actual discourse. However,
it is important to remember that, according to my Rawlsian framework, the
outcome of such a discursive process does not solely determine what meets the
standard of public reason. Public reasoning is not the same as public reason.
While public discourse may be helpful for determining what meets the standard
of public reason, it only does so insofar as it is a reliable indicator of reasonable
citizens’ satisfaction with the institutions involved in the decision, over time.
Additionally, it is important to remember that the sense of satisfaction that I
17To take an example from fiction, on the episode, “Loose Lips”, of the CBC television
programme, Little Mosque on the Prairie, a character portraying an extremely conservative
Muslim held that Yasir’s wife, Sarah, was prohibited from running her husband’s company
in his absence by the comprehensive doctrine, Islam. However, the Imam was quick to
point out that many devout Muslims reject this as a legitimate interpretation of what Islam
requires of its followers. Indeed, the show portrays through its range of characters the
diversity of positions that people who are committed to the same comprehensive doctrine
may take on particular issues. Allowing individuals to be explicit about why they hold
their positions on political issues may illuminate which aspects of people’s choices are based
on the comprehensive doctrines they hold and how, since their views are likely to be only
partially determined by their comprehensive doctrines.
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mean here is that which is modelled by wide reflective equilibrium.
4.12 Self-interest and justice
The final objection that I wish to consider from Chapter 2 is that Rawls’s
theory may allow people to treat political decision-making as a bargaining
process, and use whatever means they can to advance their own self-interest.
As we have seen, a central aim in theories of justice is to find fair terms of
cooperation in order to resolve political controversies. But then, approaching
discussions with the primary goal of advancing one’s own self-interest seems
necessarily inconsistent with justice so conceived.
The Rawlsian structure of political justification I have outlined provides a
way of understanding why, and in what way, including considerations of self-
interest in citizens’ evaluations of political decisions should be permissible. As
Rawls’s theory holds, justification for political decisions rests on reasonable
citizens’ satisfaction with the institutions making the decisions. I submit that
reasonable people are likely to share the view that one’s evaluations of deci-
sions should, in part, be based on their implications for one’s own interests.
Moreover, they are also likely to share the view that one’s satisfaction with
institutions making the decisions should be based on how one’s own interests
are thwarted or advanced over time.
Although constraints should be placed on the role of self-interest in judge-
ments about political issues, those constraints must be determined by public
reason. So, the extent to which political officials allow people’s self-interested
claims to affect the outcomes must be conducive to the satisfaction of those
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in the reasonable overlapping consensus with the institutions. Furthermore,
it seems that the criterion of reasonableness as it applies to persons excludes
those who would judge decisions based solely on the consequences for them-
selves from counting towards the justification of a decision.
The ability for institutions to be flexible in how they accommodate self-
interested reasons is, I think, a virtue when one considers that the aim of
political institutions is to fulfil the principle of equality over time. Examining
decisions and evaluating the fairness of institutions by looking at how they af-
fect the interests of particular citizens allows institutions to consider whether
their decisions are systematically disadvantaging certain citizens, i.e., whether
decisions are systematically thwarting their interests. If the citizens whose
interests are being systematically thwarted are reasonable ones who hold rea-
sonable comprehensive doctrines, then my account suggests that the mere fact
that they are being systematically disadvantaged warrants attention on the
part of political officials. And it allows for citizens to make an appeal couched
in the language of public reason, on their own behalf.
Political officials ought to take the systematic thwarting of citizens’ in-
terests into account because the objective of political officials is to promote
the satisfaction of citizens with the institutions. And insofar as citizens regard
each other as equals, if institutions systematically thwart the interests of some,
then it seems that all reasonable citizens should agree that this is cause to be
concerned about the goodness of the institutions or those making decisions
within them. They may disagree about what should be done as a result, and
they may disagree about the precise sources of unfairness. But they should
agree that it is a problem worth examining and addressing. For, systematic
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thwarting of some interests suggests that there may be something unfair about
the current structure of institutions.
4.13 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have defended Rawls’s political theory against the criticisms
raised in Chapter 2, and laid the groundwork for the main objections that I
see arising for Gutmann and Thompson, which I will raise in the final chapter.
One difference between the two theories that emerges is what sort of evidence
each believes should be privileged in political decisions. Rawls holds that
political officials should base their decisions on information that tells them
about what would be likely to meet the standard of public reason. Gutmann
and Thompson argue instead that political decisions should be grounded in
public discourse that fulfils their standards to a significant degree.
As a result of Gutmann and Thompson’s commitment to the view that
decisions should be determined by actual public discourse, it is helpful to
examine their theory at work, which I will do in the next chapter. There, I
will use the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly (OCA) to illustrate the moves they
make to address the limitations they identified in Rawls’s theory. This also
makes it possible to see the differences between how each theory guides the
approaches and decision-making processes in practice. In the final chapter, on
the basis of the Rawlsian framework I have developed here, I will argue that the
OCA could have been strengthened by grounding decisions about it in political
liberalism. However, I will also argue that there is a role for Gutmann and
Thompson’s theory, so long as it is situated within the framework built on
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political liberalism.
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Chapter 5
Deliberative Democracy in
Action
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I defended a Rawlsian framework of political justifi-
cation. There, I argued that the justification of a political decision depends
on whether it is conducive to the satisfaction of reasonable people in the soci-
ety, with the institutions as defined by the constitutional essentials. In other
words, the justification of a political decision depends on whether it meets the
standard of public reason.
In this chapter, I will return to Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, which
holds that political decisions are justified insofar as they are made in a process
in which citizens exchange reasons that are respectful and moral, and that a
binding decision must be made at some point, although it should be possible to
revisit any decision after a period of time. I will outline Thompson’s argument
that a citizens’ assembly, designed according to the principles of Gutmann’s
and his theory of deliberative democracy, should be used to review and make
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decisions about reforming electoral systems.
Thompson draws out his arguments using the British Columbia Citizens’
Assembly (BCCA), which was held to review the electoral system, and poten-
tially recommend a new one to the people to vote on in a referendum. However,
I will argue that the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly (OCA) fulfilled Thompson’s
principles at least as well as did the BCCA. Thus, in the last chapter, I will
use the OCA to draw out my critique of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory
and the practical implications of it.
5.2 Citizens’ Assemblies
In 2003, 161 British Columbians were selected to be members of the British
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA), which was responsible for developing
an electoral system that could replace the current electoral system in British
Columbia. After the BCCA had developed an alternative electoral system,
the broader population of B.C. would vote on whether it endorsed the new
electoral system in a referendum. In the first phase of its decision-making,
the BCCA met for 6 weekend sessions, during which time they learned about
different electoral systems. Next, some of the members attended public con-
sultation meetings that were held throughout B.C. This was followed by the
final deliberation phase, which consisted in 6 weekend sessions held over the
course of 3 months, when the members made their decisions about what to
propose to the people of B.C. in the referendum.
At the end of the process, the BCCA recommended a single transferable
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voting (STV) system.1 In the referendum, of the total number of ballots cast,
57.3% of the population responded “yes” in answer to the question of whether
B.C. should adopt the new system recommended by the BCCA.(Lang, 2007,
36) This fell just short of the 60% margin that was required in order for the
new system to be adopted. Thus, no change was made to the electoral system,
although the government committed to revisiting the issue again.
Then, in 2006, a similar process took place in Ontario, when 103 Ontarians
were selected to be members of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly (OCA). They
met on weekends over the course of approximately 8 months to learn about al-
ternative electoral systems, have public consultation meetings with the broader
Ontario population, and to develop an electoral system that would be proposed
in the subsequent referendum. In Ontario, only 37% of the votes cast in the
referendum were in support of the mixed member proportional (MMP) system
the OCA had recommended.2 Here, too, the process did not result in changes
being made to the electoral system.
In spite of neither process resulting in a mandate for change, according to
Thompson (2008, 49) and other proponents of citizens’ assemblies, institutions
such as the BCCA and OCA were successes. They were successes in the sense
that they had enabled the people to make an important decision – viz., about
electoral reform – themselves.
1In the most general sense, single transferable voting systems are characterized by the use
of a ballot system that allows voters to rank the candidates in order of preference.(Gallagher
and Mitchell, 2005, 10)
2In mixed member proportional systems, a fixed number of seats in the legislature are
determined by the candidate who has gotten the most votes in the particular riding repre-
sented by that seat in the legislature. After this process, the remaining seats are assigned
in a way that ameliorates discrepancies between the proportion of seats occupied by each
party in the legislature and the proportion of votes for them.
134
Even though in the referendum, the OCA failed to meet the threshold set
for changing the electoral system, proponents of the OCA and electoral re-
form argued that this was largely due to bad decisions that were made by
the government about the design of the citizens’ assembly. For example, the
government set a timeframe for the assembly to come to a decision and to in-
form the public that critics objected was obviously far too short. Furthermore,
the strategies to inform the general public about the upcoming referendum on
electoral reform were clearly inadequate. Despite these shortcomings, how-
ever, proponents argued that the legitimacy of the citizens’ assembly as a
means of strengthening democracy remained intact, since it enabled citizens
to participate in important decisions about democracy.(Rose, 2007, 16)
In the next chapter, I wish to take issue with two aspects of the view that
the OCA was a success. One is the standard against which proponents judge
the success of citizens’ assemblies, i.e., to increase citizens’ participation in de-
cisions that significantly affect them. This may be a laudable goal. However,
insofar as the goal is to strengthen democracy, or increase the legitimacy of
political institutions, I will argue that the appropriate standard against which
to measure the success of the OCA is whether it was conducive to the satis-
faction of Ontarians, both with the OCA and with the Ontario government,
not merely whether it increased citizens’ participation and engagement with
politics.
Second, I wish to show that the shortcomings of the OCA reflect principled
problems with the theory, and are not merely accidental byproducts of the
government’s decisions. Although the failure of the OCA likely was the result
of the government’s decisions, it was a foreseeable consequence of the structure
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of the theory.
In my critique of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory and the OCA, I will ar-
gue that the principles of deliberative democratic theory may still “strengthen
democracy”, by which I mean they may be conducive to more justified po-
litical decisions and more legitimate institutions. However, they only do so
insofar as decisions about deliberative democratic mechanisms are situated
within a Rawlsian framework. That is, deliberative democratic institutions
may strengthen the justification of political decisions, but only by leading to
decisions that better meet the standard of public reason.
On my view, fulfilling the principles of deliberative democracy will only
improve political institutions and decisions insofar as they conduce to the
satisfaction of reasonable citizens with the institutions involved, over time.
For instance, they may strengthen the justification of political decisions by:
showing citizens that political decisions meet the standard of public reason;
providing information to the government about how reasonable citizens are
likely to respond to decisions (so that the government may make decisions
that better meet the standard of public reason); and affecting how citizens are
likely to respond to particular decisions, such that citizens are more satisfied
with the institutions making the decisions.
5.3 Thompson’s defence of the BCCA
As I argued in Chapter 3, Gutmann and Thompson hold that the justification
of political decisions depends on whether they are made in processes that
ultimately are based on their principles of deliberative democracy. If there is
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disagreement about the design or implementation of a decision-making process,
that disagreement should be addressed in a process that fulfills the principles of
deliberative democracy. Those principles include that reasons are to be moral
and respectful, in a process that meets the principle of reciprocity. And at
some point, deliberation should cease and a binding decision should be made,
although any decision may be revisited in future.3
According to Gutmann and Thompson, it may not always be necessary for
citizens themselves to engage in a deliberative democratic process in order for
a political decision to be justified. Citizens may authorize the use of different
decision-making processes, such as a majoritarian process of voting in a ref-
erendum, to make decisions. However, for this choice to be justified, i.e., to
use an alternative process, it must be made by citizens in a process that fulfils
deliberative democratic principles.
This is one of the reasons why Thompson argues that a deliberative demo-
cratic process such as the citizens’ assembly should be held to determine the
electoral system. In many places, including Canada, the initial decision to
use the first past the post (FPTP) system that dominates in Canada was
not adopted according to deliberative democratic principles. In Canada, it
was initially instituted by the British government when Canada’s politico-
legal system was first constructed, and has remained intact, both federally
and provincially, ever since.(Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005, 102)
Another reason that Thompson argues the people ought to make their
own decision about the electoral system is the significance it has for them.
As Thompson (2008, 22) says, “the type of the electoral system significantly
3See §3.1.4 for further explication of the principles of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory.
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affects the value and range of choices that citizens enjoy when they exercise the
right to vote.” For example, smaller parties in Canada (e.g., the Independents
and members of the Green Party) rarely win enough votes to gain any seats in
the legislatures in elections under the FPTP system. This seems to effectively
diminish people’s choices who do not identify with the more dominant parties,
since their vote for a candidate from a smaller party is unlikely to result in
that candidate actually taking a seat in the legislature.
Furthermore, Thompson argues that “ordinary” citizens should be the ones
to determine the electoral system since, given the right conditions, they are
likely to do just as well as the other alternatives he identifies, i.e., a commission,
the Supreme Court, or legislature. In other words, according to Thompson
(2008, 25-6), a citizens’ assembly is justified as a way for the people to choose
the electoral system that governs them so long as they are shown to be at least
as capable of making this decision as the aforementioned institutions. After
drawing out the problems with the three alternatives, he goes on to argue that
the concerns with allowing citizens to make the decision for themselves can be
overcome in institutions designed according to Gutmann’s and his principles.
In the following sections, I will examine Thompson’s argument that citizens
have good reason to accept the decision to call a citizens’ assembly to review
and potentially reform the electoral system. Thompson uses the experience
of the BCCA to argue that using a deliberative democratic mechanism (i.e.,
a citizens’ assembly) to review and potentially reform the electoral system is
justified. He also uses the BCCA to draw out his arguments for how citizens’
assemblies about electoral reform should be designed and implemented to best
fulfil the principles of deliberative democracy.
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After presenting Thompson’s defence of the BCCA, I will then present the
process of the OCA. Although the OCA largely followed that of the BCCA, the
former did differ in some ways, which moved it closer to fulfilling Thompson’s
criteria than the BCCA, e.g., its decisions about member selection, and the
interactions between OCA members and elected officials. However, in the last
chapter, I will argue that in spite of attempts to strengthen the process accord-
ing to the theory, the OCA still did not succeed in the goal of strengthening
democracy because of principled problems with the theory.
5.3.1 Against legislatures
Thompson (2008, 24) argues that legislatures ought not to decide the issue of
electoral reform since, in his words, “electoral reform is less likely to receive
consideration on its merits if those who are deciding whether to undertake it
are the same as those whose electoral future it would determine.” Although
Thompson does not draw out the objection to partisan values explicitly in
terms of the principles of deliberative democracy we examined earlier, it seems
as though two principles at issue are that reasons must be respectful, and that
they must be moral.4 Legislators are likely to violate the principle that rea-
sons must be moral, in that their decisions are likely to be based on their
own partisan reasons, and not those of private citizens. Also, according to the
principle of respect, decisions must take into account the interests of others
who stand to be significantly affected. And since the electoral system does
significantly impact citizens, decision-makers have an obligation to take citi-
zens’ non-partisan interests into account, even though they may be at odds
4For a more detailed explication of the principles, please see §3.1.4.
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with legislators’ partisan interests.
Furthermore, the principle of reciprocity also requires that decision-makers
should take seriously others’ reasons for their disagreement, so long as those
others are disposed to do the same. But given the partisan interests that
legislators have in choosing particular electoral systems, they seem to have
significant incentive to discount the interests of private citizens. As Thomp-
son (2008, 24) argues, “A prudent principle of constitutional design is that
decisions about rules that affect who is elected should not be controlled by
individuals who have a preponderant interest against (or for) change in the
membership of the institution in question.”5
5.3.2 Against government-appointed commissions
In considering the view that the electoral system should be determined by
expert commissions, Thompson identifies two main problems. First, as we
just saw, legislators have partisan reasons to favour certain electoral systems
over others. Since those same legislators are typically responsible for appoint-
ing the members of a commission, it seems plausible that committee mem-
bers may suffer the same biases as those responsible for their appointment.
Rather than make their decisions according to what ordinary citizens would
want, members of commissions may be inclined to make decisions to favour
those who appointed them, i.e., they would be inclined to maintain the status
quo.(Thompson, 2008, 25)
On the other hand, the second problem that Thompson identifies is that, “it
5To put the point in Hartian terms, those who have a direct interest in what the secondary
rules are ought not to be the ones setting them. To be clear, this is not an objection by
Hart; I am merely putting the point in Hartian terms in case it is helpful to the reader.
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may be possible to keep the appointment process more independent of current
politics, but to the extent that members are distant, they are also too removed
from the experiences of citizens.”(Thompson, 2008, 25)6 If experts do escape
the criticism that they have partisan interests, this seems to imply a general
disinterest in political parties and the effects of the electoral system on them as
citizens. But interest in the decision and its likely effects on citizens seems to
be a necessary condition for good decisions about the electoral system. Thus,
government-appointed commissions are unlikely to be able to make choices
that serve the interests of “ordinary citizens”.
5.3.3 Against judiciaries
The last alternative that Thompson considers is using the judiciary to make
decisions about the electoral system. Judiciaries have the advantage over the
previous two institutions in that they are unlikely to have interests that conflict
with those of citizens with respect to electoral systems. However, Thompson
objects to judiciaries on grounds that their role makes them ill-suited to ad-
dress questions of institutional design. As he says, “questions about change
in the electoral system itself – to what extent it should preserve a two-party
system, for example – raise issues that are less about individual voters than
about institutional structures and the nature of democratic representation
itself, which courts are not well placed, and are usually reluctant, to ad-
6Although this argument seems much weaker than the other, I mention it because it
creates a particular structure of argument that I think does contribute some support to
Thompson’s overall point: the problem with experts is that their interests are unlikely to
reflect citizens’ views in the right way for the former to be legitimate decision-makers on
behalf of the people. Experts’ views may be skewed by partisan bias, or they may be skewed
by their relationship to politics.
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judicate.”(Thompson, 2008, 24) In Hartian terms, the judiciary is generally
charged with how to interpret and apply the primary rules with respect to
individual citizens, rather than construct the secondary rules. The function
of judges is not to create or design other institutions, but only to work within
one, viz., the courts.
5.3.4 The competence of “ordinary” citizens
Having rejected the courts, legislatures, and government-appointed commis-
sions as particularly well-suited to address electoral reform, Thompson ad-
dresses the possible objection that, nonetheless, any of these alternatives would
be better than a citizens’ assembly. Thompson argues that citizens are capable
of meeting standards that he develops as good measures of their competence
for choosing their electoral system. In answer to the question, “In what sense
must citizens be competent?”, Thompson identifies the following five stan-
dards that citizens ought to meet to be a suitable alternative to the others
who might make the decision.(Thompson, 2008, 26)
First, citizens should demonstrate a commitment to becoming informed
enough about electoral systems to enable them to make a sensible decision.
Second, they should be able to formulate goals or standards for the sort of elec-
toral system they want, which should enable them to differentiate and decide
between the alternatives. So, for instance, “preservation of local representa-
tion”, is an appropriate goal because some electoral systems meet it better
than others. Third, they should be able to make basic distinctions between
the different electoral systems, and understand the different consequences gen-
erally associated with each. Fourth, they should be able to connect their goals
142
with the different electoral systems on offer. And lastly, they should be willing
to engage in a process with one another in a respectful manner in accordance
with the principle of reciprocity.
Thompson argues that, “although most citizens do not now come close to
satisfying the criteria set out above, some may develop sufficient competence
under the right conditions.”(Thompson, 2008, 27) Citizens’ assemblies pro-
vide just those conditions necessary for citizens to meet these standards. For
example, when members of the BCCA were asked questions such as, “How
informed about electoral systems do you feel?”, about their level of interest
in politics, and how “informed about politics” they felt they were throughout
the process, Thompson notes their responses generally indicated that they felt
that all had “increased significantly.” And videos and transcripts of the dis-
cussions and website exchanges provided evidence of how well informed the
committee members became. According to Thompson (2008, 35), “on most of
the five criteria of competence set out earlier, the members seemed to do well,
at least those members who spoke or wrote.”
Although the BCCA was precluded from revisiting the mandate, Thomp-
son argues that, “their [i.e., the members’] control of the agenda and the choice
of the alternatives on which they would later vote should be seen as relatively
free.”(Thompson, 2008, 33) After deliberating amongst themselves, the BCCA
members were the ones to choose which electoral system they would develop,
and made the many decisions to determine its final formulation. So, although
they were not able to make all of the decisions, they did make many important
ones themselves. As Thompson (2008, 33) notes, “Although members relied
on expert advice to decide on some of the issues (few had strong feelings about
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the Droop quota or the weighted inclusive Gregory method), they participated
fully in the framing of the final versions of each of the models.”
Thompson considers the view that once ordinary citizens chose the elec-
toral system they preferred, a commission could be used to make the more
detailed decisions about its design. Thompson raises two worries, however,
with the possibility of using a commission to develop an alternative electoral
system that was chosen by an assembly. First, when citizens are evaluating the
alternatives, Thompson states, “they should be able to make sure that each
type appears in the form that is most attractive, and that none has avoidable
features that would disqualify it in the eyes of most voters.”(Thompson, 2008,
29) One worry, then, is that a commission may construct a weaker alterna-
tive than a citizens’ assembly, out of a desire to maintain the status quo, as
mentioned earlier. Thus, the citizenry would not really have been given the
opportunity to choose their own electoral system, because the one put before
them was so weak as to not be a real option at all.7
The second worry is that whether or not the commission developed a strong
alternative, citizens are unlikely to have the level of understanding that would
allow them to evaluate the choices of the commission in light of their own
values. Even after taking several weeks to learn about electoral systems, many
OCA members still felt uncertain about their decisions regarding the MMP
system they developed.(Rose, 2007, 15) It seems unlikely then, that citizens
7In his comparative analysis, Lundberg (2007) uses the case of the British electoral reform
process, which used a government-appointed commission, and the BCCA as an example of a
case in which a citizens’ assembly was used, to illustrate the reality of this worry shared by
him and Thompson. Lundberg (2007, 490) concludes that indeed, “the more independent
of the government (and the wider political establishment) the reviewers, the more radical
the electoral reform recommendation.”
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who hadn’t undergone the education process about electoral systems would be
in a position to evaluate a commission’s decisions, so that they could decide
whether they agreed or not.
Of course, a similar worry arises for a citizens’ assembly, as Thompson
recognizes. There may be an inherent tension between appointing a citizens’
assembly to construct the choices that will be put to referendum voting, and
arriving at an outcome that is reflective of the views of “ordinary citizens”.
As Thompson (2008, 47) states the problem in his analysis of the BCCA:
“Designed to reduce the gap between citizens and experts, the process itself
reproduced the problem that it was intended to overcome. The greater the suc-
cess of the deliberative process in the Assembly, the greater the gap between
the Assembly and the electorate.” To the extent that the process succeeds
at educating citizens, and enabling them to deliberate with one another in a
way that shifts their views about the electoral system, the views of decision-
makers in the assembly will no longer reflect the views of “ordinary citizens.”
Educating ordinary citizens so that they can make informed decisions on the
basis of relevant information simply creates a segment of the population that
understands the issue in a way that the rest of the citizenry does not. The
problem that using experts introduces – that ordinary citizens cannot retrace
the decision-making, and thus cannot know whether the decision is one that
they can endorse given their own values – seems to plague the citizens’ assem-
bly as well.
Thompson’s response to this problem is that, “if members take seriously
their obligation to explain the process to voters, and voters are prepared to
trust the judgement of members, the moral gap disappears, even if the com-
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petence gap remains.”(Thompson, 2008, 47) Even if non-members are unable
to retrace the reasoning of members, according to Gutmann and Thompson’s
account of deliberative democracy, what matters to the justification of deci-
sions is the extent to which the processes fulfil their principles. The decisions
may be acceptable to non-members then in virtue of being made in a process
that they can see is fair, i.e., made according to the principles of deliberative
democracy, even if they cannot understand the reasoning used in the process.
In his analysis of the BCCA, Thompson outlines how to conceive of and
carry out the selection process to fulfil the principle of equality. Thompson
argues that, “the Assembly was supposed to be deliberative and representa-
tive, and therefore needed members who could credibly express the views of
major interests or groups in the society.”(Thompson, 2008, 41) Besides using
a deliberative process that fulfills the principles of the theory, fulfilling the
principle of equality requires ensuring that the dominant views in the general
population are taken into account in that process as well.
Because of the obligation to ensure that the dominant perspectives of the
general population would be reflected in the deliberations of the assembly,
Thompson rejects a purely random selection process as best for choosing mem-
bers of citizens’ assemblies. Instead, he endorses stratifying the population
from which the assembly members were chosen according to gender and ge-
ographic location.(Thompson, 2008, 42) Also, ensuring that the distribution
of age in the assembly roughly matched that of the general population was
identified as important, since this too may be viewed as affecting the decisions
by the assembly.(Secretariat, 2007, 47)8
8Although there was some overrepresentation of seniors on the assemblies, it was deemed
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Thompson acknowledges that objections to the way that representativeness
was addressed on the assembly are likely to come from two directions. On the
one hand, one may object that striving to ensure the presence of particular
groups is disrespectful.(Thompson, 2008, 42) For instance, one might object
that efforts to ensure an equal number of men and women wrongly assumes
an essential difference between the two that is relevant to how they will reason
about the electoral system.
One of the main reasons Thompson gives for attempting to ensure diversity
(with respect to people’s ascriptive characteristics) in the BCCA was to make
the fairness of the process readily apparent to the general citizenry. As he says,
“however representative the substance of the deliberations might be, it could
never be as transparent as the composition of the Assembly itself.”(Thompson,
2008, 42) Even if deliberations in the assembly took into account the views of
different groups, those designing the process needed to ensure that it would be
evident to citizens outside the assembly that deliberations took into account
diverse perspectives. Since citizens did not have access to all of the discussions
and consultations to establish this for themselves, organizers selected members
who others would be able to see would be likely to represent a diverse range
of perspectives.
From the other direction, some may object that the assembly did not go
far enough in ensuring an adequately diverse assembly. Thompson defends the
decision to only ensure representation with respect to age, gender, geographic
location, and Aboriginal status on the following grounds:
Among groups that are potentially disadvantaged, these four [age,
gender, geographic location, and (self-identified) Aboriginal iden-
negligible by organizers.
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tity] are defined by criteria of membership that are more objectively
ascertainable. Who is a woman is less contestable than who counts
as poor; who is a Northerner is clearer than who is Asian enough
to qualify for that ethnic group. (Aboriginal status raises similar
problems, which is probably why it was not included as a criterion
in the original terms of reference.)(Thompson, 2008, 43)
If representativeness and selection criteria were based on any other group iden-
tities except for the first three he mentions, this would be likely to raise con-
troversies about whether the person chosen is a legitimate representative of
the group. In accordance with Thompson’s view, the designers of the process
in B.C. decided not to select members on the basis of ethnicity to ensure that
certain groups were represented.
However, upon checking the demographics of the assembly at the end of
its selection process, only one individual had been chosen who was “a status
Indian through marriage,” and another who had “recently discovered Me´tis an-
cestry.”(Thompson, 2008, 42) The Chair, Gordon Gibson, determined that this
did not sufficiently represent the “Aboriginal point of view.” He subsequently
got approval from the government to add one self-identifying Aboriginal man
and one woman to the assembly.
It seems as though the decision to add two self-identifying people may be
supported by Thompson’s arguments about representativeness in two ways,
even though, generally speaking, he may be read as being opposed to it. First,
the decision may be justified in light of the importance he places on whether
citizens are likely to believe that the assembly has considered diverse points of
view about the issue. So, including a member who self-identifies as Aboriginal
may be more likely to convince British Columbians that the views of Aboriginal
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peoples were taken into account in the assembly’s deliberations.
Second, one might argue that for the purposes of the assembly – to convince
others that Aboriginal views have been taken into account – the question of
who should count as a representative can be adequately settled by self-selection
with respect to the Aboriginal people. Of course, the question of how to
determine who should have “Indian status” for the purposes of government
policy has certainly been a source of significant controversy, e.g., determining
who are eligible recipients of benefits from some social programmes. However,
determining membership on the assembly by self-identification, so that others
are likely to agree that perspectives of Aboriginal people have been included,
may seem to be an acceptable way to settle the issue.
Thompson confirms that BCCA members did consider issues from more
than just their own perspectives. As he describes it, “many members usu-
ally did not express only views that their ascriptive status would lead one to
expect.”(Thompson, 2008, 42) So, the experience in the BCCA suggests that
ascriptive representation is not as significant as one might think, in fulfilling
the goal of representing a diversity of perspectives on an issue. Ensuring a
diversity of viewpoints may not straightforwardly depend on including mem-
bers of particular groups who are thought to hold certain views. Rather, what
matters is the extent to which those in the assembly are aware of and willing
to put forward other points of view.
Another potential problem is that even if the assembly is roughly repre-
sentative in its composition, as Thompson (2008, 45) points out, “some people
talk more than others, and the talkers come disproportionately from the rel-
atively advantaged groups in the society.” So, even if the assembly included
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people from groups that are often marginalized in politics, such as Aboriginal
peoples, the concern remains that they will not be as comfortable as others
are with voicing their concerns or objections in the assembly. Thus, even if the
assembly is comprised of a diverse group of citizens, this still does not ensure
that the discussions will be substantively diverse.
Thompson (2008, 45) acknowledges this concern, but argues that, “even
strict egalitarians should not want to insist on completely equal participation.
Even if it were possible to achieve, the elaborate rules and artificial constraints
would hardly show respect for the otherwise disadvantaged members.” Trying
to impose rules to ensure that members from all groups participate equally
seems likely to not make those from marginalized groups feel or be seen as more
equal. If other members did hold prejudices against those from marginalized
groups, imposing rules that may appear to privilege participation of the latter
over others’ could well create or perpetuate feelings of unfairness or animosity
towards those from marginalized groups.
Thompson favours the approach taken by Gibson to address this in the
BCCA. Gibson informally approached members who seemed reluctant to speak
out in the assembly proceedings to hear their views, and personally encouraged
them to speak in the public forums.(Thompson, 2008, 44) Thompson suggests
some other measures that could have been taken to make the discussions more
balanced, such as “authorizing the Chair to call on members rather than wait-
ing for them to volunteer.” Also, suggests Thompson (2008, 45), “the Chair
could have distributed assigned tasks more widely – for example, by asking less
vocal members to take responsibility for preparing short reports for the As-
sembly or the website.” So, rather than implementing procedural mechanisms
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to increase the participation of some, the chair could act as a facilitator, and
create opportunities within the standard mechanisms to enable more balanced
participation in decisions.
Another feature of the BCCA that Thompson considers is the relationship
the citizens’ assembly should have with other groups, such as the media, lob-
byists, or party members. Thompson notes that in B.C., the pressure exerted
on assembly members by partisans, lobbyists, or public officials was rarely of
the sort that he considers to be of real concern. Indeed, after interviewing rep-
resentatives of the BCCA, the Ontario Select Committee9 found that, “there
seemed to be considerable resentment among BC-STV10 supporters that nei-
ther the Green Party nor the [New Democratic Party] officially endorsed the
BC-STV model, and in particular, that the Greens were actively campaigning
for the MMP option, even while the Assembly was doing its work.”(on Elec-
toral Reform, 2007, 53) Rather than attempting to sway the decisions of the
assembly by manipulating them directly, the assembly and the parties sim-
ply adopted an adversarial position, and the latter began their own anti-STV
campaign in competition with the assembly.
In the BCCA, another way of ensuring equality was to conduct votes by
secret ballot to avoid members exerting pressure on one another to vote in
a particular way.(Thompson, 2008, 38) Thompson recognizes that this had a
number of benefits. One main advantage is that people would likely feel freer
to vote whichever way they felt was appropriate without fear of reprisal from
9This was a committee of political officials that did preliminary research on the question
of how to design a citizens’ assembly in Ontario. Much of their report was based on research
done on other similar initiatives by other countries and the province of British Columbia.
10The alternative single-transferable voting system developed by the BCCA.
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any others who disagreed with their position.(Thompson, 2008, 38)
However, Thompson points out that this choice comes at the cost of trans-
parency, accountability, and the ability for those affected by the assembly’s
decisions to raise legitimate challenges to the reasoning of members. His com-
plaint is that allowing secret ballot voting “is to let members abdicate their
individual responsibility.”(Thompson, 2008, 39) He argues that, “unlike or-
dinary voters, the members were acting at least in part as representatives.
Even – or especially – if they were representing not any particular group or
constituency but the general public, they should have been willing to defend
their own votes in public.”(Thompson, 2008, 39) Insofar as members of the
assembly were meant to be making decisions on behalf of the people, citizens
should be able to see the ways that members contributed to the outcome of
the assembly. We might understand this commitment by Thompson as similar
to the Rawlsian view I outlined in the last chapter. That is, citizens have
a moral obligation to account to one another for their positions on political
issues because (ideally) these will affect political decisions that in turn could
significantly affect others.11
Thompson notes that the issue of fairness and equal opportunity to par-
ticipate also arises because those who were content with the status quo may
have been less likely to take part in the project. As Thompson speculates,
“those who were content with the status quo were probably less likely to want
to participate in this project. The selection process favored volunteers, and
may have also attracted citizens less sympathetic to major parties than the
11I say “similar” because Rawls’s view is that this is a moral obligation, but the issue of
what this implies in terms of political obligations is to be settled by what meets the standard
of public reason.
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general electorate is.”(Thompson, 2008, 34) Thus, the deliberations by the as-
sembly may not have reflected the views of the general populations because of
an under-representation of those opposed to changing the status quo.
Thompson also considers the possibility that assembly members might have
chosen to reform the electoral system because, as he puts the point, “the very
existence of an Assembly with the mandate it had may have predisposed mem-
bers – not toward any particular model, but against the status quo. To many
members, it might well have seemed a failure if after all this work they had
come to a conclusion that the existing system should be retained.”(Thompson,
2008, 34) Many may have felt that everything that had been spent on their
extensive education and public deliberation would have been all for naught, or
been seen by the general public as a waste if they decided not to recommend
an alternative to the status quo.
In response, Thompson (2008, 34) points out that, “even so, a substantial
minority, including some of the most articulate members, defended the existing
system;” seven members of the BCCA continued to maintain their support for
the status quo, up to, and including in, the final vote. This may be taken as
evidence that the decision-making process was carried out in such a way that
the choice to retain the current system was a live possibility for members.
In his analysis of the outcome of the BCCA, Thompson argues that the
only grounds for criticizing the final decision of the assembly is by finding fault
with the process. Any of the systems the BCCA was considering would have
been reasonable ones to choose. According to Thompson (2008, 39–40),
We should not judge how well members performed (or the extent to
which they were autonomous) by whether they reached the right
conclusion. All of the alternatives on which members voted are
153
within a range of reasonable disagreement. None violates basic
liberties or fundamental rights. The Assembly’s case is closer to a
case of pure procedural justice, in which there is no independent
criterion for what counts as a correct outcome.
Each electoral system promotes certain values and necessarily compromises on
others, such that reasonable citizens may favour different alternatives. Since
none of the choices that the assembly considered were contrary to democratic
principles, it would have been reasonable for the assemblies to accept and
recommend any of the options under consideration. There is no way in this
case to judge the outcome independently of the process used to reach the
decision. In other words, asking whether the assembly reached the “correct”
decision just is to ask whether the process it used was the right one.
However, Thompson argues that the decision by the assembly could still
be criticized, for example, “by showing that STV does not satisfy the goals
the Assembly set as well as another system does, or by showing that the
goals themselves are mistaken or incomplete.”(Thompson, 2008, 40) So we
see the theoretical structure of justification in deliberative democracy theory
reflected in practice. The principles of the theory are substantive, but those
substantive constraints apply to the procedure of decision-making. And what
those principles should imply in practice is to be determined according to
the best understanding of the principles, to the best understanding of the
individuals involved. Thus, the outcome of the BCCA may be criticized by
showing that it did not complete its task adequately, in light of the values and
commitments espoused by the assembly.
But Thompson (2008, 40) argues that even if such apparent mistakes in
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reasoning are identified, “unless we are prepared to try to persuade the Assem-
bly to change its collective mind (assuming we could call it back into session),
we are not justified in substituting our view for that of the Assembly (assum-
ing we had the power to do so).” So while we may take issue with the process
used to arrive at its conclusion, and call into question the justification for its
decision, changing the conclusion itself would be justified only after engaging
in a deliberative democratic process with the reasoners whose decision is at
issue.
5.3.5 The referendum
Thompson argues that the decision to hold a citizens’ assembly, and to design
it according to the reasoning just discussed, is normatively justified because
of the significance of the electoral system for citizens, and because a process
so designed fulfils the principles of deliberative democracy. Once the assembly
reaches a decision, however, the question remains of how to determine whether
to implement its recommendation. Thompson argues that the decision of
whether to adopt the recommendation of the assembly should be made by
popular referendum. And indeed referenda were held in both B.C. and Ontario.
However, in both provinces, there was controversy about whether more than
a simple majority of votes supporting change should be required.
In B.C., politicians made the decision to require that a minimum of 60% of
voters support BC-STV before the electoral system would be changed. How-
ever, as Thompson objects, “As a result, the 57 percent of the voters who
supported the Assembly’s proposal did not get their way. The bar was set
higher than for other electoral reforms in the province, and arguably set ex-
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cessively high.”(Thompson, 2008, 38) This position reflects the worry we saw
Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 91) raise earlier, that “procedures for amend-
ing the Constitution, for example, make the possibility of future change in
some major policies seem hopelessly remote.” Holding a citizens’ assembly on
the question of electoral reform may be seen as a step in the right direction
in terms of promoting democracy. However, the decision to require a super-
majority seems to thwart the goal of making the political structure more just
because it makes reform on the basis of deliberative democratic decisions too
difficult.
In spite of the referendum results in B.C., Thompson concludes that the
BCCA was a success, given that it affirmed a desire on the part of the electorate
for reform, and that those involved in the process had been able to identify a
key limitation to be resolved in the future reform process. In his words, “The
deliberative process in which the B.C. citizens engaged stands as an exemplar
that can guide future efforts to give citizens greater control over their electoral
systems.”(Thompson, 2008, 49) The B.C. experience was a success in that
it demonstrated that deliberative democratic mechanisms such as citizens’
assemblies may be used to empower citizens in societies undertaking electoral
reform.
For Thompson (2008, 49), while it may not be possible in all cases to
employ deliberative democratic mechanisms for political decision-making, the
B.C. experience showed that, “no democracy can now responsibly undertake
electoral reform without seriously considering an assembly of citizens as part
of the answer to the question, who should govern who governs?” While it may
have encountered some difficulties, for Thompson, its success lies in the fact
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that a citizens’ assembly remains a viable alternative in principle for addressing
the question of electoral reform.
Thompson may be right that the BCCA did provide evidence to some that
citizens could come to a decision about the electoral system in a process that
would meet their deliberative democratic principles. This seemed to be the
view of the Ontario government that followed suit and instituted the OCA.
In the next section, I will outline the reasoning and decisions that were made
about the OCA, which largely fulfilled Gutmann and Thompson’s principles,
as well as the further specifications in Thompson’s defence of the BCCA.
5.4 In defence of the OCA
The reasoning that the Ontario government gave for holding the OCA reflects
Thompson’s defence of holding a citizens’ assembly about the electoral system.
As the Secretariat of the OCA said, “It was timely, early in this new century,
to examine our electoral system from the perspective of a group representative
of Ontario as it exists today”.(Secretariat, 2007, 3) One reason to institute
the OCA was that the initial adoption of the FPTP system was not made in
a process that fulfilled deliberative democratic principles. The FPTP system
that currently prevails in Canada was initially decided upon by the British
government, when the British North America Act was enacted in 1867, and
has remained in place ever since.(Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005, 102) Second,
the population at the time that FPTP was initially instituted is significantly
different than the current population. So, even if the adoption of FPTP had
been according to deliberative democratic principles, there may still be good
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reason for the current population to have the opportunity to revisit the deci-
sion.
In its decision about the size of the assembly, and who would be included in
it, the Ontario organizers chose to have one individual from each riding, rather
than two (on female and one male from each) as they had done in B.C. In the
OCA, either a female or a male would be chosen from each riding to represent
it, so that 52 females and 51 males would be chosen, and the alternate for each
riding would be the same sex as the primary representative. Thus, the size of
the assembly was as small as possible while still being representative in the
relevant ways (i.e., with respect to gender and ridings), to make deliberations
more manageable.
The selection meetings in Ontario were advertised to take place in various
locations across the province, and at those meetings, respondents were chosen
by lottery to fulfil the necessary gender and riding criteria. Also, measures
were taken to address a problem that arose for the BCCA, namely, that the
first selection process had resulted in a lack of any Aboriginal or First Na-
tions’ peoples being chosen as members on the assembly.12 To ensure that
representatives from the Aboriginal communities were on the assembly, one
of the selection meetings was designated specifically to select a member and
2 alternates who self-identified as Aboriginal. As a result, ensuring represen-
tation of Aboriginal peoples did not upset the equal representation of ridings
in the OCA. Also, it better integrated the goal of ensuring representation of
Aboriginal peoples into the overall process, rather than making it seem like an
12As a result, in B.C , they selected two self-identifying Aboriginal members who were
added to the membership consisting in two people from each riding.
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afterthought.
Before the meetings commenced, and throughout the learning, consulta-
tion, and deliberation phases in Ontario, the assembly had the opportunity to
review and question decisions about how the meetings would be conducted,
e.g., the processes that would be used to come to decisions by the group, and
the values that would be promoted throughout the process.(Secretariat, 2007,
51)13 The first decision that OCA members made was about the values that
would underlie each stage of decision-making. Ultimately, they chose values
that generally reflected those advanced by Gutmann and Thompson, such as
respectfulness towards others, and the requirement that people leave their
biases at home.(Secretariat, 2007, 63)
Another aspect of the OCA that seems to have met Thompson’s require-
ment that citizens should have a say in all aspects of decision-making is that
members seemed to feel free to take control of the process used to reach the
final decision. For example, towards the end of the deliberation process, when
it was time to make the final decisions, members revised the decision-making
procedure they would use. Two changes they made were to have a scrutineer
who would oversee ballot counting, and to videotape votes that were done by
show of hands.(Secretariat, 2007, 120)
Also, the decision to videotape votes done by a show of hands met Thomp-
son’s recommendation to make the decision-making process more transparent
than secret-ballot voting. However, for some decisions, the OCA still resorted
to secret ballot, presumably to ensure that members felt fully free to vote as
13For a list of the decision-making points in the OCA process, consult, e.g., Secretariat
(2007, 101).
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they truly felt they should. So, they seemed to understand the tension be-
tween the two values – transparency/accountability and autonomy – and the
need to balance them on a case-by-case basis.
Throughout the OCA, an independent, non-profit organization, the Insti-
tute on Governance, collected information through surveys and observation to
evaluate the OCA. Its questions reflected Thompson’s criteria of competence
to develop an alternative electoral system. For example, the surveys asked
participants about whether they felt the process gave people equitable oppor-
tunities to participate, and whether information was presented in a way that
facilitated members’ education about electoral systems.(on Governance, 2007,
33) According to it, members ranked quite.14(on Governance, 2007, 59–60)
In its concluding statements about the OCA, the Institute on Governance
(2007, 2) agrees with Thompson about the potential for citizens’ assemblies
in general, and says about the OCA in particular: “It serves as a model
of how to engage and empower citizens to deliberate and decide on selected
public policy questions”. Under the proper conditions, which can be met in
citizens’ assemblies, citizens may meet Thompson’s criteria for good decision-
making about the electoral system. Citizens’ assemblies provide a good way
of remedying the deficiencies in ordinary citizens’ knowledge, and provide a
forum in which they may deliberate together effectively about the issue at
hand.
A question that is absent from the report by the Institute on Governance
reflects Thompson’s view about the appropriate standards to use to evalu-
14In the rankings associated with these criteria, scores were, on average, 4 out of 5 or
better.
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ate the assembly. Thompson (2008, 39–40) rejects that critics may judge
the outcome of a citizens’ assembly on electoral reform independently of the
reasoning process used to reach its conclusion. Accordingly, surveys used to
evaluate the process did not include questions to test how well the OCA un-
derstood electoral systems or their implications, generally. The only questions
that were asked about their substantive understanding of electoral systems
were about whether members knew where different systems had been em-
ployed, or whether members felt competent in their knowledge of electoral
systems.(on Governance, 2007, 41) Members answered in the affirmative, and
they had in fact invested a great deal of time and energy into learning about
electoral systems. Thus, one may reason that their own positive evaluations
were likely an accurate reflection of their understanding.
The view that one could not evaluate the OCA’s decision apart from the
process used to reach it was also reflected in the instructions given to the
OCA by its Chair, George Thomson. For example, the OCA repeatedly heard
statements such as that, “We know the date of arrival, we just don’t know the
destination yet.”(Secretariat, 2007, 94) Through this advice and slogans such
as Yogi Berra’s, “It ain’t over till it’s over”(Secretariat, 2007, 60), assembly
members were advised throughout the process that although they would have
to arrive at some decision in the end, they were to keep an open mind about
what should be the final decision.
Insofar as citizens were successful in improving their understanding of elec-
toral systems, however, the problem of how well they represent the views of
non-members in their deliberations and decisions is raised. In his analysis
of the OCA, its Academic Director, Jonathan Rose, considers the possibil-
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ity that public consultation meetings may help to close the knowledge gap
between members and non-members. For, it seems as though public consulta-
tion meetings may result in ordinary citizens becoming better informed about
assembly members’ decisions, and the assembly members may become better
informed of citizens’ values and views about their decisions.
However, Rose (2007, 14) rejects this as a way of overcoming the apparent
paradox of citizens’ assemblies. For he reports that, “As one OCA member
put it when asked if anything new was learned at these meetings, ‘No, it goes
to show you how well prepared we are’.” In some cases, when their views
diverged, members may have gained insights from non-members to consider
in deliberations. But it seems that members also attributed disagreements
to lack of knowledge by the general public. Thus, disagreements with the
general public may have been seen by assembly members as the result of inad-
equate understanding on the part of the general public, rather than legitimate
disagreement with their reasoning.
There is, however, another way that the public consultation meetings may
address the gap between members and non-members, which would go towards
fulfilling Gutmann and Thompson’s principles. Communicating with the gen-
eral citizenry about the activities of the assembly may have the result that, in
Thompson’s words:
A voter can say to an Assembly member not only, ‘I trust you
because you engaged in a process that seemed fair and reason-
able’ (which might be said to any representative), but also, ‘I trust
you because you are a person not so different from me, and you
decided as I can imagine that I might have done in similar circum-
stances.’(Thompson, 2008, 47)
Public consultations and correspondence may serve to narrow the gap created
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by education and deliberation by showing the general citizenry that people
similar to themselves deliberated about the question, and came to the answer
that citizens themselves would have, if they had participated in the deliber-
ative democratic process. Even though they may not fully understand the
decisions the assembly made, through hearing from the assembly members,
the general public may come to appreciate assembly members’ commitment
and effort to make a decision that was in the interests of all Ontarians. Seeing
the commitment and effort that assembly members spent on learning, think-
ing about, and discussing, electoral systems in light of their values as fellow
Ontarians, may have increased the trust of the general public that the OCA
would likely arrive at a system that it would accept if it went through the
same process.
Rose’s analysis about the point of the public consultation meetings seems
to confirm this view by Thompson. In Rose’s words:
The difficulty is that although the members were obliged to listen to
the concerns of other citizens they struggled with the fact that the
consultation phase was not primarily about obtaining information
(like the learning phase) but could more easily be understood as an
exercise in legitimacy. It can be argued that the OCA consultation
phase was designed not to benefit those doing the consulting (the
OCA members) but instead to benefit the public whose views were
sought.(Rose, 2007, 14)
As Rose diagnoses it, the problem of understanding the role for public con-
sultation arises if we assume that they are primarily to exchange information
between the assembly and citizens. Rather, as Thompson’s argument eluci-
dates, it seems as though we ought to conceive of public consultation meetings
as an exercise for the benefit of the general public, specifically, to build trust
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between members and the general citizenry. In this way, the latter can be bet-
ter assured that the decisions about the electoral system were made in such a
way that citizens would be able to accept them.
Additionally, plenary sessions were open to the public, as well as some of
the smaller group sessions, at the discretion of the Chair so that the public
could see deliberations as they were taking place. This could also have served
to show the public that deliberations were taking place in a way that allowed
citizens “just like them” to learn about electoral systems, and make competent
decisions about their design.
Another aspect of the OCA that may be seen as a method of building
this trust in non-members was the emphasis on the diversity of the OCA
membership in public communications. In public education material, such
as a video that was published about the process used in Ontario, assembly
members made statements such as the following:
We [the members] were selected at random. We had different per-
spectives. Different backgrounds, different views. But none of
us represented any particular group. We were representing all of
Ontario. So we had a common goal. Our goal was to decide on
the best electoral system for Ontario, one that reflected all of our
values.(on Electoral Reform, 2007)
And in the brochure sent out to Ontarian households, entitled “Who We Are,”
the brochure explains that the assembly was randomly selected, and describes
itself as “a cross-section of Ontario voters.” Although the brochure does not
make Thompson’s point explicit, it describes its recommendation as a decision
that Ontarians who were just like the rest of the general citizenry (achieved by
the unbiased method of random sampling) agreed was best.(on Electoral Re-
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form, 2007)
After the OCA reached its decision to recommend the mixed member pro-
portional (MMP) system it had developed, the government called a referendum
to be held in conjunction with the general election in 2007. The government
followed B.C. in requiring the support of a supermajority of 60% of the votes.
Moreover, it required that there be a supermajority in 64 of the ridings in
Ontario in order for it to consider adopting the new system.
But in Ontario, in spite of revisions to the process, of the approximately
56% of constituents who turned out to vote in that election, only 37% sup-
ported reform; 63% voted to retain the FPTP. In his analysis, LeDuc et al.
(2008, 42–3) argues that the two main reasons for the shortfall were lack of
knowledge about the referendum, as well as lack of knowledge about the OCA
process itself. In spite of the shortfall in the referendum however, proponents
insist it was a success. For, in Rose’s words: “Its significance is determined not
by whether or not its recommendation will be accepted but whether or not as
a process of learning, consulting and deliberation it offered a creative approach
to citizen-participation. On these grounds it was clearly a success.”Rose (2007,
16)
In this chapter, I have presented deliberative democratists’ arguments for
holding that the OCA and the BCCA were a success, in spite of not leading
to electoral reform. These processes did enable citizens to have a say about a
decision that significantly affects them, and to become more engaged with the
political structure that governs them. In the next chapter, I will challenge the
view that “strengthening democracy”, or increasing the legitimacy of political
institutions, should be thought of in these terms. Although these measures
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may improve the legitimacy of democratic institutions, they only do so insofar
as they increase the satisfaction of reasonable citizens with the institutions
that govern them.
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Chapter 6
A Rawlsian Deliberative
Democracy
6.1 Introduction
As I argued in Chapter 5, the design of the OCA seemed to meet the desiderata
in Thompson’s defence at least as well as the BCCA, and in some respects,
did better. Thus, instead of the BCCA, I will use the OCA as a case study
to draw out my principled concerns with Gutmann and Thompson’s theory,
and Thompson’s defence of it in practice. Specifically, I will use the OCA
to draw out my argument that although Gutmann and Thompson’s theory
may be useful for strengthening democracy, it lacks an adequate foundation
to determine political decisions about how to pursue this goal in the face of
reasonable disagreement.
Furthermore, I will show how my Rawlsian framework provides the foun-
dation that is lacking in deliberative democracy. As I argued in Chapter 4,
according to my view, the legitimacy of political institutions does not depend
directly on citizens’ participation, but rather on the satisfaction of reasonable
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people with the institutions that are meant to govern them, over time. Citizen
participation may have implications for their satisfaction with institutions, but
it is the latter that determines the legitimacy of institutions.
Accordingly, the OCA and its promotion of citizen involvement in decision-
making may have strengthened democracy in Ontario in some ways. For ex-
ample, the OCA shed light on some people’s opinions about electoral reform,
which may be taken into account in decisions about how to proceed on the
issue. And Ontarians who agree with Gutmann and Thompson’s view, that
institutions such as the OCA are the most democratically legitimate way of
making decisions, may have become more satisfied with the government be-
cause of its decision to hold the OCA.
But the point is that deliberative democratic institutions such as the OCA
only strengthen the legitimacy of political institutions insofar as they increase
the satisfaction of reasonable citizens with the institutions involved. Thus,
political officials also need to take into account whether some citizens’ sat-
isfaction with the institutions involved may not have increased, and indeed
may have even diminished, as a result of decisions made about the citizens’
assembly. My arguments in this chapter are meant to show how the Rawlsian
framework I have developed provides a basis for determining decisions such as
whether to hold the OCA and how to design it, in light of my conception of
democratic legitimacy. In so doing, I will draw out my view of how deliberative
democratic institutions may (and may not) serve to strengthen the legitimacy
of political structures.
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6.2 The regress problem
Earlier in the thesis, one of the fundamental problems I presented for relying on
public discourse to settle issues in politics was reasonable disagreement. That
is, public discourse between even the most reasonable people rarely leads to
agreement in politics. Thus, political officials are left wanting for something
more on which to base their decision. Thompson’s defence of using a citizens’
assembly to address the issue of electoral reform, and his commitment that
the principles of deliberative democracy provide a foundation for institutions
and their decisions, fails to adequately address the fact that reasonable people
will persistently disagree with Gutmann and Thompson about their theory or
its principles.
Gutmann and Thompson recognize that turning back to the principles of
deliberative democracy to settle disagreement about the principles themselves
raises a problem for their theory. As they themselves acknowledge, because the
theory rests most fundamentally on actual public discourse among stakeholders
to make and justify political decisions, they face the following question: “How
is it possible for a theory to propose substantive principles to assess laws while
regarding citizens as the final moral judges of the laws they make?”(Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004, 111)
If one is committed to the view that citizens should be the final arbiters
of political decisions, it seems that what is right will just be whatever the
people decide. This view encounters a number of problems, but here, both I,
and Gutmann and Thompson, are concerned with the problem of reasonable
disagreement. Even citizens who are fully committed to a principle of equality,
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and recognize an obligation on the part of political officials to take others’ views
into account in their decisions, will continue to disagree with one another about
what ought to be done in politics.
Gutmann and Thompson recognize the persistence and depth of disagree-
ment among citizens in politics, and that this may threaten their claim to
offer substantive principles to guide decision-making. Nevertheless, according
to them, “each element of the content of deliberation – basic liberty, basic
opportunity, and fair opportunity – depends on deliberative procedures to ad-
vance a common understanding of its substance.”(Gutmann and Thompson,
1996, 229) In the face of disagreement about how to fulfil the basic principles
of democracy such as liberty and fairness, we should try to find deliberative
democratic ways to settle this disagreement, i.e., about how to decide the issue
with which we began.
However, it seems unlikely that citizens will be able to reach agreement at
this next level either. The threat of a regress looms.
I appreciate Gutmann and Thompson’s aims to better engage citizens in
political decision-making, and to allow them to have more say in decisions
about the basic structure of political institutions. However, Gutmann and
Thompson’s response to the threat of a regress poses a significant problem for
their view. Because their theory rests political justification on public delibera-
tion, it fails to provide an answer to the question: on what basis are decisions
by political officials justified, given that people will continue to disagree, and
given that governments are supposed to make decisions in a way that respects
citizens’ equality? In other words, when a decision is made in a deliberative
democratic institution, why is it justified for a democratic government to im-
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pose a decision on those who continue to disagree with it or the way it was
made?
Indeed, this issue arose in the OCA. There, 104 Ontarians (including the
Chair) were selected to review and make a recommendation about how to
reform the electoral system, which Ontarians would then have the opportunity
to vote on in a subsequent referendum. And, as I argued in the previous
chapter, the decision-making process adopted by the OCA was structured
according to deliberative democratic principles. In spite of this, however, at
the end of the process, members of the OCA continued to disagree about
whether to recommend the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system that
it had developed to the broader population in a subsequent referendum.
Two final votes were put to the OCA, which both relate to my objec-
tion. First, in the second-to-last question on which members voted, they were
asked whether they believed that the alternative MMP system should replace
the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. Sixteen out of the 102 members (ap-
proximately 15%) who were present voted “no”.(Secretariat, 2007, 128) In
spite of designing and making decisions in the OCA according to deliberative
democratic principles, disagreement persisted about which electoral system
members thought was better.
The last question that members voted on was whether the system that had
been developed should be recommended to the broader population of Ontario.
Even if members answered “no” to the previous question, they might still
have agreed to recommend the alternative MMP system to the general public,
e.g., because of the fairness of the process. But 8 members answered “no”
to this question as well.(Secretariat, 2007, 131) The question that Gutmann
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and Thompson’s theory seems to leave unanswered is: given the disagreement
that persisted, why was the decision to recommend the alternative system to
Ontarians justified, even though some members continued to reject it?
The challenge that I am raising for Gutmann and Thompson is not unlike
the one they raised in Chapter 5, to requiring a supermajority in the B.C. ref-
erendum. However, I contend that justification for overruling a minority is no
less required than for overruling a majority, given the reasonable disagreement
that exists about both. A strength of my framework, as opposed to Gutmann
and Thompson’s theory, is that mine is equipped to answer that challenge.
According to my theory, the legitimacy of any institution depends on
whether reasonable citizens are satisfied enough with it so that the institu-
tion and its decisions have obligatory force. The sense in which I am arguing
they must be satisfied is modelled by the concept of wide reflective equilib-
rium. As I have said before, hopefully institutions will have more than the
minimal degree of “support”, whereby the current regime is the “least worst”
option.
But the important point is that this notion of satisfaction is the place to
look to determine the legitimacy of institutions; it is not the espoused views
of citizens per se. Citizens may criticize their government, even heavily, and it
may remain legitimate nonetheless. The views that citizens espouse, including
within deliberative democratic mechanisms, is only relevant to the question of
legitimacy insofar as it accurately reflects how well the sufficiency condition is
met by reasonable citizens.
Gutmann and Thompson’s response – that citizens are to continue to de-
liberate with one another to determine what principles are meant to apply in
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making particular decisions, and how they are meant to apply – falls short
of resolving the issue that reasonable disagreement raises. For, Gutmann and
Thompson (rightly, I think) reject consensus as an appropriate aim for demo-
cratic theories and institutions. However, if consensus is not the justificatory
basis for decisions, then they must provide a principled alternative for deter-
mining how to proceed in the face of persistent and reasonable disagreement.
Holding further deliberative democratic processes seems unlikely to resolve the
problem, and as Gutmann and Thompson themselves hold, at some point, a
binding decision must be made.
6.3 Addressing the regress problem
In considering the regress objection in the context of electoral reform, Thomp-
son (2008, 31) offers the response that, “The potential regress can be fore-
stalled by appealing partly to pragmatic considerations (the marginal benefits
of creating yet another level of decision are likely to be small compared to the
costs), and partly to normative considerations (free and equal citizens should
not object to stopping the process at the level of an assembly).” Pragmatically
speaking, disagreement is likely to continue at each successive step of decision-
making that is created to deal with the last, e.g., citizens will disagree about
how to choose the electoral system, and then, how to decide how to choose the
electoral system, and so on, and so forth. Thus, since disagreement is likely to
persist at all levels of decision-making, little seems to be gained by continuing
to create yet more deliberative democratic institutions about how to proceed.
And although he himself does not develop it explicitly, I take it that the
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normative line of reasoning returns us to the arguments that Gutmann and
Thompson make, that the principles of deliberative democracy best respect
citizens as free and equal. Their theory provides citizens with meaningful
opportunities to participate in political decisions that significantly affect them,
and to do so in a process that recognizes their status as equals who have the
capacity to deliberate with each other to decide issues that stand to affect
them all.
However, as I pointed out in Chapter 4, Gutmann and Thompson’s delib-
erative democracy theory is more “comprehensive” than Rawls’s theory. The
justification for deliberative democracy rests on Gutmann and Thompson’s
arguments that its principles best fulfil the tenets of democracy. Political
officials are to make their decisions according to Gutmann and Thompson’s
principles as best they can within the current structure. And if it is not possi-
ble to involve citizens initially in a decision about a contentious political issue,
then, as we shall see, they may construct a mechanism for doing so, such as a
citizens’ assembly.
Then, once citizens are within the fold of deliberative democracy, they
may revisit any prior decisions that were made. That process of revisiting
decisions from within a deliberative democratic institution may thereby confer
legitimacy on those decisions. For instance, the assemblies in Ontario and
British Columbia could have asked that another citizens’ assembly be called
about any issues they identified within the deliberative democratic forum, or
about any disagreements they could not resolve within the OCA or BCCA.
Although neither did so, as Thompson claims, “if the danger of a regress were
to come to be regarded as a serious practical problem, there is no reason why a
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future assembly could not have the responsibility for resolving it.”(Thompson,
2008, 32) So, if citizens believed that there was good reason not to rely on the
citizens’ assembly to make a decision about some political issue, a citizens’
assembly could have been convened about that.
6.3.1 The initiation problem
Thompson’s response to the regress problem is that citizens may provisionally
accept an institution that has been designed according to decision-makers’ best
understanding of its principles. Then, once within the deliberative democratic
institution that is formed, they may challenge any decisions that have been
made about it. But even accepting Thompson’s response to the regress prob-
lem for the moment, there is still the question of how to initiate a deliberative
democratic institution.
In answer to this, Thompson (2008, 29–30) states, “It is preferable, for
pragmatic and constitutional reasons, that the institution be established by
the legislature or some regular procedure of government.” In the face of rea-
sonable disagreement among citizens, we may fall back on what I will refer to
as ‘ordinary legislative mechanisms’ (e.g., legislatures, courts, ministries) to
make the decision to create a deliberative democratic institution, as well as
to make the initial decisions about its design.1 For example, in Ontario, the
Premier, Dalton McGuinty, seemed to be primarily responsible for the deci-
sion to hold it (Secretariat, 2007, 197–198), and the Ministry Responsible for
Democratic Renewal, headed by Marie Bountrogianni, was charged with its
1More precisely, it would determine how to make decisions about the design – i.e., it
might make them itself, or decide to delegate them to another body, or do something in
between, e.g., make the final decisions on the basis of recommendations of a commission.
175
implementation (Secretariat, 2007, 205–206).
Thompson does not expand on what he means by “constitutional reasons”,
but the reasoning to support this move may relate to Gutmann’s and his
view that justification for political institutions comes in degrees (§3.1.2.).2
Often, institutions such as the legislature are not fully justified according to
deliberative democratic principles. For, often, neither those institutions nor
the decisions they make have been determined by the people in deliberative
democratic processes.
However, ordinary legislative mechanisms may still make decisions to form
a deliberative democratic process, and these may be justified to some extent
initially. How well justified they are seems to depend on the extent to which
the process fulfils the principles that Gutmann and Thompson advance, ac-
cording to the best understanding of the principles at the time. And, as we
have seen, there seemed to be good reasons for thinking that the OCA, as
it was constructed by the government and decision-makers initially, fulfilled
Gutmann and Thompson’s principles to a significant degree. Then, in subse-
quent deliberative democratic institutions, citizens may revisit prior decisions,
which have been made by ordinary legislative mechanisms on the basis of how
those involved believe Gutmann and Thompson’s principles are best fulfiled.
The subsequent democratic deliberation by citizens would then seem to more
fully justify either the initial decisions or their revision.
I agree with Thompson that ordinary legislative mechanisms may be used
2On my view, I generally conceive of institutions as legitimate, and decisions as justified,
although institutions may confer some degree of legitimacy on decisions they make. However,
I have adopted Gutmann and Thompson’s terminology throughout this part of my argument,
which seems to apply the concept of justification to both institutions and their decisions.
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to create a deliberative democratic institution to address an issue such as elec-
toral reform. However, this is not the only way to initiate deliberative demo-
cratic institutions that may be legitimate, and that may give rise to legitimate
decisions. Deliberative democratic institutions may also be initiated and de-
veloped by people in other institutions, such as academics and professionals
such as physicians, clinicians, or lawyers.
Also, mechanisms may be developed by grassroots or non-governmental
organizations to enable citizens to communicate with one another and politi-
cal officials about policy decisions. For example, the Directgov online petition
website (http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk/) was initially developed by a
grassroots organization to facilitate British citizens’ ability to communicate
with their government. Eventually, it was incorporated into the formal polit-
ical structure. If more than 100,000 citizens sign a particular e-petition, the
issue may be debated in the House of Commons. Also, political officials may
respond to petitions on the website.
So, although they go unnoticed in Thompson’s analysis, there are alterna-
tives to ordinary legislative mechanisms that may initiate deliberative demo-
cratic institutions. The existence of alternative ways to initiate deliberative
democratic institutions is worth noting, since I will argue that there is a seri-
ous challenge for relying on ordinary legislative mechanisms to stop the regress
and initiation problems, as Gutmann and Thompson do. The problem arises
from what motivates many deliberative democratists, including Gutmann and
Thompson, to ground their conception of legitimacy in citizen participation:
ordinary legislative mechanisms have systematically failed to protect and pro-
mote at least some citizens’ interests.
177
I agree with Gutmann and Thompson that this is a serious problem that
plagues many political institutions in many modern liberal democracies. But
insofar as this is what motivates deliberative democratists, there is a prob-
lem with turning to ordinary legislative mechanisms to initiate deliberative
democratic institutions. If ordinary legislative mechanisms have consistently
failed to adequately consider citizens in their decisions, it seems as though we
should not be surprised when, yet again, political officials fail to fulfil that
goal in designing and implementing new institutions.
Of course, some change in context may occur to make it more likely that
existing legislative mechanisms will construct an institution that serves to
strengthen democracy.3 But generally, there must be some change in the ordi-
nary legislative mechanism first, if it is to be likely to construct a deliberative
democratic mechanism that strengthens democracy. In Rawlsian terms, the in-
stitution must do better at consistently meeting the standard of public reason
in its decisions, including those about the deliberative democratic mechanism.
Gutmann and Thompson’s theory fails to address the question: why think
that political officials would construct an institution that would fulfil their
principles, if they have systematically failed to do so in the past?
And indeed, the OCA seems to bear out this worry with Thompson’s re-
3For example, political officials may change their behaviour because they perceive that
many citizens are becoming so dissatisfied with current politics that the authority of the
institutions (from which political officials derive their authority) is under threat. Two
examples of this may be found in British Columbia, when a number of scandals associated
with the ruling New Democratic Party was made public(Lundberg, 2007, 482), and seemed to
do significant damage to the legitimacy of the provincial government there, and in Scotland,
when, during the Thatcher era, the British government implemented numerous policies
that many of the Scottish people found objectionable, because the policies during that era
strongly conflicted with their public political conception of justice, which favoured a more
welfarist government.(Paterson et al., 2001, 121)
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sponse to the regress problem. Prior to the OCA, there was evidence to suggest
that one of the most serious problems with Ontario’s political institutions was
that officials were not meeting the standard of public reason adequately, and
that this was affecting the legitimacy of the Ontario government. This is not
to say that at any point, the Ontario government had no legitimacy. But there
was evidence to suggest that its legitimacy seemed to be weakening in recent
years.
For instance, prior to the government’s announcement to convene the OCA,
Cameron et al. (2003, 42) reported that 68% of Ontarians felt that, in the au-
thors’ words, “legislators lose touch with the people.” Furthermore, supporting
the view that the electoral system undermined the legitimacy of the political
structure for some, Cameron et al. (2003, 42) also noted that “almost half of
respondents indicated that the first-past-the-post system is ‘unacceptable’.” In
its report to the Ontario government, submitted before the OCA began, the
Law Commission of Canada (2002, 5) cited that over 70% of Canadians polled
in 1997 reported believing that “both federal and provincial political systems
are highly corrupt.” And, in his report on the special consultation meetings4
held during the OCA, Clutterbuck (2007, 3-11–3-12) notes that “Participants
in all four communities felt strongly that there were major barriers to the
participation of many people in the general democratic political process at all
levels of government, which went beyond the electoral system itself.”
On my view, these complaints with the government are usefully under-
stood as being about failures of public reason. That is, the basic reason for
4Four “special consultation meetings” were designed and held for the specific purpose of
engaging citizens who are often excluded from politics, such as those in northern Ontario
and predominantly Aboriginal communities.
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Ontarians’ dissatisfaction was because it was not apparent to them that po-
litical officials were striving to take into account citizens’ views about what
they ought to do. Although a significant number of citizens reported being
dissatisfied with the electoral system, the sources of their dissatisfaction were
much broader in scope. Besides the electoral system, the references to corrup-
tion and major barriers to political participation suggest that many citizens
believed that political officials, in general, were failing to take into account rea-
sonable people’s views about political issues that significantly affect them.5 In
short, political officials were making decisions in ways that citizens perceived
as unjust.
And a number of decisions by the Ontario government about the OCA
suggest that this trend continued, of not adequately meeting the standard of
public reason. For example, the Ontario government was heavily criticized for
the inadequate amount of time that the assembly had to make its decisions
about the alternative electoral system, as well as for public engagement and
education of the general public prior to the referendum. And although an
analysis of the demographics of the OCA has not yet been made public, it
seems unlikely that the OCA fared any better than the BCCA on the ques-
tion of whether marginalized groups were better represented on the assembly.6
These aspects of the OCA seem to be the basis of reasonable people’s further
5It is worth noting, I think, that citizens’ complaints were not that political officials were
making decisions to which citizens deeply or strongly objected, but were about the apparent
lack of any consideration at all of their own or other citizens’ views about politics. The
distinction is important, since the first may suggest that such citizens were unreasonable,
while the second does not. Rather, in Rawlsian terms, in the second line of objection may
be restated as that political officials were failing to acknowledge the political equality of
some citizens, thereby apparently failing to meet the standard of public reason.
6For a thorough critique of the BCCA on this score, see Rabinder (2008).
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dissatisfaction with the Ontario government, because they violate people’s
conceptions of justice.
6.3.2 Path dependence
To be clear, many proponents of the citizens’ assembly took issue with features
of the design for which the OCA was criticized, e.g., the timing and public
education campaigns. And I agree that the justification of such decisions was
questionable at best. However, my contention is that the structure of Gutmann
and Thompson’s theory allows these problems to arise, in principle and in
practice. It does so because it provisionally justifies these decisions, until they
may be revisited at a later time in a deliberative democratic mechanism.
While any decision remains open to being revisited in future, it is impor-
tant to recognize how difficult it may be to revise decisions once they have
been made. To understand the challenge this presents, the concept of path
dependence may be useful. As Margaret Levi (1997, 28) defines it,
Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once
a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal
are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrench-
ments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy re-
versal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree,
rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many differ-
ent branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn
around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if the
chosen branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins is the
one she tends to follow.
In some cases, political decisions may be easily changed, but this possibility
generally depends on multiple factors. Some of those factors may be best
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understood as a matter of relatively arbitrary choice, such as what percentage
of the vote in a referendum must support it to reform the electoral system. But
other factors, as Levi points out, that may affect the ability to revise previous
political decisions are the amount of resources that have already been spent to
develop and implement a particular course of action (the resources to “grow”
a particular part of the tree, and how far up the tree and along a particular
branch one has travelled), and the additional cost in resources that will be
required to pursue an alternative course instead (how much it will cost to get
to another branch to which one wishes to switch).
To give examples from the OCA, I have suggested that public reason may
have supported selecting a different mandate than electoral reform. Or the
government might have reconsidered other decisions, such as the amount of
time and resources it was willing to invest in public education and engage-
ment. In Rawlsian terms, I have argued that it should have better addressed
that these decisions apparently (in the eyes of reasonable citizens) did not
adequately address reasonable citizens’ dissatisfaction with the OCA or the
government.
While I do believe that the government ought to have revisited many fun-
damental decisions about the OCA, such as its mandate and the timeframe for
public engagement for the purposes of strengthening democracy, the concept
of path dependence may be useful for understanding the reasons it had for
not doing so. Put simply, the farther along in the process of designing and
implementing the OCA, the greater the cost of most of these changes. For
example, a change to the mandate, just in terms of the resources that had
been invested to design the process on the presumption of electoral reform,
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much less those used once the process had begun, would have resulted in a
significant loss of resources with no apparent return on the investment.
To return to Levi’s metaphor of a tree, the choice of mandate would be
quite close to the base of the trunk. And many other aspects of the OCA
would be dependent on that one, or would branch out from that point in
the base, e.g., the design and planning of learning exercises about electoral
systems through voting simulations, arranging visits by guest speakers to give
presentations on electoral systems. Thus, getting something of value in return
for the resources spent on these preparations would depend on the mandate
remaining the same. If a decision so far down on the base of the tree were
changed, this would entail at least losing the value of resources that had been
used to develop the original structure of the tree. And, to the extent that the
original plans had been executed, a significant amount of additional resources
would likely be required to get to an alternative part of the tree.
In contrast, other decisions may cost less to change, as they are farther up
the tree. For instance, it may be relatively easier, and cost fewer resources, for
the assembly to change its decision about which electoral system to develop,
rather than its general mandate to develop an alternative electoral system.
How much it would cost to change its decision about which electoral system
to develop would depend, in part, on how far up the tree the assembly had
actually travelled, or how far along the decision-making process about its first
choice the OCA had gotten.
In other words, the cost of changing its decision to develop one electoral
system instead of another may be thought of in terms of how much distance
would have to be travelled to get from one branch of the tree to the other. In
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contrast with the decision to change its mandate, the choice to change its de-
cision about which electoral system to develop would not require going all the
way back down to the base of the trunk of the tree. Nor would it require grow-
ing a new part of the tree, so long as the assembly chose to change its decision
to another system already included among the options to be considered.
According to Rose (2007, 15), the OCA had 15 decisions to make about
the MMP system that it would recommend to Ontarians. If the OCA had not
yet begun to make any of these decisions, the switch to another system, e.g.,
Single Transferable Vote (STV), would be relatively “cheap,” compared to the
cost of switching after it had worked through all of these decision points. In
its initial learning phase, the assembly participated in simulations designed
to teach it about all of the electoral systems they would have the option of
developing. Thus, they could have made a move from the “branch” to design
an MMP system to another, e.g., to design an STV system, at very little cost
if they had not yet begun to work through the decisions about the design of
an MMP system.
I raise all of this to explain another problem with Thompson’s argument
that citizens should accept ordinary legislative mechanisms to make the initial
decisions about a citizens’ assembly. Thompson’s view that the benefits of
accepting their decisions is likely to outweigh the costs because they may be
revisited later is weakened by two questionable assumptions. The first is that,
as the concept of path dependence may help to illustrate, decisions may be
more resistant to change than Thompson seems to acknowledge. This depends
on how entrenched the decisions are, and the costs that have already been spent
on pursuing a particular path. Second, as I will argue below, some citizens,
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particularly those who are marginalized, may have good reason to doubt that
they will have an opportunity to challenge decisions that have been made by
ordinary legislative mechanisms.
On my view, citizens may rely on ordinary legislative mechanisms to de-
sign institutions, but whether they should do so depends on how well ordinary
legislative mechanisms meet the standard of public reason. This avoids the
pitfalls of placing so much weight on the opportunity to revisit decisions. De-
cisions are only ever justified to the extent that they meet the standard of
public reason, or are likely to be conducive to citizens’ satisfaction with the
institutions involved, over time. This is not to deny that the justification of
a particular decision may change with time. But on my view, insofar as any
of the decisions made by the Ontario government and decision-makers were
likely to compromise the legitimacy of the OCA or the institutions involved,
they were less justified.
6.4 The scope and nature of evidence
I have argued that when they are assessing their options, political officials
ought to be wary of placing too much weight on the idea that decisions may
be revisited in the future, and that a theory of political justification should
reflect this. At the time when political officials make their decisions, they ought
to ensure that their reasoning takes into account evidence that has been made
available to them about how well they and their decisions are currently meeting
the standard of public reason. For, to the extent that their decision does not
meet the standard of public reason, it may undermine the legitimacy of the
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institutions involved. Furthermore, political officials should consider evidence
about the likely effects that decisions will have on meeting the standard of
public reason.
According to my Rawlsian framework, citizens’ views within deliberative
democratic institutions, such as citizens’ assemblies, may count as evidence
towards one policy option over another. However, this is not the only sort of
information that should be taken into account. Some other sorts of informa-
tion, which may be reliable indicators of citizens’ views about governments’
actions and their decisions, are studies and research done by social scientists,
or reports by members of legislatures who have shown themselves to be well
aware of their constituents’ satisfaction with political institutions.7
This point brings to light a problem with Thompson’s position on represen-
tation (which was adopted by organizers and the chair of the OCA). According
to Thompson, the exclusion of citizens who belong to particular social groups
in the OCA is unimportant for the purposes of electoral system review. Citi-
zens from marginalized groups may well have agreed that being excluded from
an assembly on electoral reform was not a major concern for them. However,
as I have argued more generally, according to my conception of political justi-
fication, it is important to be aware of whether citizens agree with Thompson
about this point. Insofar as they did not, that disagreement could undermine
the legitimacy of the institutions involved with the OCA.
7It should be noted that the ability of these sources of evidence to improve the justifi-
cation of a decision also depends on the political legitimacy of those institutions involved.
The extent to which political officials should rely on academic institutions or researchers
depends on the satisfaction of reasonable citizens with those institutions. If researchers or
particular institutions have provided evidence or recommendations to political officials, but
citizens do not perceive these sources as reliable and trustworthy, then this may compromise
the ability of political officials to take these into account.
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And I submit that even if citizens’ views on electoral reform were unlikely
to differ significantly from those citizens in the OCA, reasonable citizens who
are typically marginalized in politics have another reason to take issue with
being excluded.8 For, as Thompson points out, being on the assembly has
the potential to provide citizens with an opportunity to object to fundamental
decisions about it, such as its mandate, or to suggest other issues about which
citizens should have an opportunity to deliberate. However, I will argue that
the structure of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory undermines the possibility
for non-members to raise such concerns.9
It may seem as though even if non-members were unable to express dissat-
isfaction with the assembly from within it, they could have done so through
mechanisms such as the public consultation meetings. In reports on the special
public consultation meetings that were held in Ontario, audience members did
raise objections to the members, such as that they felt that other issues were of
far greater concern than the electoral system. For example, they raised worries
about inadequate representation of typically marginalized groups’ interests in
politics; the inability for certain groups, such as the poor and homeless, to
meaningfully participate in politics; literacy and language barriers that pre-
8At this point, in the absence of empirical evidence to support that there were in fact
reasonable citizens who belonged to marginalized groups, and were dissatisfied with the
mandate of the OCA, I can do little more than speculate. But this does not weaken my
point, which is that one should not stand on Thompson’s reasoning that, e.g., reasonable
citizens should not be concerned about certain aspects of representation, and take it for
granted that they are not. An adequate theory for liberal democracies ought to be concerned
with what reasonable people in fact think about issues such as representativeness in political
institutions.
9This is not to say that I believe that it will be sufficient to include people from marginal-
ized groups on the assembly, for them to be heard. This is a point I shall address below.
For now the only argument I want to make is that Thompson’s framework seems to make
it necessary for people from marginalized groups to have a say about the decisions made
within and about the institution.
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vent some people’s participation in politics and voting; and the lack of repre-
sentation of “everyday people” in politics.(Clutterbuck, 2007, 3-3) And some
remained unconvinced that electoral system reform was adequate to address
these concerns. Accordingly, they insisted that organizers of the consultation
meetings make a formal note of the other barriers to democratic participation,
which were outside the scope of the OCA.(Clutterbuck, 2007, 3-3)
Thus, the public consultation meetings may seem to have afforded non-
members meaningful opportunities to raise objections to the OCA. And the
meetings were designed to fulfil deliberative democratic principles, such as al-
lowing assembly members and non-members to exchange moral and respectful
reasons about the electoral system and their concerns with it. However, as I
alluded to in §5.3.4, the way that assembly members viewed audience mem-
bers’ input reflects another problem with relying on subsequent processes to
revisit past decisions once within the deliberative democratic mechanism.
Because non-members had not gone through the process that assembly
members had, e.g., learning about different electoral systems, and discussing
different views with one another, assembly members tended to discount crit-
icisms by the former. Indeed, assembly members reported that the public
consultation meetings served to show them how much more than most assem-
bly members knew about electoral systems, rather than raising points that
could meaningfully inform the deliberations by the assembly.(Rose, 2007, 13)
It seems that the less involved in the institution individuals are, the more their
views are likely to be discounted10 as not “deliberative enough” by those who
10In saying they are likely to be discounted, I mean that they may be dismissed altogether,
or they may be given less weight by those who have been part of the other deliberative
processes.
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are responsible for making decisions within the institution.
Thus, the exclusion of marginalized groups is a problem for Thompson in
light of one of the main reasons that he argues citizens ought to accept ordi-
nary legislative mechanisms to initiate a deliberative democratic institution.
According to Thompson, once inside that framework, citizens can then revisit
prior decisions made by the ordinary legislative mechanisms. But if the initial
decisions tend to result in the exclusion of certain groups, then reasonable citi-
zens have good reason not to accept Thompson’s argument to accept ordinary
legislative mechanisms to initiate an assembly. It is likely to be one more po-
litical process in which marginalized groups are excluded and prevented from
having a say, and their opportunities to raise their objections elsewhere are
(by definition, as a marginalized group) almost nonexistent.
Contrary to Thompson’s claim then, it seems unlikely that the structure of
Gutmann’s and his theory provides meaningful opportunities for those who are
not included in the institution to challenge and initiate revisiting the initial,
fundamental decisions such as the mandate, selection process, representative-
ness, etc. And if this is true, then Thompson’s argument that there is good
pragmatic reason for citizens to accept ordinary legislative mechanisms as a
solution to the initiation and regress problems seems to fall. Those who are
typically marginalized (and will most likely continue to be in such decisions)
may well have good reason to reject such mechanisms as an adequate solu-
tion to the regress problem, barring other changes in the conditions of the
democracy.
In contrast, the Rawlsian framework I have developed is meant to draw
explicit attention and consideration to both the burdens of judgement and
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the burdens of injustice as potential challenges for ordinary legislative mech-
anisms attempting to strengthen democracy. However, these two factors can
and should be treated separately. If the burdens of injustice are weakening
a democracy, e.g., unreasonable people are constraining decision-makers who
are trying to strengthen democracy, then clearly this is a problem. But the
problem is how to decrease the proportion of unreasonable people in the soci-
ety, in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the democracy, not how to satisfy
conflicting conceptions of the good.11
The question then becomes what to do about the prevalence of unrea-
sonableness in the society, e.g., are there democratically legitimate ways to
change people’s conceptions of justice or conceptions of the good so that they
are more reasonable? What is ‘reasonable’ here will be determined by what is
in accordance with the public political conception of justice. That is, what the
state may do to increase the prevalence of reasonableness, and what sort of
reasonableness it may promote among unreasonable people, depend on what
maintains a reasonable overlapping consensus that supports the constitutional
essentials.
If, instead, the major challenge for strengthening a democracy is the bur-
dens of judgement, then the state is obligated to attempt to make decisions
that maintain the satisfaction of the people, given their conceptions of the
11As I argued for in §4.4, although unreasonable people’s dissatisfaction with institutions
does not count against their legitimacy, this is not to say that the state is permitted to do
anything it likes to unreasonable people, or that their interests do not count. Unreasonable
people are still persons, and are to be treated accordingly, i.e., with the same equal moral
status owed to all persons. But because of their unreasonableness, their (dis)satisfaction
with political institutions is not to count towards the justification of the state’s decisions,
or their legitimacy. I am very grateful to Charles Weijer for pointing out this important
distinction.
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good. However, institutions may sometimes make decisions that do not have
popular support, or fall short of public reason at the time they are made. They
may do so if there is evidence that reasonable people’s opinions will change,
and their decisions will meet the standard of public reason in time, or that
reasonable people’s dissatisfaction will be outweighed by other decisions that
will be made in future.
These points open the door for ordinary legislative mechanisms to address
the marginalization of social groups in democracies, but also illuminate the
challenges for relying on them to do so. Longstanding institutions may be
able to make a legitimate decision that is not well-supported by public reason
if the reason it is not well-supported is the prevalence of unreasonableness. Or,
they may make a decision that does not meet the standard of public reason
at the time of the decision if, overall, the institutions involved have made or
expect to make decisions that will maintain reasonable citizens’ satisfaction.
An institution may maintain the satisfaction of reasonable citizens with
it if, on the whole, it tends to make decisions that accord well enough with
citizens’ conceptions of justice for them to view the institution as legitimate.
Even if an institution makes a single decision that a person deems to be un-
fair according to her conception of justice, the institution may demonstrate
its fairness in other decisions – that is, it may show that it is not unfairly
favouring or discriminating against any one group, or working to that group’s
(dis)advantage all of the time. This may give constituents reason to accept
a single decision as obligatory even if it is contrary to individuals’ egalitarian
conceptions of justice.12
12I owe thanks to Richard Vernon for bringing this point out as a feature of my view.
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But this view of legitimacy with respect to decisions, which gives some
weight to citizens’ prior experiences with the institution, works both ways.
That is, if the number and importance of decisions that are contrary to cit-
izens’ conceptions of justice accumulate and threaten to outweigh those that
are consistent with those conceptions of justice, it may become increasingly
difficult for them to accept particular decisions that they disagree with as legit-
imate. In such cases, the institution may have to work quite hard to convince
citizens that a particular decision ought to be accepted by them, in order to
counter the weight of evidence that has led citizens to question the legitimacy
of the institution.
As I mentioned earlier, there seemed to be evidence to suggest that this
was the situation that the Ontario government was facing.13 That is, prior to
the announcement to hold the OCA about electoral reform, the legitimacy of
the Ontario government had been weakened because a significant proportion
of people seemed to doubt that it was striving to fulfil the standard of pub-
lic reason. And a significant proportion of Ontarians seemed doubtful about
whether electoral reform would be a meaningful change that would address
their major concerns.(Cameron et al., 2003, 42) As my framework draws out,
the government ought to have done more to be to convince people that elec-
toral reform was significant for them, given the people’s own comprehensive
doctrines, which may have included the view that the government would not
be a good judge of what was important to them.
Newly formed institutions, on the other hand, such as the OCA, will have
neither a good history nor a bad one as a result of past decisions they have
13E.g., the surveys cited by Cameron et al. (2003, 42).
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made. That is, citizens will not yet have evidence, in the form of other decisions
it has made, to inform their judgements about whether they should accept any
particular decisions that seem contrary to their conceptions of justice. Newly
formed institutions may, however, “inherit” some amount of the progenitor
institution’s reputation. For example, a citizen’s judgements about the Ontario
government may influence those about the OCA or its decisions.
As with longstanding institutions that have consistently made decisions
that are contrary to citizens’ conceptions of justice, newly formed institutions
may have to work harder than a longstanding institution with a “proven track
record” to meet the standard of public reason. But the reason that a newly
formed institution may have to work harder to convince people that they
should accept objectionable decisions as just is different than before. It is not
because previous experience has shown the institution to be unjust according
to citizens’ personal conceptions of justice. It is because they lack information
in the form of prior decisions, to help them determine whether the institution is
fair, but this is just one decision that is contrary to their personal conceptions
of justice, or whether this is one unjust decision in a series of unjust decisions to
come.14 Thus, proponents of institutional reform will have to find alternative
14This may be a way of understanding why the processes through which constitutional
reform takes place typically take so long to carry that out. The processes for undergoing
constitutional reform, or constitutional conventions, are generally novel with respect to the
citizenry, as are the possible outcomes. Thus, the extended period of time is needed to work
out what outcome will be likely to be to the satisfaction of reasonable people, given their
personal conceptions of justice. And in places where constitutional reform frequently takes
place, it seems likely that the people’s experiences to date with the reformatory institutions
will have been negative. Otherwise, it seems unlikely that they would be undergoing such
frequent constitutional reform. In these latter cases, successful constitutional reform – i.e.,
constitutional reform that results in a stable legitimate democracy – may take a long period
of time because of the need to overcome people’s distrust in the reform process itself, such
that they will be likely to accept the results.
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ways to convince citizens of the positive benefits they believe it will bring to
them, if institutional reform is to meet the standard of public reason.
So, thus far, I have largely targeted Thompson’s argument that accepting
ordinary legislative mechanisms is pragmatically justified. I have challenged
his claim that the people ought to accept ordinary legislative mechanisms to
initiate deliberative democratic institutions because the benefits of entrusting
the decision to ordinary legislative mechanisms will outweigh the costs of doing
otherwise. And I have argued that there was evidence to suggest that a signif-
icant proportion of reasonable people disagreed with Thompson’s arguments,
and decisions that were made about the OCA. To the extent that this is true,
on my view, the citizens’ assembly on electoral reform was less justified.
6.5 The regulatory role of reasonable compre-
hensive doctrines
Thompson’s normative line of reasoning to support his response to the regress
and initiation problems is problematic as well. Thompson argues that the
decision to hold a citizens’ assembly about electoral reform is justified on nor-
mative grounds, since deliberative democratic institutions best fulfil the tenets
of democracy. As Rawls (1997, 770n19) points out, and as I have drawn at-
tention to before, one of the main differences between political liberalism and
Gutmann and Thompson’s theory is that the former depends on citizens’ per-
sonal conceptions of justice overlapping in a way that supports a set of consti-
tutional essentials, even though they conflict in many ways. The latter rests
on citizens’ acceptance of the comprehensive set of principles that Gutmann
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and Thompson advance, which I outlined in Chapter 3.
This difference is exemplified in several of Thompson’s arguments, which I
presented in the previous chapter, including his view that electoral reform was
an appropriate task to give to a citizens’ assembly – i.e., citizens should want to
make decisions about it for themselves because it has significant implications
for their interests. Also, in his arguments about representation, he advances his
view that non-members should be willing to see assembly members as enough
like them to be trusted with designing an alternative system that other ordi-
nary citizens could accept. According to Thompson, only “being Ontarian”
matters to the issue of electoral reform. Other aspects of people’s identities,
e.g., their race, ethnicity, religion, geographic location, are not relevant to the
question of which electoral system to prefer.
In contrast, according to my Rawlsian framework, any political decision
or institutional arrangement is normatively justified only to the extent that
reasonable citizens are satisfied with it. Thus, governments may construct
democratically legitimate institutions, in which citizens do not (directly) make
decisions that significantly affect them, such as government-appointed commis-
sions. Their legitimacy depends on whether that arrangement is capable of
maintaining a reasonable overlapping consensus.15 For example, a government
may appoint a commission to review and propose an alternative electoral sys-
15For an example, see the argument (summarized on pps. 1–2) by Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse (2002), that while a significant proportion of American citizens want to be able to
participate in politics when they feel they must, e.g., to hold decision-makers accountable
for unfairly pursuing decisions in their own interests and at citizens’ expense, in an ideal
political system, much of the decision-making happens “off their radar” so to speak (hence,
the book’s title, Stealth Democracy. The authors argue that the drive behind much of
grassroots activism today is, for many citizens, an unfortunate necessity in light of political
officials’ shortcomings, i.e., using their power and authority to make self-serving decisions
that thwart the interests of others.
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tem, or may even carry this task out itself.
To continue with the example of a commission, suppose that the govern-
ment appointed one to review the electoral system, in spite of evidence that
its members would be likely to make decisions that will leave the people dis-
satisfied with the commission and the government.16 At the time it makes the
decision, that evidence counts against its justification. However, as I argued
in the previous section, the government may decide to go ahead and convene
the commission anyways, in the belief that the cost to its legitimacy will be
overturned or outweighed in future.
Contrary to Thompson’s line of reasoning, the Ontario government may
have justifiedly made the decision to hold an expert commission about electoral
reform, to appoint the courts to decide the issue, or even to make the decision
themselves. The justification for choosing any of these options, however, would
depend on whether there was good reason to think that citizens would be
satisfied with the outcome. And this is also likely to be affected by the process
undertaken to make the decision.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the justification for using any
decision-making process is likely to depend on a number of factors, includ-
ing particular aspects of its design. For instance, although using an expert
commission to choose an electoral system may be democratically justifiable,
generally speaking, whether it is justified in particular cases will depend on,
e.g., who is chosen for the commission and how, whether it uses a process
that citizens recognize as addressing their concerns, etc. These things bear on
16For simplicity’s sake, I only mention these two, but there may be other institutions that
are implicated by the actions of the commission, e.g., if it is a group of academics, then the
academic institutions associated with the commission.
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the justification of the decision insofar as they may affect citizens’ satisfaction
with the institutions involved and the decisions they make. Thus, these and
other identifiable factors that may affect citizens’ satisfaction should be taken
into account when determining what decision-making process to use and how
to design it.17
So, on my view, in order to answer any questions about the justification
of decisions, one needs to know about citizens’ values and beliefs, and how
they are likely to be affected with respect to the institutions involved. But
also, one needs to continue to attend to citizens’ views about the institutions
involved. So, even if the Ontario government initially believed that its decisions
would meet the standard of public reason, that assessment ought to have been
checked throughout the OCA’s decision-making process. And, as I indicated
earlier in the chapter, it seems that there was evidence from the outset that
suggested the decisions about the OCA were not meeting the standard of
public reason.(Cameron et al., 2003; of Canada, 2002; Clutterbuck, 2007)
Gutmann and Thompson may argue that their theory accommodates this
point, because of its commitment to the principle that decisions are to be
open to revision. So, they may argue, it too allows for the justificatory status
of decisions to change. However, my objection is that there is a tension in
17Here, I will not go into the question of how much time needs to pass before a warranted
judgement can be made about a decision. This will, I think, depend on a number of complex
factors. For instance, the reason that I believe it is warranted to pass judgement on the OCA
now, rather than having to wait for a longer period of time, or having to add the caveat that
any judgement may or is likely change, is in part because the OCA resulted in no action being
taken. By contrast, if the process had resulted in reform, judgements about the justification
for the OCA process and reform on its basis would have to be more tentative, and continue
for longer, since citizens’ satisfaction may change over time, depending on, e.g., results of
future elections, citizens’ satisfaction with those results, and their perceptions about the
reform as a causal factor in their satisfaction.
197
Thompson’s view about the basis for either assessing or reassessing decisions,
which comes out in his defence of citizens’ assemblies.
On some issues, it seems that Thompson’s substantive commitments about
what decisions ought to be made may conflict with those held by reasonable
citizens. For example, reasonable people disagree with his view that, in princi-
ple, expert commissions ought to be rejected. Also, reasonable people disagree
with his view of how representation in citizens’ assemblies should be addressed.
And reasonable people disagree about whether to require a supermajority in a
referendum about reforming constitutional-level laws. However, not only does
Thompson not provide a principled way of settling disagreement between the
people, he does not provide a principled way of settling disagreement between
his views and those of the general population about how best to fulfil the
principles of democracy.
6.5.1 Self-interested reasons
Another issue that highlights the comprehensive nature of Thompson’s view
is the appropriate role of self-interested reasoning in politics. According to
Thompson’s account, the principles that reasons must be moral and respectful
heavily constrain self-interested reasons from contaminating decision-making
processes. As I discussed in §4.10, according to Gutmann and Thompson
(2004, 86), one way of approaching disagreement in politics is to continue to
deliberate in an effort to seek an economy of moral disagreement. That is,
people are to try to find common ground between their views in a process that
fulfils their principles, and to identify the remaining points of disagreement.
What justifies decisions about which they agree is that it is reached in a process
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that fulfils their principles.
On my view, however, what determines whether particular interests – self-
or other-regarding – are permissible when determining political decisions is the
standard of public reason. For example, many reasonable Canadians hold that
the poorer health, lower social and economic status, poorer living conditions,
etc. that many Aboriginal peoples in Canada suffer from are good grounds for
political reform. It is entirely appropriate for Aboriginal peoples in Canada
to argue that the connections between current political structures and the
negative effects on their health are good reasons for political reform, even
though they are self-interested reasons. The justificatory basis for accepting
these self-interested reasons as admissible grounds for political reform depends
on the support of reasonable people’s conceptions of justice for doing so.18
Placing such strong priority on the principles of deliberative democracy,
and to the exclusion of self-interest, to justify taking the position one does in
politics encounters a number of problems. First, as Jane Mansbridge points
out, it seems as though if all of the people involved are willing to accept a
decision on the basis of their own self-interest, that would be good reason to
take that decision. And the justification for doing so is not based on whether
18As I will argue below, it is important to distinguish between support for the judgement
that there is something wrong with the political institutions with respect to some group of
people in society, and judgements about what ought to be done about that problem, or where
the source of the problem lies. Also, I wish to emphasize that I have not made any claims
throughout about the proportion of Canadians who are reasonable with respect to Aboriginal
peoples. And, to the extent that Canadians are unreasonable with respect to them, political
institutions will be constrained in their ability to make just and justified decisions with
respect to those people as well. Although I believe that the burdens of judgement are to some
extent responsible for the continued injustice of contemporary Canadian institutions against
Aboriginal peoples in Canada, I believe that the burdens of injustice, or the prevalence of
unreasonableness towards Aboriginal peoples, also stymies efforts to address injustice against
Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
199
the process used to arrive at it met Gutmann and Thompson’s principles. In
her words,
In a primordial way, simply stating that something is in one’s own
interests is a justification. Imagine a deliberation in which each
individual serially said, “This policy is in my (my group’s) in-
terests,” and each identified the same policy. Further discussion
involved only means. If no others were affected, the group would
have discovered a common good. No one would have to make
a further justification, because simply saying that the policy was
in their interest would count as a justification. That the policy
meets everyone’s interest counts as a reason “in the desired sense.”
Indeed, it counts as the dispositive reason, none other being nec-
essary.(Mansbridge, 2006, 126)
If everyone agreed with taking the same course of action on the basis that
it served each of their own interests, I agree with Mansbridge; I can see no
good reason not to follow through and take that action. And furthermore, I
agree with her that a good reason for them to do so just is that it is in each
person’s interests. Furthermore, assuming that the interests that drive each
party to agree with the policy are different, the common good that Mansbridge
identifies in this example is analogous to the sort of agreement sought after in
the reasonable overlapping consensus.
While this justification may be understood as primordial, it can, I think, be
further supported by appeal to the concept of public reason. Settling a political
decision on the basis of self-interest in this case would be justified because it
seems likely that reasonable people (who are also necessarily rational) would
agree with doing so. That is, it seems unlikely that, as a matter of fact,
reasonable people would object to taking this decision.
On the other hand, if people’s interests lead to conflict about political
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decisions, Ian Shapiro raises the following problem for Gutmann and Thomp-
son’s insistence that the people continue to publicly deliberate about the issue.
Shapiro (1999, 31) points out that, “People with opposed interests are not al-
ways aware of just how opposed those interests actually are. Deliberation can
bring differences to the surfaces, widening the political divisions rather than
narrowing them.” The crux of Shapiro’s challenge is that, contrary to what
Gutmann and Thompson seem to suppose, public deliberation may not serve
their goal to find an economy of moral disagreement. Instead of showing peo-
ple how their interests converge in ways they did not realize, and closing the
moral gap between their positions in politics, deliberative democratic mecha-
nisms may bring to light more ways that their interests conflict than they were
aware of before deliberations began.
The point I wish to draw from Shapiro’s argument is not that public dis-
course in the political structure should be discouraged for the sake of limiting
disagreement. Rather, Shapiro’s argument is meant to provide a reason for
why citizens may support alternative sorts of institutions to which Gutmann
and Thompson (1996, 12,44–45) object, such as supreme courts. My argu-
ment agrees with Gutmann and Thompson’s general point that supreme courts
should not be seen as the sole site for deliberation in the political structure.
But Shapiro’s point suggests a democratic basis for endowing them with the
task of making some particular sorts of decisions. The people may be satisfied
with this arrangement because they recognize that continued public discourse
is unlikely to bring convergence to people’s positions in politics, at least not
for the foreseeable future. In light of the likelihood that disagreement amongst
the general citizenry will continue, citizens may support the use of other sorts
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of institutions to make decisions about some things, such as allowing a small
group of individuals to decide what laws should imply for people’s freedom
to do certain things. On my view, citizens’ continued support for any kind
of institution (in the sense modelled by wide reflective equilibrium) depends
on the extent to which that institution demonstrates that it is meeting the
standard of public reason.
One sort of self-interested reasoning that my account of political justifica-
tion precludes, however, is that which supports institutions that systematically
exploit certain groups. On my view, reasonable people cannot plausibly claim
to regard others as their moral equals while simultaneously endorsing insti-
tutions and decisions that systematically perpetuate serious harms against
certain social groups. For example, the gross disparities in the morbidity and
mortality rates of Aboriginal peoples in Canada has been traced to injustices
found in the basic structure, including political institutions.(MacKinnon, 2005;
Romanow, 2002) Given that this connection has been established, reasonable
people should accept that the political structure ought to be changed some-
how to address this problem. Insofar as people reject this conclusion, they are
demonstrating unreasonable views regarding Aboriginal peoples.
Of course, this raises the challenge of how decision-makers are to proceed
in practice. A major criticism I have advanced against Gutmann and Thomp-
son’s theory is its inability to provide a way to make a decision in the face of
reasonable disagreement. But it may seem as though my Rawlsian framework
does no better on this score. For, the standard of public reason is unlikely to
yield a singularly determinate outcome in answer to political issues either.
An important difference, however, is that although my theory may result
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in multiple options being justified, the theory also provides a way of evaluating
those options, and brings to light what should be taken into consideration when
deciding which one of the range of options to pursue. In practice, decision-
makers should choose from among the range of options available to them based
upon the likely implications for the satisfaction of reasonable people with the
institutions involved in the decision.
Also, they should bear in mind that any particular decision by an insti-
tution will be just one decision among many, and will be made as part of a
system in which other institutions are making decisions as well. This is espe-
cially important to keep in mind when particular decisions are likely to have
negative implications for a group of reasonable people who have been system-
atically disadvantaged by the institutions involved, and are deeply dissatisfied
with those institutions as a result. Political officials may make unpopular de-
cisions if they believe that the resulting dissatisfaction with the institution is
likely to diminish in future. For example, the dissatisfaction may be offset by
other decisions that it makes. Or the public may come to see the decision as
a good one in time, because it sees that the consequences are not as bad as
they thought they would be, and in fact, brings unanticipated advantages.
Although Thompson holds that decisions should be open to revision, the
question remains of how to settle disagreements that are likely to persist be-
tween, e.g., the theorist and members of the general population. Thompson
may admit that his views about, e.g., representativeness, or the suitability
of other institutions to make the decision about electoral reform, are subject
to the agreement of citizens in deliberative democratic institutions. But this
fails to address the question of who is to have the final say in the matter if
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disagreement continues, which is likely.19
As I have argued, a number of aspects of the OCA did not seem to address
potential objections that reasonable citizens might have had to its design.
My point in this chapter is not that officials must have fully convinced all
reasonable citizens about every aspect of the OCA. My objection is to the
lack of effort demonstrated by the government to address reasonable citizens’
concerns about it. I contend that one of the main shortcomings of the OCA
process was the government’s failure to address Ontarians’ dissatisfaction with
the institutions – e.g., the premier and legislative bodies – who were involved
with making the decisions, or Ontarians’ dissatisfaction with the OCA.
Certainly, the OCA’s decision was publicized as one that took into account
non-members’ views, e.g., the public was told that the decisions were made by
citizens just like them, and were told that electoral reform could have signifi-
cant implications for their concerns. But reasons were not given to address the
scepticism that non-members may have had about these claims, or about the
OCA more generally. In Rawlsian terms, convincing reasons were not provided
to show non-members why they should accept the OCA’s decision, given their
own comprehensive doctrines, and past experiences, or lack thereof, with the
institutions involved.
6.5.2 Public reason and representation
As my Rawlsian framework highlights, so long as citizens are reasonable – i.e.,
they have the two moral powers and are committed to fair terms of social co-
19The way that Thompson’s arguments are presented seems to suggest that he should
have the final say, but that seems contrary to the spirit of his theory.
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operation when deciding questions about political institutions – what matters
for the justification of a decision is the likely effects on their satisfaction with
the institutions involved over time. Regardless of whether Thompson or even
experts of the electoral system agreed with the design and outcome of the
OCA, what ultimately counts for questions of legitimacy and justification is
whether reasonable citizens thought the OCA members were truly “just like
them” in the ways that citizens thought were relevant. Thus, if there is good
reason to think that more than just provincial citizenship might bear on citi-
zens’ views about the legitimacy of the OCA, then this ought to be taken into
account in decisions about the design and implementation of the assembly.
One of Thompson’s reasons for sidestepping the issue of which groups
should be ensured inclusion on the assembly is the thorniness of the ques-
tion: “who is ‘x’ enough to count as a representative?”(Thompson, 2008, 43) I
agree with Thompson that this may be an insurmountable issue for organizers
of the assembly to adequately address. That is, it may well not be possible to
resolve the issue of who should be included in the OCA in a way that fulfils
the ideal of public reason enough to justify making any decision about that
matter. Another way of putting the point is that any decision that may be
made about representativeness would undermine legitimacy so much that this
cannot be offset by other decisions, or with time.
Furthermore, I agree with Thompson that even if it were possible to ade-
quately address the question of who to include, the challenge remains of how
to ensure that members actually have meaningful opportunities to participate
in the process. Although there may be great gains in understanding what af-
fects people’s willingness to voice their opinions in group interactions, how to
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address these challenges fairly is less well worked out. Finally, as Thompson
points out, it is difficult to ensure that so-called representatives participate in
a way that can be considered to represent the interests of the group. Not only
is this a pragmatic problem, but it is a conceptually thorny one, as well.
Many deliberative democratists turn to random selection processes to ad-
dress the problem of representativeness. The process of random selection itself
undisputedly precludes any bias on the part of those making the selections from
contaminating the process. However, what matters is whether reasonable peo-
ple believe that the selection process that is used is fair, according to their
comprehensive doctrines and personal conceptions of justice.
Employing a random selection process may not convince reasonable people
that the selection process was fair, or that they should accept its outcome as
just. One reason it may not is that the random selection process, e.g., a lottery
draw, may be embedded within a larger structure that fails to fulfil reason-
able people’s conceptions of justice. For example, advertising and recruitment
strategies, and remuneration structures, which will affect the pool of people
from whom the final group will be selected, may result in the unfair exclusion
of certain groups. Thus, overall, the process to determine the members of the
assembly may still unfairly discriminate against particular people, even if the
specific mechanism used to select participants, e.g., a lottery draw, precludes
any bias from contaminating that part of the overall process of appointing
members.
If it is not possible (as Thompson himself suggests it may not be) to find
a way to address the issue of representativeness that would satisfy the rea-
sonable people in the society, one must accept that this will be a factor that
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compromises the legitimacy of the institution and its outcome. In Rawlsian
terms, the outcome of the assembly will be less likely to garner support that
approximates a reasonable overlapping consensus, which is necessary to its
legitimacy; and this may affect the legitimacy of any institution proposed on
the basis of the outcome of the OCA.
6.6 The referendum and the constitutional es-
sentials
Another important issue that arose in the process of designing the OCA was
what threshold of support in a referendum should be required for the govern-
ment to change the electoral system. Proponents of deliberative democracy,
as well as electoral reform, argued that a simple majority should be sufficient
to warrant the change. (See §5.3.5) One of the reasons behind this position
seemed to be that when there is disagreement in politics, majoritarianism is
the fairest way to proceed. Additionally, it would be undemocratic to effec-
tively tie the hands of the people from reforming the structures that govern
them.
However, according to the Rawlsian framework I have developed, the le-
gitimacy of majoritarian institutions rests on the same basis as any others.
That is, whether a majoritarian institute is legitimate depends on the degree
of support by a reasonable overlapping consensus. Setting the threshold at a
simple majority may have the support it needs to be legitimate at the time
that the ruling is made, e.g., many reasonable citizens’ conceptions of justice
may support settling for a simple majority. But recall that I have argued for
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the importance of considering whether decisions (are likely to) continue to be
supported by public reason.
There is, I think, good reason to suppose that a prevalence of reasonable
people in wide reflective equilibrium would be satisfied with requiring a super-
majority before changing constitutional-level laws, in general. One reason is
because of the relationship that I have argued exists between the obligatory
force of political institutions and the reasonable overlapping consensus about
the constitutional essentials. To make clear this relationship, I wish to first
present a somewhat commonly held view about the purpose or function of
constitutional laws, which I am rejecting.
As Waldron (1999, 257-260) outlines,20 some hold that constitutional laws
are meant to protect individuals’ equality against violations either by other
individuals, or the state. On this view, the primary value of having a constitu-
tion, and the reason to make it nearly impossible to change, is to ensure that
people’s fundamental rights cannot be easily written out of existence. That is,
the constitutional essentials are meant to define the politico-legal structure in
a way that protects individuals from state-sanctioned persecution.
As I argued in §4.9, on my Rawlsian view, the constitutional essentials do
not, in themselves, bind anyone from violating individuals’ rights. Written
constitutions may make explicit, and perhaps symbolically demonstrate, cer-
tain commitments that “the people”, as a matter of fact, hold, such as beliefs
about the equality of persons regardless of their race, religion, gender, etc. And
they may be seen as defining the roles that people are to have in a democracy,
20Although I am drawing on Waldron’s elucidation of this view, I should make clear that
he does not hold this view.
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which is necessary for it to function well.21 But to the extent that what is
expressed in the constitutional essentials is not accepted by reasonable people
in wide reflective equilibrium, the constitutional essentials have no power over
political institutions. Indeed, political institutions will be precluded from ful-
filing those principles and realizing those values in a way that may be called
“democratic”.
Rather than constraining politico-legal officials from making decisions that
violate these principles, the constitutional essentials are better conceived of
as identifying what must be true of the people in order for officials to make
just decisions. The other function of the constitutional essentials is to define
the mechanisms or processes that will be used to determine what these values
and principles imply for particular political and legal decisions that must be
made. Again, on my view, the obligatory force of these institutions depends
on the degree of support they have from a reasonable overlapping consensus.
That is, the constitutional essentials constrain individuals’ behaviour – i.e.,
the decisions by political and legal officials – only insofar as the constitutional
essentials continue to have the support of the people that approximates a
reasonable overlapping consensus.
We may now return to the question of why one might think that public rea-
son would support requiring a supermajority in a referendum before changing
the constitutional essentials, such as the electoral system. It is not to make it
all but impossible for any individual or the state to violate commitments that
have been standing since some earlier point in time. It is in order to ensure,
21I owe this way of expressing the role that constitutional laws may have to Richard
Vernon.
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first, that there is sufficient support to maintain the authority of the institu-
tions that are defined by the constitutional essentials and their decisions. A
well-constructed referendum may provide a sense of to what extent a change
to the constitutional essentials, e.g., those that define the electoral system,
would garner support that approximates a reasonable overlapping consensus.
Second, requiring a supermajority may enhance the legitimacy of the stand-
ing institutions that are responsible for making and implementing the decision
to change the structure, by making manifest that it is striving to make deci-
sions that meet the standard of public reason. However, the mere fact that a
supermajority supported a change to the constitutional essentials would not
guarantee that it meets the standard of public reason sufficient to enact the
change. For instance, if the outstanding minority consisted in reasonable peo-
ple, and some proportion of the supermajority held unreasonable views about
the minority, then not making the change would also be justified according to
public reason.
The support of a supermajority in a referendum does not in itself ensure
that the resultant institution will have legitimacy. However, it does go some
way towards increasing the likelihood that reasonable people committed to fair
terms of social cooperation will accept the institutions involved from within
their own comprehensive doctrines.
6.7 Conclusion
I have argued that there are good reasons not to rely on deliberative democratic
theories such as Gutmann and Thompson’s as a foundation for strengthening
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democracies. However, my arguments do not preclude any role for them in
efforts to strengthen democracy. But the problems encountered in the OCA
suggest some serious pitfalls that need to be avoided, in both theory and
design. I have argued that my Rawlsian framework of political justification
and legitimacy can provide some guidance in attempts to avoid those pitfalls.
Within the Rawlsian framework that I have developed, citizens’ assem-
blies may prove useful for informing political officials’ decisions in a way that
strengthens their justification. For example, they may provide information to
political officials about which particular courses of action citizens are likely
to find acceptable from within their own comprehensive doctrines. Or they
may affect citizens’ views about the decisions that political officials make in a
way that strengthens the justification of those decisions. However, delibera-
tive democratic mechanisms do not give justificatory weight to any particular
decision directly.
According to my Rawlsian view of political justification, determining whether
a political decision would be or was justified requires knowing what would meet
the standard of public reason. That is, it requires knowing the likely effects on
reasonable citizens’ satisfaction with the political institutions involved. As for
the epistemic question of how to gauge the satisfaction of reasonable people
in a society, I have suggested that this may be determined in practice in a
variety of ways, not just through public discourse in deliberative democratic
mechanisms.
Indeed, public discourse in institutions such as citizens’ assemblies may
lead one astray in accurately assessing this. Although I believe that attention
should be given to people’s expressed preferences, it is important to recognize
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that what people say will vary depending on the context in which they express
their views, e.g., what questions they have been asked, by whom, in what
order, with what audience present, etc. And this must be taken into account
in assessments of their likely reactions to different policy options.
In the case of the OCA, I have argued that there was information that
should have been taken into account by the government in its decisions about
the OCA, because it suggested challenges that would compromise the ability
of the OCA to meet the standard of public reason. For example, reports were
submitted by academics, members of the legislature, and a law commission, all
of which suggested that many citizens were likely to be highly sceptical about
the choice of the mandate for the OCA. And this was further supported in the
views expressed by non-members in public consultation meetings. Thus, this
should have suggested to the government that if undertaking electoral reform
was to strengthen democracy in Ontario, more would need to be done to meet
the standard of public reason.
I also wish to stress the difference between how my Rawlsian account, on
the one hand, and Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, on the other, may ad-
dress the interests of marginalized groups. I have argued that Gutmann and
Thompson’s theory struggles with this issue, since their theory relies on partic-
ipation in public discourse to justify political institutions and their decisions.
Marginalized groups are unlikely to be selected to participate in delibera-
tive democratic institutions, such as citizens’ assemblies. And if people from
marginalized groups are selected, they are likely to continue to be marginalized
within the institution.
My Rawlsian framework highlights that institutions will be unable to ad-
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dress marginalization until what is, on my account, the more basic issue is
addressed: the members of marginalized groups must be recognized by the
general citizenry as having equal moral status, and this must be acknowledged
and reflected in political institutions and their decisions. This is not to deny
that the design and creation of political institutions may go some way to-
wards advancing the equal moral status of citizens. However, the legitimacy
of institutions, and their ability to make just decisions, is constrained by the
reasonableness of the people in society, including political officials.
Another way of modelling what justice requires with respect to marginal-
ized groups is through the concept of the veil of ignorance. If a reasonable per-
son adopted the veil, and imagined that she could be a member of a marginal-
ized group for all she knows about herself, she would have good reason to
choose to have the interests of such groups better represented in politics than
is current practice. However, even if a significant proportion of reasonable peo-
ple agree that the political structure is unjust with respect to certain people in
the society, my framework reflects a further serious challenge for reform efforts:
the burdens of judgement. Even reasonable people are likely to deeply and
persistently disagree about what the state ought to do about any particular
decision.
However, political institutions may still make justified decisions, and main-
tain their legitimacy in the face of reasonable disagreement. They may do so
if they are able to make decisions that are conducive to the satisfaction of the
reasonable people with the institutions involved, over time. After identifying
and weighing different policy options in terms of what they imply for public
reason, institutions will often be left with a range of justifiable options.
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Although some may find the lack of a singularly determinate answer about
how institutions should proceed to be a drawback, I see this as a virtue. It
accurately reflects the extremely complex nature of political decision-making,
and how that will affect the ability to make justified decisions. However, using
the OCA as an example, I have offered ways to address this complexity in
principle. Decision-makers are to do their best to determine what will meet
the standard of public reason.22 To the extent that they get this wrong, the
justification of the decision, and the legitimacy of the institutions involved will
be compromised.
In recent decades, governments have been turning to deliberative demo-
cratic mechanisms for a variety of reasons. In some cases, such as in Ontario,
the express purpose has been to better engage the public in politics, and em-
power more ordinary citizens to have a say in important political decisions.
To that end, the government convened an institution that I have argued was
supported by the principles advanced by Gutmann and Thompson. I have set
out to show that although deliberative democratic institutions such as citi-
zens’ assemblies may serve these aims, the connection to legitimacy is much
less direct than deliberative democratists hold.
I agree with Gutmann and Thompson’s diagnosis that political officials too
often ignore the interests of citizens, and that in some democracies, there are
serious shortcomings in the ability to hold political officials accountable for
this. And I agree with them that democracies may be strengthened when po-
22Also, although I have not argued the point here, this suggests a deep connection between
sources of evidence that political institutions are likely to need to make good decisions, and
reasonable citizens’ perceptions of those institutions. E.g., to the extent that governments’
decisions may need to rely on the findings of academics working in universities, both of these
institutions have good reason to try to maintain citizens’ satisfaction with universities.
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litical structures incorporate the ideal of deliberative democracy into decision-
making. But how to incorporate the ideal of deliberation into politics demo-
cratically ultimately rests on a more fundamental ideal: public reason.
6.8 Summary overview
In my thesis, I have considered two responses to the problems of what it means
for democratic institutions to have legitimacy, and how they may make justified
decisions, given the pluralism of modern liberal democracies. One response
that I examined is Rawls’s constitutionalism; the other was Amy Gutmann and
Dennis Thompson’s deliberative democracy theory. While some view these two
theories as compatible accounts of political justification, I have argued that
there are fundamental differences between these two theories, and tried to
identify the strengths and limitations of each, and draw out the importance of
their differences for practice.
In the first chapter, I introduced the question that I address throughout my
thesis: how is it possible to make justified political decisions in modern liberal
democracies? Although it seems as though governments do so, the pluralism
that characterizes modern liberal democracies raises a question about how
they are to be directed by “the will of the people”, when there is widespread
disagreement among “the people” about what the government ought to do
in politics. To define the scope of my argument, I outlined A.J. Simmons’
framework of justification and legitimacy. This also served to delimit the
assumptions that I could legitimately help myself to throughout my thesis.
My arguments have been based on the assumption that, contrary to Simmons
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and principled anarchists like him, it is possible for democratic institutions to
be legitimate. Subsequent chapters have been meant to lay out how this is
possible, and how political officials may maintain the legitimacy of democratic
institutions.
In the second chapter, I examined a number of objections that Gutmann
and Thompson raise against Rawls’s theory. Many of these objections target
the idealizations that they argue he makes, such as the veil of ignorance,
original position, reasonable overlapping consensus, and public reason. Others
also advance arguments that closely align with the concerns that Gutmann
and Thompson raise, which I considered for the purposes of elucidating the
challenges facing Rawls’s theory.
At the end of Chapter 2, it appeared as though two main challenges un-
dermine Rawls’s theory. First, it seems unable to provide us with determinate
answers about how to make political decisions, since it is based on unrealis-
tic idealizations about consensus among the people, and their reasonableness.
And the second worry was that the idealizations in his theory discourage criti-
cal scrutiny of the basic structures of society, and so make it difficult to identify
how the current political structures could be reformed to make them more just.
In the third chapter, I presented the substantive principles that Gutmann
and Thompson argue ought to justify political decisions, in light of the criti-
cisms they raise against theories such as Rawls’s. These include: that those
in the process be committed to Gutmann and Thompson’s conception of the
principle of reciprocity; that the reasons exchanged in the decision-making
process be moral and respectful; that decision-makers be held accountable for
their decisions by those significantly affected by them; and that the reason-
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giving process result in a decision that is binding at least for some period of
time, although any decision ought to be open to being revisited in the future.
Besides outlining the substantive principles to which Gutmann and Thomp-
son are committed, I presented the structure of their theory. They allow that
the principles they advance may not all or always apply to particular decisions.
However, decisions about which principles should govern a political decision-
making process, and how they ought to do so, must ultimately be justified by
a deliberative process that fulfils their principles, according to Gutmann and
Thompson.
In Chapter 4, I examined two processes that were designed and imple-
mented in a way that largely fulfil the principles of deliberative democracy that
Gutmann and Thompson advance: the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly (OCA),
and the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA), which were to review
their provincial electoral systems. Thompson himself published a defence of
the BCCA, arguing that citizens in a deliberative democratic institution –
viz., a citizens’ assembly – rather than a committee of experts, legislators, or
judges, ought to be given the opportunity to review and potentially recom-
mend changes to the electoral system. Then, this electoral system should be
voted on by the full electorate, in a referendum to be determined by simple
majority.
According to Thompson, this process better fulfils the principles of de-
liberative democracy than do the other aforementioned political institutions.
Thus, according to Thompson, a citizens’ assembly followed by a referendum
provides a better political basis for decisions about the electoral system. After
presenting Thompson’s arguments in support of the BCCA, I argued myself
217
that the OCA not only met the principles that Thompson advances, but served
as a stronger case that illustrates the potential of the theory to ground justified
decisions in politics.
In Chapters 5 and 6, however, I argued that Gutmann and Thompson’s
theory is not adequate as an account of political justification, because their
principles do not, in themselves, provide the ideals at which democratic in-
stitutions should aim. The positive argument I made is that Rawls’s theory
of justification as he advances it in Political Liberalism provides us with the
necessary concepts for determining when political decisions may be justified in
modern liberal democracies. In addition to critically examining the principles
of each theory, in the last two chapters I used the experiences of the OCA to
illustrate the theoretical points that I make.
The conclusion that I have defended here is that, although the OCA was
largely designed and implemented in accordance with the principles that Gut-
mann and Thompson advance, it illustrates that Gutmann and Thompson’s
theory has serious limitations. That is, I used the OCA to show the problems
that arise by neglecting the standard of public reason as the ultimate ground-
ing for political decisions. I concluded that while Gutmann and Thompson’s
theory is not equipped to be a basis of political justification in modern lib-
eral democracies, fulfilling the ideal of deliberative democracy may serve to
strengthen the justification of political decisions and the legitimacy of demo-
cratic institutions. It may do so insofar as is conducive to the satisfaction of
reasonable citizens with the institutions and decisions they are making, over
time. Grounding decisions about how to structure deliberative democratic
institutions within Rawls’s theory allows us to better understand what was
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wrong with decisions that have been heavily criticized about the OCA, e.g.,
who was included in the process and how, and the length of time that was
taken to engage with the public about the decision at hand. Furthermore, my
alternative understanding of the theories is also meant to provide a better way
of determining how similar mistakes may be avoided in the future.
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